This is a blog is related to my academic work in the International Academic Forum on SOGIESC Law but meant to serve anyone who wants to contribute to improve the protection of human rights worldwide. It is intended to keep interested readers informed about legal developments relating to sexual orientation, gender expression and identity and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). Hopefully, it will make it easier to find correct legal information about the developments in all regions of the world and, in particular, with regard to international law.
Executive Summary The 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana were marked by an unprecedented surge in anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric, hate speech, and misinformation. Political leaders and campaigns from both major parties – the then ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) – openly leveraged homophobic messaging as an electoral strategy. … Continue reading
Earlier this month, Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered his Opinion in Shipov, a case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) dealing with the gender recognition rights of a trans woman who lives in Italy but is originally from Bulgaria, where legal gender recognition is generally impossible. Just two years ago, the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation reaffirmed this practice, basing its reasoning on a 2021 Constitutional Court decision that held that “sex” is a binary biological category and determined definitively at birth. Given these recent judgments, the AG opinion – should the ECJ ultimately follow it – could have far-reaching implications for the rights of trans persons in Bulgaria and beyond.
Trans rights before the ECJ
The engagement of the ECJ with the rights of trans persons can be traced back to 1996 and its landmark ruling in P v. S and Cornwall CC. In that case, the Court held that discrimination “arising from the gender reassignment” of a person constitutes discrimination based on sex and is contrary to EU law. Since then, the ECJ has developed a steady line of case law favourable to trans applicants (KB, Richards, MB, Mousse, Deldits), touching on issues ranging from pensions, job dismissals, and (same-sex) marriages to data protection. More recently, however, in Mirin, the Court for the first time confronted a free movement question in a case involving a trans Union citizen.
In Mirin, the Court held that the non-recognition of the change of legal gender of a trans Union citizen across Member States could cause “serious inconvenience” and thereby impede the exercise of EU free movement rights. The pending case of Shipov, however, pushes the boundaries further. Unlike in Mirin, where the applicant had already completed a legal gender recognition procedure in another Member State, the applicant in Shipov has not undergone such a procedure anywhere. Accordingly, the Court is asked to address a novel and particularly sensitive question: whether EU law requires Member States to provide their trans nationals with a means of changing their legal gender to reflect their gender identity – a matter that cuts to the heart of national competence in the field of personal status.
The facts of Shipov
K.M.H., a trans woman of Bulgarian nationality, was born in Bulgaria and registered as male, with a first name, patronymic, and surname corresponding to that gender. After exercising her free movement rights, she moved to Italy, where she lives with her long-term partner. She has begun transitioning and explained that the discrepancy between her female identity and her male documents causes daily problems, particularly in finding work. Thus, she applied to a Bulgarian court for a declaration that she is female, for her name to be amended accordingly, and for that change to be reflected in her birth certificate. Her application was, however, dismissed, as Bulgarian law does not allow amendments to civil status documents “on psychological bases”. After a series of unsuccessful appeals, the case reached the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation, which made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, asking, essentially, whether EU law precludes national legislation that rules out any possibility of amending a trans person’s civil status documents to reflect their lived gender.
The AG Opinion
On 4 September 2025, Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered his Opinion, explaining that the situation falls within the scope of EU free movement law. The applicant had exercised her free movement rights, resides in a Member State other than that of her nationality, and seeks to live, work, and move freely under an identity resulting from the legal recognition of her gender identity in her state of origin, while also securing her family life with her Italian partner (para. 46).
He then considered whether Article 21(1) TFEU (which guarantees free movement of Union citizens), read together with Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38 (which requires Member States to issue or renew an identity card or passport) is breached by Bulgaria’s dismissal of the applicant’s claim. According to the Advocate General, identity documents must reflect an individual’s lived gender identity, rather than only the sex recorded at birth. Names and personal identification numbers should also be updated to ensure consistency. Otherwise, documents that do not correspond to a person’s lived gender create doubts about their authenticity and constitute an obstacle to free movement. This obstacle arises not from conflicting civil status documents (as in Mirin) but from the mandatory indication of the sex recorded at birth in identity documents without the possibility of alignment with the person’s lived gender (paras. 67, 75 and 76).
