ILO’s Work on Inclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons in the world of work
Source: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—gender/documents/publication/wcms_846108.pdf
Repost: Giulio Fedele – Strasbourg’s Coming Out
Coming out is a deeply personal and sensitive process that can be incredibly challenging. Everyone needs their own time and space to determine when and how they choose to share their journey of acceptance and disclosure. Admittedly, the European Court of Human Rights chose a very apt moment in selecting the first day of Pride Month to make its own.
On June 1st, in Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, the Court determined for the first time in clear terms that the general absence of legal recognition for same-sex couples is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This marks a significant addition to the Court’s case-law concerning the rights of same-sex couples with implications for future litigation on this subject.
Article 14 has been in the closet for quite some time, as the Court has constantly denied and downplayed its significance regarding the rights of same-sex couples. In numerous cases involving gay rights, the Court often chose to omit a distinct examination of potential discrimination under Article 14, instead prioritizing the assessment of the substantive provision violation in isolation.
In the case of Dudgeon v. UK, for instance, the Court restricted its examination to determining whether a national law that criminalized consensual sexual relations between men infringed upon the right to respect for private life, without delving into an analysis of its discriminatory nature (paras. 64-70).
Likewise, when addressing the issue of legal recognition for same-sex couples, the Court held that States had an obligation to provide some form of legal recognition according to Art. 8. This obligation stemmed from the fact that the absence of legal recognition prevented same-sex couples from enjoying various social benefits and civil rights, thereby impacting their right to private and family life. However, the Court declined to examine the applicants’ additional complaints that the absence of such recognition amounted to discrimination (see Oliari v. Italy, 2015; Orlandi v. Italy, 2017; Fedotova v. Russia [GC], 2023, see here and here for some comments; Buhuceanu v. Romania, 2023).
This practice stems from the Court’s tendency to consider a separate violation of Article 14 only when it is firmly convinced that discrimination is a “fundamental aspect of the case” under consideration (Airey v. Ireland, 1979, para. 30).
The Court remained steadfast in this approach, even when it was evident that the respondent State possessed clear discriminatory intent in denying same-sex couples any form of legal recognition. As noted by partly dissenting judges Pavli and Motoc in the case of Fedotova v. Russia [GC], sexual orientation “was the sole basis for denying [same-sex couples] any form of legal recognition or protection of their bond as couples in committed relationships” (para. 4 of the partly dissenting opinion). Indeed, it was clear that that the Russian State exhibited bias against same-sex couples, as it relied on the prevailing negative perception among the majority of the Russian population towards same-sex unions to justify the complete absence of recognition (Fedotova v. Russia, para. 118). This was even more clear in the case of Buhuceanu v. Romania, where the respondent State deemed it appropriate to emphasize that the majority of Romanians disagreed with the idea that “gay, lesbian, and bisexual people should have the same rights as heterosexual people” (para. 50). They asserted that this disagreement constituted a “pressing social need” that could outweigh the need of recognition of same-sex couples (ibid.).
In Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, the Court reconsidered its position and finally accepted (as scholars long suggested) that Art. 14 speaks to the denial of legal recognition to same-sex relationships. The Court emphasized that while unmarried different-sex couples had the option to choose between marriage or maintaining a de facto family union, same-sex couples were “denied any such choice” (para. 68). Consequently, the Court maintained, similarly to its approach in Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy (2016, see para. 83), that it would be artificial to solely compare the situation of same-sex couples with unmarried different-sex couples. Unlike different-sex couples who opt not to marry for personal reasons but can still receive some legal recognition and protection in Ukraine due to their de facto family status, the applicants in this case had no access to marriage nor any alternative form of legal recognition. As a result, same-sex couples were subject to differential treatment due to the absence of legal recognition and protection. Given that the Ukrainian State failed to provide sufficient justification for this disparity, the Court concluded that Article 14 had been violated.