De la Tour further argued, that a Member State cannot invoke the absence of a national legal gender recognition procedure to deny its nationals identity documents necessary for exercising free movement rights (para. 77). Importantly, in legal systems where the birth certificate remains the reference document throughout a person’s life (as in Bulgaria), an identity card reflecting a person’s lived gender can only be issued once the change is officially registered. In such cases, therefore, in order to prevent obstacles to free movement, there is an obligation to legally recognise the lived gender identity of the person concerned and to record it in the birth certificate so that identity documents can reflect that person’s gender identity (para. 82).
The Advocate General also recalled that, for such obstacles to be justified, national measures must not only pursue a legitimate aim but also comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which needs to be interpreted in line with the ECHR (para. 89). Relying on ECtHR case law, he recalled States’ positive obligation under the ECHR to provide a quick, transparent, and accessible framework for legal gender recognition (para. 90). Therefore, refusal to issue identity documents reflecting a person’s lived gender identity cannot be justified, as that would violate Article 7 of the Charter. Finally, the Advocate General confirmed that conditioning gender recognition and the issuing of corresponding identity documents on gender confirmation surgery is incompatible with EU and ECHR standards (paras. 98-100).
The merits of Shipov
One could argue that Shipov is a relatively straightforward case, as it arises from a specific scenario that calls for a specific solution: in the Member State concerned there is a complete absence of any legal gender recognition procedure, and identity documents can be amended only if the person’s legal gender is first changed in the birth certificate. According to the Advocate General, a trans Union citizen must be able to have her lived gender identity reflected in her identity documents in order to exercise her free movement rights under EU law; if this can only be achieved through the prior amendment of her birth certificate following a legal gender recognition procedure, EU law requires that such a procedure be permitted.
At first glance, this appears to be a far-reaching solution, yet one that the particular circumstances of the case render inevitable. The difficulty, however, is that because this reading of EU law seems to impose on Member States an obligation to allow legal gender recognition within their legal orders, it may be perceived as an unwarranted interference by the EU in a domain (a person’s civil status) that falls within Member State competence. A second reading, however, reveals important nuances in the Advocate General’s Opinion.
Let’s “unpack” the Opinion. According to it, the general rule remains that EU law does not require Member States to provide for legal gender recognition, as, indeed, this is a matter for the Member States to decide; it suffices that identity documents used when exercising free movement reflect the lived gender identity of their nationals. It is only in Member States like Bulgaria – where this is impossible without first amending the birth certificate – that EU law also requires such an amendment, which in practice presupposes the existence of a de jure or de facto legal gender recognition procedure.
Taking the “safe route”
The approach adopted by the Advocate General in Shipov clearly resembles his previous Opinion in the pending case of Cupriak-Trojan and Trojan (analysed here), which concerns the cross-border recognition of same-sex marriages. In Cupriak-Trojan and Trojan, a male same-sex couple who married in Germany sought to have their marriage certificate transcribed in Poland. The Advocate General argued that EU law simply requires Member States to recognise the effects of same-sex marriages contracted abroad. That recognition, however, need not necessarily take the form of recognising the relationship as a marriage, provided it is acknowledged in some legal form. For this, he drew on ECtHR case law, which requires States to introduce a legal framework for the recognition of same-sex relationships (e.g., Oliari and Others v. Italy and Przybyszewska and Others v. Poland) and to afford recognition to same-sex marriages contracted abroad, albeit not necessarily as marriages (Orlandi and Others v. Italy and Formela and Others v. Poland). In the same Opinion, however, the Advocate General added that where the only way to recognise the effects of such a marriage is by transcribing the certificate in the national marriage registry (thus recognising the marriage as a marriage), then EU law requires that outcome.
A similarly qualified approach was also adopted by the same Advocate General in Mirin. There, the Advocate General accepted that EU law requires cross-border recognition of a change in legal gender concluded in another Member State, but only for the purposes of establishing the identity of the person concerned, which is necessary for the exercise of free movement rights.
In Mirin, the facts were relatively straightforward, as cross-border recognition was sought only for identity purposes and not in relation to family ties. As argued elsewhere, this allowed the Court to avoid stating clearly whether it endorsed the Advocate General’s qualified approach or whether it requires the cross-border recognition of the change in legal gender for all legal purposes – something which would clearly have wider implications and entail a deeper intrusion of the EU into family law, an area that also remains within Member State competence.
In Mirin, Cupriak-Trojanand Trojan, and now Shipov, the Advocate General appears to adopt a “safe” route, opting for a compromise. While he safeguards the effective exercise of free movement rights, he does so with the least possible intrusion into national competences, requiring deeper interference only where the specific national framework makes it necessary in order to ensure that Union citizens can in practice exercise those rights.
This “safe route” is also evident in the Advocate General’s choice to ground his reasoning in Strasbourg jurisprudence. By relying on obligations already recognised under the ECHR, he effectively anchors the EU law obligations he proposes in a body of case law that is familiar and binding on all Member States. This allows him to extend protection to LGBT Union citizens whilst minimising the appearance of EU law carving out new, autonomous obligations in areas – such as personal status and family law – that remain highly sensitive and thus jealously guarded by the Member States. In Shipov, even the more far-reaching obligation that is imposed, which effectively requires Member States to permit changes in legal gender in their territory, mirrors the obligations already read as arising under the ECHR. In fact, there have already been two rulings (Y.T. v. Bulgaria and P.H. v. Bulgaria) in which the Strasbourg Court held that Bulgaria breached Article 8 ECHR, because of the legislative absence of a legal gender recognition procedure.
Conclusion
It would not be surprising if the ECJ were to follow the Advocate General’s proposed solution in this case. Even though the case does not concern the cross-border recognition of an existing status – a scenario generally seen as less controversial and less intrusive upon Member State competence – but rather prescribes directly how Member States must exercise their competence in the context of personal status, the fact that Bulgaria has already been found by the ECtHR to be in violation of the ECHR for failing to provide what is required here, will make EU intervention less controversial.
Interesting Article: T Wimark – Decoding Sexual Orientation in Refugee Status Determination: The Influence of Accounts of Emotions on Decision‐Making in Sweden in: International Migration, 2025
The understanding of sexual orientation as the basis for a Particular Social Group under the Refugee Convention is a contentious issue. Conventional thought suggests that sexual orientation (SO) claimants often face unfavourable treatment by …
Queering Democracy examines how LGBTIQ people navigated, participated in, and shaped electoral processes across 60 countries and the European Union during this historic year. From Brazil to Botswana, from the European Union to Indonesia, this comprehensive report reveals both the barriers faced and the victories achieved by sexual and gender minorities in their fight for political inclusion.
Key Findings: Hate as a Campaign Strategy vs. Queer Resilience
LGBTIQ People Made History Despite Barriers
Across the globe, queer candidates broke new ground in political representation. The report documents how LGBTIQ individuals and organizations worked tirelessly to raise political awareness, ensure electoral integrity, and secure their place in democratic processes—even when faced with criminalization, violence, and systemic discrimination.
Hate Became a Campaign Strategy in Elections
In at least 51 of the 61 jurisdictions studied, political candidates weaponized anti-LGBTIQ rhetoric for electoral gain. Politicians demonized “gender ideology,” labeled LGBTIQ people as “foreign agents,” and scapegoated sexual and gender minorities to deflect from policy failures. In some countries, elections devolved into what one observer called “a competition of who was the most homophobic.”
Queer Communities Defended Democracy
When authoritarian movements threatened democratic institutions, LGBTIQ people showed up. From Bangladesh’s July revolution to anti-authoritarian protests in Türkiye, queer communities mobilized not just for their own rights but in solidarity with all marginalized groups—understanding that their fates were intertwined with the health of democracy itself.
What’s Inside the “Queering Democracy” Report?