As is often the case with coming out, the European Court experienced some personal confusion and uncertainty during the process. Notably, just one week prior to the Maymulakhin and Markiv case, the Court had dealt with a similar issue in Buhuceanu v. Romania (May 23rd), where several same-sex couples lodged complaints regarding their inability to marry or form legally recognized partnerships. Confusingly, the Court approached these two cases in entirely different ways. In Buhuceanu, the Court focused solely on the practical dimension of legal recognition, namely the rights and benefits associated with it. It approached the complaint under the perspective of Article 8, rejecting a separate examination of Article 14. As I argue elsewhere, arguments grounded on equality considerations seemed to disappear entirely from the decision.
In Maymulakhin and Markiv, however, the Court adopted a completely different approach. It emphasized the “intrinsic value” of recognition as a symbol of inclusion and equality of same-sex couples, affirming in para. 64 that “allowing same-sex couples to be granted legal recognition and protection undeniably serves [the Convention’s] ideals and values in that recognition and protection of that kind confers legitimacy on [same-sex] couples and promotes their inclusion in society, regardless of sexual orientation. A democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation, being built on the equal dignity of individuals and sustained by diversity”. Furthermore, the Court noted that the core of the applicants’ grievance was “to be treated with equal dignity” and that “the State would confer a sense of legitimacy on their relationship by legally recognising its existence and by ensuring its adequate protection” (para. 77).
Both judgments evince different underlying logics, with one emphasizing the practical dimension of legal recognition in terms of rights and benefits (Article 8 analysis), and the other highlighting its symbolic value in terms of equality (Article 14 and Article 8 analysis). It might also be that the different outcomes hinged on the formulation of the complaint. Thus, the applicants in Maymulakhin and Markiv chose to directly invoke Article 14 in conjunction with Art. 8, rather than Article 8 alone, which was the case in Buhuceanu.
Adding further nuance, the composition of the Court differed between Maymulakhin (Fifth Section) and Buhuceanu (Fourth Section), with no overlap amongst the judges hearing each case. The apparent implicit inconsistency may eventually find its way to the Grand Chamber, especially considering that the latest GC judgment on same-sex couples and legal recognition, Fedotova v. Russia, employed arguments grounded in equality considerations but ultimately denied a separate examination of Article 14 (on this point see more extensively para. 5 of the partly dissenting opinion of judges Pavli and Motoc).
If the opportunity presents itself, the Grand Chamber should re-evaluate this stance. An equality-based approach to legal recognition is preferable to analysis based on Article 8 because it can address the broader societal implications and consequences of denying legal recognition to certain individuals or groups. For one, it acknowledges the fundamental importance of treating all individuals equally and ensuring that they have access to the same rights and benefits, regardless of their characteristics. At the same time, it recognizes that the impact of legal recognition extends beyond the immediate practical dimension and contributes to the advancement of the values underlying the ECHR, such as democracy, social justice and inclusion. Moreover, an equality approach serves a practical purpose, since Article 14 allows a comparative assessment between different-sex couples and same-sex couples in deciding the exact content of protection that should be granted with legal recognition.
In this regards, Judges Pavli and Motoc aptly noted in Fedotova v. Russia (para. 5 of the partly dissenting opinion) that:
“[…] laws have a moral dimension and they help shape a society’s moral views. They tell their beneficiaries that they are not invisible, that they are seen and valued as equal members of that society, irrespective of their differences. Conversely, national legal regimes that discriminate on impermissible grounds do the contrary: they tend to reinforce prejudice and social segregation, causing harm that goes above and beyond the violation of particular individuals’ Article 8 rights. There is, therefore, great inherent value in a Court judgment that confirms the “equal enjoyment of rights” is imperative.”
Within the LGBT community, there is a light-hearted saying that when somebody comes out, it seems like everyone else follows suit. In Proust’s “À la recherche du temps perdu” the protagonist’s discovery of the first homosexual character occurs in the fourth book, “Sodome et Gomorrhe”. Afterward, it seems that a multitude of characters within the story engage in various homosexual relationships or encounters.
One may wonder if, after this judgment, other Convention rights will eventually “come out”. Specifically, one may consider the implications of this judgment for Article 12, which guarantees the right to marry. Historically, the Court has consistently maintained that restrictions on the right to marry cannot be examined in light of Article 14 (from Schalk and Kopf v. Austria onwards, more explicitly in Oliari v. Italy, para. 193). However, it is plausible that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage constitutes an excessive restriction of a Convention right based on sexual orientation.