Building on previous research by Outright International and complementing the GLIDE 2024 Landscape Analysis, this report offers:
Global Overview: Trends and developments in LGBTIQ political participation, and the inclusion of LGBTIQ issues in political campaigning
11 In-Depth Case Studies: Detailed examinations of electoral dynamics in key countries
12 Country Snapshots: Focused analyses of specific electoral contexts
38 Compendium Entries: Comprehensive coverage of all 61 jurisdictions
Concrete Recommendations: Actionable steps for governments, electoral bodies, civil society organizations, and international institutions
Repost: Jeremy Yu: Rainbow in the Dark [Hong Kong]
On 16 July, the Hong Kong government introduced the Registration of Same-sex Partnerships Bill (“Bill”) in the Hong Kong Legislative Council (“LegCo”). This move was mandated by two decisions of Hong Kong’s apex court – Court of Final Appeal (“the Court”) – in a 2023 case (collectively, “STK Decisions”). The Bill only grants same-sex couples who have already registered overseas the right to have their relationships legally recognised through government registration and to deal with each other’s medical and after-death matters. Albeit socially conservative, it was opposed by nearly half of LegCo. Some LegCo Members even suggested responding to the Court by curbing its constitutional review jurisdiction over “important social value issues” and by amending the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“Bill of Rights”), the basis of the STK Decisions, to effectively declare them void for misinterpreting the Bill of Rights. On 10 September, LegCo scheduled to vote on the Bill.
The STK Decisions came as a beam of light at the grim time of Hong Kong’s authoritarian turn. Supporting their enforcement, I argue that, first, doctrinally, both curbing courts’ constitutional review jurisdiction and narrowing the Bill of Rights are unconstitutional propositions. Second, strategically, if the Bill is rejected, despite political pressure, the Court should grant “declaration of partnership at common law” and lay down statutory interpretive principles favouring same-sex partners. My analysis demonstrates judicial strategies for navigating a liberal enclave within the authoritarian regime1) and the correlation between “gender backlash and constitutional degradation”.
The STK decisions
In the STK Decisions, the Court held that the right to private life – protected under art. 14 Bill of Rights – requires the government to introduce a form of legal recognition of same-sex couples. It may or may not be same-sex marriage (para. 115). As to what rights and obligations this recognition entails, the Court largely left it to the government and legislature. Nevertheless, borrowing from ECtHR jurisprudence, it specified that “core rights” are necessary, while “supplementary rights” fall within a wider margin of discretion (paras. 179-188). It ordered the government to legislate accordingly before 27 October 2025, with possible extension given compelling reasons.
Basic Law-Bill of Rights supremacy
The Bill of Rights has constitutional effect based on the Hong Kong Basic Law (“Basic Law”). Conferring Hong Kong high autonomy within China, no restriction to freedom and rights in Hong Kong may contravene the Basic Law (arts. 11, 39(2)), including its art. 39(1) which provides that Hong Kong-applicable ICCPR provisions “shall be implemented” through Hong Kong laws. That implementation is the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, containing the Bill of Rights. It is thus entrenched (para. 15) beyond other laws.
The association of the three instruments means that limiting either courts’ constitutional review jurisdiction or the Bill of Rights is unconstitutional.
First, courts’ constitutional review jurisdiction is constitutionally obligatory (para. 61), because only they could effectuate the Basic Law-Bill of Rights supremacy. Under the Basic Law, where citizens allege Basic Law contraventions, only the judiciary has the jurisdiction2) (arts. 19, 80) and therefore the duty([106(c)]) to adjudicate and the power to interpret the Basic Law (art. 158) to verify the allegations. Thus, restricting or transferring courts’ constitutional review jurisdiction violates art. 19 Basic Law for usurping judicial power (paras. 49-60)3) and art. 11 for undermining its necessary component – timely detection and disapplication of Basic Law infringements.4)
Second, “shall be” in art. 39(1) means local implementation of applicable ICCPR provisions is “necessary” (para. 32). Restricting its “embodiment” (para. 15) in the Bill of Rights is therefore impermissible.5) The same follows from the Chinese text: the mandatory-toned adverbial “通過香港特別行政區的法律予以實施” (literally: “implemented through Hong Kong laws”) applies to “[ICCPR provisions] as applied to Hong Kong” without qualification.
Moreover, the Bill of Rights is not just an ordinary law, but part of the Basic Law which LegCo cannot amend (art. 159). Indeed, the Bill of Rights is “expressly incorporated by [art 39]” (para. 62) and rights in both the Bill of Rights and the Basic Law itself are “fundamental rights […] constitutionally guaranteed” (para. 14), suggesting equal footing.
The STK Decisions and courts in authoritarian Hong Kong
The STK Decisions are not just a victory for LGBTQ+ rights. They also boosted judicial independence amid Hong Kong’s authoritarian turn. This context informs the judicial strategies that follow.
Despite the Basic Law’s constraints on central power, Beijing “self-aggrandised” (p. 55) to impose on Hong Kong a National Security Law in 2020 and a LegCo election overhaul in 2021 – and Hong Kong courts could invalidate neither (para. 37). The reforms seriously affected judicial independence and the political-constitutional constraints on penalising activist courts. First, they demonstrated the authoritarian sovereignty’s absolute power.6) Second, a Beijing-supervised, Hong-Kong-government-staffed National Security Committee now effectively (paras. 39-44) has higher jurisdiction than any Hong Kong court does. Third, post-overhaul election allowed only pro-Beijing candidates.7) Fourth, almost all major opposition parties, which traditionally supported LGBTQ+ rights8) and made court-curbing politically costly9), dissolved, with 45 opposition LegCo contenders jailed under the 2020 Law. Today, LegCo is dominated by pro-Beijing legislators traditionally opposing LGBTQ+ rights.
Against this background, the Court’s bold findings in the STK Decisions and the government’s willingness to comply, however minimally, were breakthroughs for judicial independence and rights protection. As the applicant in the STK Decisions recalled, hearing about them, he “yelled and teared”, grabbing bars of his prison cell – he, too, was among the jailed 45.
Lessons from the past and future judicial strategies
If LegCo rejects the Bill, what could the Court do to ensure the effectiveness of the STK Decisions – thereby maintaining the independence it reclaimed – when facing an omnipotent Beijing, an aggrandised executive, a hostile legislature, and the absence of an opposition movement? Its successful past may be illuminating.
The first lesson was discerning the varying political risks of different cases. LGBTQ+ rights were regarded as an issue in which Beijing had little core interest that warranted intervention, unlike national security. Indeed, it benefited from a legalistic-and-cosmopolitan-looking Hong Kong. Capitalising on this, the Court consistently expanded LGBTQ+ protection, blazing a trail among Asian jurisdictions.10)
Beijing’s position seems unchanged. To date, it has neither clearly opposed the STK Decisions nor the Bill, notwithstanding the former’s unprecedented and radical requirement for systematic change rather than piecemeal relief. This suggests a relatively low risk of Beijing’s retaliation if the Court acts assertively upon the Bill’s defeat.
Second, “focal point” judgments could channel popular support to pressure the authoritarian regime into compliance.
One must start by recognising that nothing compels authoritarians to follow unwelcome judgments. However, Hong Kong’s authoritarians (its executive head, legislature, and Beijing) – all undemocratically elected even pre-202011) – usually did follow. As Eric Ip suggested, this was because, despite having their preferences, if it cost them a large-scale clash with the public, they would concede (until recently). Thus, the effectiveness of an unwelcome judgment depended on whether authoritarians perceived it as enjoying strong enough public support to warrant concession.
Yet, Hong Kong had no genuine democratic institutions for the public to unite their power and put the authorities under pressure. It was the Court that partially stepped in. Its esteem, publicity and majoritarian reputation focused both the public’s and the authoritarians’ attention on its judgments, rendering them “focal points”. Therefore, when a judgment favoured the public over the authorities regarding an issue, it redirected popular expressions of discontent into support for the Court itself, thereby uniting popular voice and thus strengthening its perceived popularity. The same function enabled the authoritarians to efficiently evaluate the strength of popular will and decide, based on their perception of the judgment’s popularity, whether to concede to popular will by respecting the judgment.