Some of the arguments presented by the Court in the Maymulakhin and Markiv case may hold relevance for future assessments of complaints under Article 12. This is particularly evident upon examination of the Court’s dismissal of the States’ justification for the protection of the traditional family, which is often invoked as a valid reason to oppose same-sex marriage. The Court affirmed that the recognition of same-sex couples does not impede different-sex couples from marrying or establishing a family based on their own understanding of the term (para. 77). Furthermore, the Court emphasized that securing rights for same-sex couples does not inherently weaken the rights of others or other couples (ibid.). These considerations may have implications for future evaluations of complaints related to Article 12.
Ukraine: Draft law on same-sex civil unions
The Ukrainian MP Andrii Kozhemiakin is a wiry, conservative ex-spy who likes to emphasise his Christian faith and large family. He is also an unlikely new recruit in the fight for LGBT rights in Ukraine.
A draft civil union law that would give same-sex partnerships legal status for the first time was introduced this year to Ukraine’s parliament, which is still functioning despite the war.
Kozhemiakin’s committee was the first to debate it and the team behind the legislation were bracing for defeat; they had even prepared a statement. He started with a script they recognised, talking about his Soviet-era KGB training, his religious beliefs and his “personal opinion about LGBT people”.
And then he announced his wholehearted support for the legislation, referencing Vladimir Putin’s homophobic claim that there are no gay Russians.
“Anything that our enemy hates … I will support,” Kozhemiakin said. “If it will never exist in Russia, it should exist and be supported here, to show them and signal to them that we are different. This law is like a smile towards Europe and a middle finger to Russia. So I support it.” …
More: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/05/war-brings-urgency-to-fight-for-lgbt-rights-in-ukraine
Repost: Inter* Personen im menschenrechtlichen Warteraum (Tessa Grosz)
Quelle: https://verfassungsblog.de/inter-personen-im-menschenrechtlichen-warteraum/
Bei Fällen aus dem LGBTIQ*-Themenkreis vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) lässt sich ein gewisses Muster erkennen: In dem jeweils ersten Beschwerdefall (sei es das Adoptionsrecht für homosexuelle Personen, sei es die Frage der Anerkennung der Geschlechtsidentität von trans* Personen), erkennt der EGMR zunächst keine Verletzung eines Konventionsrechts an. Häufig erklärt er aber auch, dass diese Einschätzung sich ändern kann. So könnte es auch bei der Frage des Personenstatus von inter* Personen kommen.
Zu dieser Frage hatte der EGMR jetzt zum ersten Mal Gelegenheit sich zu äußern: Die beschwerdeführende Person Y wurde 1951 in Straßburg geboren. Die Geburtsurkunde deklarierte die Person als männlich, Y deklariert sich als inter*. Die französischen Gerichte lehnen eine Änderung von „männlich“ auf „neutral“ oder „intersex“ ab. Y sieht sich im Recht auf Privatleben verletzt und legte Beschwerde beim EGMR ein. Der Gerichtshof sieht darin zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt keine Verletzung von Art 8 EMRK. Auch dieses Urteil weist darauf hin, dass zukünftige Fälle anders ausfallen könnten. Positiv zu beurteilen ist auch dass das Leid der beschwerdeführenden Person ausdrücklich anerkannt wird.