While far-outnumbered and likely underestimated, 19.3% was actually impressive. Hong Kong people’s views on LGBTQ+ rights largely align with the pro-Beijing/opposition line.12) Yet, the total liquidation of the opposition camp, the nuisance and harassment inflicted on civil society (even Hong Kong’s largest LGBTQ+ event lost its venue during the consultation), and the written-submission-only requirement all suggested that mainstream political mobilisation for Bill supporters would be absent. Meanwhile, the pro-Beijing political machine remained intact. Accordingly, the support rate could have been much lower, since presumably only the most committed supporters – probably far less than 19.3% of the population – would have participated on their own volition. Against this backdrop, the 19.3% figure in fact demonstrated the Court’s focal point power in coordinating support on its own.
This was reinforced by two features of the Bill’s consultation. First, it was unique, being the only public consultation held on the STK Decisions. Second, it was a low-risk venue for expression, owing to its nature and its “reversed focal point effect” – informing citizens of the government’s attitude. This was crucial given current speech restrictions. It was no coincidence that 20% of supporters (para. 3) echoed the government’s narrative – “government respects rule of law, hence the Bill” – without citing rights protection.
Learning from this, if LegCo rejects the Bill, follow-up reliefs should amplify their popularity by providing unique and low–risk venues and loci for coordinating liberal expression. This and other incentives (e.g., economy and pink-washing)13) may be just enough to dissuade the authoritarian government from potentially disregarding the reliefs and its continuing duty to legislate.
Third, as Dixon and Yap argue, “responsive judicial remedy”14), such as suspended declarations, has helped the Court avoid backlash and promote dialogue while maintaining normative demands and the “democratic minimum core”, since such remedies carry fewer “stings” (e.g. less immediacy, more discretion).
The reliefs could and should be granted by the court
First, for legal recognition, the Court could direct lower courts to grant a “declaration of partnership at common law” for same-sex partners.
To buffer opposition, this remedy resorts to a pre-existing jurisdiction. In NF v R, only one party in a lesbian couple was registered as a “parent” to an infant born to the them via RIVF. The other party applied for recognition as a parent under statutory law. Constrained by statutory language, the judge declined. However, finding the result absurd and discriminatory, the judge declared her “a parent of [the infant] at common law” (para. 161).
The remedy demonstrates both firmness and efficacy, since judicial recognition – in lieu of statutory recognition – confers legitimacy and dispels a sense of inferiority (para. 142), as the Court promised same-sex couples.
Second, for related rights and obligations, the Court may lay down a statutory interpretive rule that, as far as possible (para. 42), all laws applying to married couples should be read as applying to holders of the above declaration.
This avoids confrontation with LegCo. It merely reflects the established principle of constitution-consistent statutory interpretation, whose specific effects remain indeterminate until stated by policy or judgment, and which may be overriden by unambiguous legislative intent. Yet, this interpretation is broad and immediately effective.
Moreover, its three implicit “strengths” could keep LegCo engaged. First, provisions clearly displacing the proposed interpretive rule would likely invite constitutional challenge. Second, abolishing this rule is unconstitutional, as it flows from the constitution’s supremacy. Third, LegCo may not want to abolish this rule or the underlying principle, since both help reduce declarations of unconstitutionality by enabling courts to adopt strained or remedial interpretations instead.
LegCo would then face two choices: either amend each individual statute to exclude same-sex couples – a prohibitively cumbersome task that would ultimately leave same-sex couples with wider protections than the Bill – or reconsider the narrower Bill. Either way, same-sex partners obtain statutory protection, and the Court’s authority is reinforced.
Finally, given Bejing’s nonchalance, both remedies may function as standing focal points, reinforcing their resilience. The government’s stalling of legislating for the STK Decisions suggests that interested parties will focus their attention uniquely on litigating the details of the two remedies, thereby forming a specific, structured and low-risk venue (courtroom) where government and public could continuously exchange views. This is a pivotal function which authoritarians may not lightly discard (p. 353). Moreover, as same-sex couples keep invoking the two remedies – that is, application or clarification – the cumulative effect signals their and their allies’ strong commitment, deterring government from repealing the remedies.
Since the passage of the 2020 National Security Law, Hong Kong has witnessed a general deterioration in fundamental rights protections. Its performance on constraining government power and fundamental rights now ranks near the bottom of its income group. Today, even peaceful criticism may face up to a 10-year imprisonment if it is deemed, inter alia, to sow hatred, contempt or disaffection against the government (Division 4).
But it is in this tightened environment that, more than ever, the people of Hong Kong count on the judiciary to step up. The follow-up to the STK Decisions is both a strategic opportunity and moral obligation for the courts. While in national security cases judges may feel powerless amid Beijing’s wrath15), the foregoing arguments show that they may still make a difference by leveraging the preferences and moves of other actors’ to amplify the efficacy of their decisions.16)
I am indebted to Professors Cora Chan and Stefano Osella for their substantive and instructive help. All errors are mine.
References[+]
References
↑1
Cora Chan, ‘Pluralizing Constitutionalism’ in Madhav Khosla and Vicki C Jackson (eds), Redefining Comparative Constitutional Law: Essays for Mark Tushnet (Oxford University Press 2025).
↑2
Johannes Chan and C.L. Lim, ‘Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible Restrictions’ in Johannes Chan and C.L. Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2022), para 17.016.
↑3
Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1970] HKLR 231.
↑4
Eric C Ip, ‘Logical Foundations of Judicial Review of Legislation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ (2020) 50 Hong Kong Law Journal 19, 22-26; Johannes Chan and C.L. Lim (n 2), para 17.017.
↑5
Dinusha Panditaratne and Rehan Abeyratne, ‘Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR’ in Johannes Chan and C.L. Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2022), paras 16.059-16.060, 16.121.
↑6
Cora Chan, ‘From Legal Pluralism to Dual State: Evolution of the Relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong Legal Orders’ (2022) 16 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 99.
↑7
Eric Chan, ‘The Legislative Council of Hong Kong’ in Po Jen Yap and Rehan Abeyratne (eds), Routledge Handbook of Asian Parliaments (Routledge 2023) 159-163.
↑8
See e.g. Amy Barrow, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Equality in Hong Kong: Rights, Resistance, and Possibilities for Reform’ (2020) 15 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 126, 133.
↑9
Eric C Ip, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Politics of Constitutional Review in Chinese Special Administrative Regions (Cambridge University Press 2019) 106, 190-191.
↑10
Julius Yam, ‘Approaching the Legitimacy Paradox in Hong Kong: Lessons for Hybrid Regime Courts’ (2021) 46 Law & Social Inquiry 153, 167-168; Rehan Abeyratne, Courts and LGBTQ+ Rights in an Age of Judicial Retrenchment (Oxford University Press 2025).
↑11
Albert H Y Chen and Po Jen Yap, The Constitutional System of the Hong Kong SAR: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2023), 96-100.
↑12
Tien Ee Dominic Yeo and Tsz Hang Chu, ‘Beyond Homonegativity: Understanding Hong Kong People’s Attitudes About Social Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian People, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, and Same-Sex Marriage’ (2018) 65 Journal of Homosexuality 1372.
↑13
Rehan Abeyratne (n 10) 228-230.
↑14
Rosalind Dixon, Responsive Judicial Review: Democracy and Dysfunction in the Modern Age (Oxford University Press 2023).
↑15
‘Hong Kong’s Courtroom Dramas’ The Economist (London, 23 August 2025) 51.
↑16
Lee Epstein and Keren Weinshall, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2021) 8-9.
United Kingdom – Meaning of ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010: The judgment of the Supreme Court in For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16
Italy: The Supreme Court has ruled that maintenance allowance may be granted even after the dissolution of a civil partnership
Unioni Civili, sì al mantenimento come per il divorzio, sentenza storica della Cassazione
Una sentenza storica perché spinge l’istituto dell’unione civile verso una parificazione sostanziale con il matrimonio per quanto riguarda gli effetti patrimoniali della sua fine.
Guyana may be about to become the final country on the South American continent to decriminalise homosexuality after the country’s ruling party was returned to power with a promise to repeal the law.
President Mohamed Irfaan Ali and his People’s Progressive Party/Civic won Guyana’s general election on September 1, claiming three additional seats compared to its 2020 election result.
International and Comparative SOGIESC Law - Professor Andreas R Ziegler 