Y ist seit Geburt an inter*, der Prozess der Geschlechtsdifferenzierung hat sich in utero nie vollzogen. Weder Hoden, noch Eierstöcke haben sich geformt, daher hat Y auch nie Geschlechtshormone produziert. Daran änderte auch die Pubertät nichts: Mit 21 Jahren hat Y ein unbestreitbar androgynes Aussehen. Aufgrund einer Osteoporose wurden Y im späteren Leben männliche Hormone verschrieben. Diese verändern sein androgynes Aussehen kaum, führt allerdings zu Bartwuchs und einer tieferen Stimme. Auch mit 63 Jahren behält Y seine inter* Identität, die sich neben dem biologischen Aspekt auch durch eine „psychologische Intersexualität“ und eine „soziale Intersexualität“ bemerkbar macht (Rz 10). Am 12. Jänner 2015 beantragt Y beim Gericht erster Instanz (Tribunal de Grande Instance), die Geschlechtsbezeichnung von „männlich“ auf „neutral“ (oder „intersex“) zu ändern. Das Gericht gab am 20. August 2015 dem Antrag statt: Weder die Medizin noch das Umfeld von Y noch Y selber sehe Y als männlich (oder weiblich). Derlei Fälle seien so selten, dass sie auf „keine rechtlichen Hindernisse im Zusammenhang mit der öffentlichen Ordnung stoßen“ (Rz 14, Übersetzung durch die Autorin).
Das Berufungsgericht (Cour d’Appel) sah dies anders und hob das Urteil mit 22. März 2016 auf. Es begründete seine Entscheidung damit, dass Y ein männliches Aussehen hat, verheiratet ist und ein Kind adoptiert hat. Auch das Kassationsgericht (Cour de Cassation) wies die gegen die Berufungsentscheidung eingelegte Beschwerde zurück. Es wies darauf hin, dass „die französische Rechtsordnung die Eintragung eines anderen als des männlichen oder weiblichen Geschlechts in den Personenstandsregistern nicht zulässt“ (Rz 16, Übersetzung durch die Autorin). Art 8 EMRK sei nicht verletzt, da „die Zweigeschlechtlichkeit des Geschlechtseintrags in den Personenstandsurkunden ein legitimes Ziel verfolgt, welches für die soziale und rechtliche Organisation notwendig ist, deren grundlegendes Element sie ist“ (Rz 16, Übersetzung durch die Autorin). Die Einführung eines neutralen Geschlechts hätte tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf die französische Rechtsordnung. Die Gewährung eines solchen neutralen Geschlechtseintrags sei daher unverhältnismäßig.
Dagegen erhob Y Beschwerde an den EGMR. Nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofs handelt es sich bei der behaupteten Verletzung von Art 8 EMRK aber nicht um eine Frage der Selbstbestimmung im Zusammenhang mit der Geschlechtsidentität: Viel mehr gehe es darum, welche Folgen sich aus Art 8 EMRK ergeben, wenn eine inter* Person, die biologisch weder männlich noch weiblich ist, dem männlichen oder weiblichen Geschlecht zugewiesen wird (Rz 44). Nach dieser Formulierung etwas überraschend erklärt der EGMR daraufhin, dass der Fall im Lichte der positiven Verpflichtungen des Staates untersucht werden muss. Die eingrenzende Formulierung hätte dem EGMR allerdings ermöglichen müssen zu konstatieren, dass es sich bei der Falschzuschreibung in der Geburtsurkunde von Y um einen staatlichen Eingriff handelt. Der Gerichtshof kommt jedoch zu dem Entschluss, dass es sich um eine Beschwerde gegen eine Lücke im französischen Recht handle, welche die beschwerdeführende Person in ihrem Privatleben beeinträchtigt, und nicht um eine Beschwerde gegen einen staatlichen Akt (Rz 69).
In seiner Prüfung stellt der EGMR auf zwei Aspekte ab: Zum einen die allgemeinen Grundsätze zur Beurteilung positiver Verpflichtungen eines Staates, wie die Frage, ob es einen europäischen Konsens zur Frage der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit von inter* Personen gibt. Zum anderen, ob zwischen dem Interesse der Allgemeinheit und jenem der Einzelperson angemessen abgewogen wurde.
Zum Fall selbst stellt der EGMR zunächst fest, dass die Geschlechtsidentität einer Person einen wesentlichen Aspekt der Intimsphäre darstellt. Mit Verweis auf A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France erinnert der Gerichtshof daran, dass „der Begriff der persönlichen Autonomie einen wesentlichen Grundsatz widerspiegelt, der der Auslegung der Garantien des Art 8 EMRK zugrunde liegt“ (Rz 75). Das Recht auf Geschlechtsidentität und persönliche Entfaltung ist somit ein grundlegender Aspekt des Rechts auf Privatsphäre. Dieser Umstand verringert den Ermessensspielraum des Staates. Demgegenüber hebt der Gerichtshof allerdings hervor, dass die Fragen, die in dieser Beschwerde aufgeworfen werden, in den Vertragsstaaten noch – zum Teil „kontrovers“ (Rz 77) – diskutiert werden und sich in demokratischen Staaten durchaus sehr divergente Meinungen dazu halten. Während der Gerichtshof zwar durchaus bekräftigt, dass die Frage der Anerkennung von Geschlecht außerhalb der Binarität in einigen Länder diskutiert wird und in einigen Vertragsstaaten schon akzeptiert ist, reiche es dennoch nicht für einen europäischen Konsens. Der Gerichtshof begibt sich hier in Widerspruch zu seiner eigenen Argumentation in Goodwin v UK, wo er einen „emerging consensus“ (Rz 84) unter dem Vertragsstaaten bereits als ausreichend eingestuft und insbesondere auch auf den internationalen Trend abgestellt hat. Entwicklungen außerhalb der Konvention, etwa in Australien, Indien oder Nepal, werden im Fall Y vom EGMR gar nicht berücksichtigt.
Im Anschluss setzt sich der EGMR mit der Interessenabwägung auseinander. Der Gerichtshof stellt außer Zweifel, dass es sich bei Y um eine inter* Person handelt. Es ist außerdem nicht zu bezweifeln, dass die Diskrepanz zwischen dem tatsächlichen biologischen Geschlecht von Y und der rechtlichen Identität dazu geeignet ist, Leid und Angstzustände hervorzurufen. Der Gerichtshof hebt in diesem Zusammenhang die Ausführungen des*der Psychotherapeuten*in von Y hervor, in denen auf die andauernde „Identitätsverletzung“ hingewiesen wird, die dadurch entsteht, vorgeben zu müssen „Mann zu sein“, obwohl man einem „dritten Geschlecht“ angehört. Entschieden stellt sich der EGMR auch gegen die Beurteilung des Berufungsgerichts, wonach das vermeintlich männliche Aussehen (v.a. bedingt durch die Osteoporose-Medikamente) Vorrang vor der inter* Realität von Y haben sollte. Nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofs ist allerdings auch das öffentliche Interesse Frankreichs besonders zu berücksichtigen. Die Anerkennung eines neutralen Geschlechts hätte weitreichende Auswirkungen auf die französische Rechtsordnung (Familien-, Abstammungs- und Fortpflanzungsrecht sowie die Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern), wie es auch das Kassationsgericht angemerkt hat. Die subsidiäre Rolle des Konventionsmechanismus wird ebenfalls in Erinnerung gerufen. Die Einführung eines weiteren rechtlichen Geschlechts sollte durch die Gesetzgebung, nicht durch die Gerichte, erfolgen.
In Anbetracht der Gesamtsituation, des Fehlens eines europäischen Konsenses und des weiten Ermessungsspielraums der Vertragsstaaten müsse es jedoch dem beklagten Staat überlassen bleiben, zu bestimmen, wie schnell und in welchem Umfang den Forderungen von inter* Personen entsprochen werden kann. Der Gerichtshof erinnert abermals, dass es sich bei der Konvention um ein lebendiges Instrument handelt, das im Lichte der aktuellen Umstände gelesen werden muss. Zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt sieht der EGMR allerdings keine Verletzung der aus Art 8 EMRK erwachsenden Gewährleistungspflichten Frankreichs.
In ihrer abweichenden Meinung stellt Richterin Šimáčková fest, dass es zwar bisher keinen europäischen Konsens zur Frage der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit von inter* Personen gibt und internationale Gerichtshöfe mit Blick auf die innerstaatliche Gewaltentrennung zur Zurückhaltung verpflichtet sind. In diesem Fall könne man aber von der konkreten Situation der Person und ihre Lebensumstände nicht abstrahieren. Richterin Šimáčková fasst die Situation von Y folgendermaßen zusammen: „Du bist zwar weder als Mann noch als Frau geboren worden, aber das Gesetz erlaubt das nicht. Deshalb musst du deinen Körper (auch wenn du darunter leidest) und deine Seele (auch wenn du dich gedemütigt fühlst) anpassen, um den vom Staat verabschiedeten Gesetzen zu entsprechen. Ich finde diese Eingriffe so schwerwiegend, dass sie meiner Meinung nach das Recht der beschwerdeführenden Person auf Achtung seines Privatlebens verletzen“ (Rz 1, Übersetzung durch die Autorin). Die Richterin formuliert diesen Fall im Rahmen negativer Verpflichtungen, die sich aus Art 8 EMRK ergeben. Es geht nicht darum, dass Frankreich aktiv Schritte setzt, um die Rechte von Y zu gewähren (positive Verpflichtungen), sondern, dass Frankreich die Pflicht hat, eine Handlung zu unterlassen – hier eine falsche Eintragung in der Geburtsurkunde – die in ungerechtfertigter Weise in die Rechte von Y eingreift. Die Geschlechtsneutralität anzuerkennen muss in diesem Fall als Pflicht angesehen werden, sich nicht in das Privatleben der betroffenen Person einzumischen. Tatsächlich hätte die Formulierung und Eingrenzung der zu untersuchenden Frage durch den EGMR genau eine solche Auslegung nahegelegt. Gerade, weil er die zu untersuchende Frage so formuliert, dass es um Folgen einer Falschzuschreibung in der Geburtsurkunde geht, hätte eine konsequente Auslegung geboten, eine Verletzung der negativen Verpflichtungen resultierend aus Art 8 EMRK anzuerkennen.
Im ersten Fall vor dem EGMR, in dem es um die rechtliche Anerkennung der Geschlechtsidentität eines trans* Mannes ging, wurde im Oktober 1986 mit zwölf zu drei Stimmen gegen eine Verletzung von Art 8 EMRK entschieden. Es dauert bis Juli 2002 (und mehrere Fälle dazwischen) bis der Gerichtshof in Goodwin v UK seine Haltung änderte und die Weigerung, die Geschlechtsidentität anzuerkennen, als Verletzung des Rechts auf Achtung des Privatlebens anerkannte. Legt der Gerichtshof im Fall von inter* Personen ein ähnliches Tempo an den Tag, so dürften diese wohl frühestens im Jahr 2039 mit entsprechendem menschenrechtlichem Schutz rechnen. Bei den Fällen von trans* Personen handelte es sich allerdings um die Anerkennung innerhalb eines binären Geschlechtersystems. Die Kategorien waren da, nur der verwaltungsrechtliche Weg zur Änderung war nicht etabliert. Im vorliegenden Fall geht es dagegen – wie auch in den vor wenigen Jahren vom deutschen BVerfG und dem österreichischen VfGH entschiedenen Fällen – um die Schaffung einer neuen bzw. dritten rechtlichen Kategorie. In diesem Kontext spielt wohl auch die vorherrschende, als Standard empfundene Heteronormativität eine Rolle. Die Frage ist: Wie lange müssen inter* Personen im menschrechtlichen Warteraum ausharren?
UK Metropolitan Police commissioner apologizes for treatment of LGBTQ+ community
In a letter addressed to LGBTQ+ campaigner Peter Tatchell, the Metropolitan Police (Met) Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley became the first UK police chief to apologize on Wednesday for the force’s homophobic failings.
Rowely accepted that the Met “had systems and processes in place which have led to bias and discrimination in the law we have policed London’s communities, and in the way we have treated our officers and staff, over many decades.” A recent public survey showed that between 2015-16 and 2021-22, the general trust of the police by LGBTQ+ respondents fell by 20 percent, as compared to a fall of 12 percent by those who do not identify as LGBTQ+.
“Recent cases of appalling behaviour by some officers have revealed that there are still…homophobes and transphobes in the organisation, and we have already doubled down on rooting out those who corrupt and abuse their position,” Rowley continued. “I am clear that there is much for us to do. I am sorry to all of the communities we have let down for the failings of the past.”
Rowley’s statements come only a few months after a March review, conducted by Baroness Louise Casey, which found that the Met was institutionally racist, sexist and homophobic. The review also found that there were widespread cases of bullying towards LGBTQ+ staff and officers within the Met. 35 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents in the review reported experiencing bullying at least once or twice a week.
As part of his #ApologiseNow campaign, Tatchell called on all UK police services to apologize for their historic ill-treatment, persecution and “decades-long victimisation” of the LGBTQ+ community. Tatchell described Wednesday’s apology as “a ground-breaking step forward…draw[ing] a line under past Met prosecution.”
The post UK Metropolitan Police commissioner apologizes for treatment of LGBTQ+ community appeared first on JURIST – News.
Swiss Federal Supreme Court: Deletion of gender indication according to German law -.
No recognition in Switzerland – Judgment of June 8, 2023 (5A_391/2021)
The deletion of the indication of gender obtained in Germany by a person of Swiss nationality is not recognized in Switzerland and cannot be entered in the Swiss register of civil status. Swiss civil status register. According to the clear will of the legislator, the binary legal gender order (man/woman) continues to apply for the time being (man/woman) and the renunciation of a gender entry is inadmissible. The Federal Court is not authorized to deviate from this due to the separation of powers. A person of Swiss nationality living in Germany declared in Berlin in 2019, based on German law, the deletion of the gender entry. The competent Registry Office certified the declaration. The person subsequently applied in Switzerland for recognition of the deletion of the gender entry made in Germany. The Department of Economic Affairs and the Interior of the Canton of Aargau refused the subsequent certification and recognition. The Higher Court of the Canton of Aargau upheld the complaint of the person concerned in 2021 and ordered the deletion of the gender entry in the Swiss civil status and birth register.
At its public deliberation on June 8, 2023, the Federal Supreme Court upheld the complaint of the Federal Office of Justice and overturned the decision of the Aargau High Court. The deletion of the indication of gender in the Swiss civil registry register is not compatible with federal law.
More: https://www.bger.ch/files/live/sites/bger/files/pdf/de/5a_0391_2021_yyyy_mm_dd_T_d_11_22_57.pdf
Repost: Strasbourg’s Coming Out
Coming out is a deeply personal and sensitive process that can be incredibly challenging. Everyone needs their own time and space to determine when and how they choose to share their journey of acceptance and disclosure. Admittedly, the European Court of Human Rights chose a very apt moment in selecting the first day of Pride Month to make its own.
On June 1st, in Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, the Court determined for the first time in clear terms that the general absence of legal recognition for same-sex couples is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This marks a significant addition to the Court’s case-law concerning the rights of same-sex couples with implications for future litigation on this subject.
Article 14 has been in the closet for quite some time, as the Court has constantly denied and downplayed its significance regarding the rights of same-sex couples. In numerous cases involving gay rights, the Court often chose to omit a distinct examination of potential discrimination under Article 14, instead prioritizing the assessment of the substantive provision violation in isolation.
In the case of Dudgeon v. UK, for instance, the Court restricted its examination to determining whether a national law that criminalized consensual sexual relations between men infringed upon the right to respect for private life, without delving into an analysis of its discriminatory nature (paras. 64-70).
Likewise, when addressing the issue of legal recognition for same-sex couples, the Court held that States had an obligation to provide some form of legal recognition according to Art. 8. This obligation stemmed from the fact that the absence of legal recognition prevented same-sex couples from enjoying various social benefits and civil rights, thereby impacting their right to private and family life. However, the Court declined to examine the applicants’ additional complaints that the absence of such recognition amounted to discrimination (see Oliari v. Italy, 2015; Orlandi v. Italy, 2017; Fedotova v. Russia [GC], 2023, see here and here for some comments; Buhuceanu v. Romania, 2023).
This practice stems from the Court’s tendency to consider a separate violation of Article 14 only when it is firmly convinced that discrimination is a “fundamental aspect of the case” under consideration (Airey v. Ireland, 1979, para. 30).
The Court remained steadfast in this approach, even when it was evident that the respondent State possessed clear discriminatory intent in denying same-sex couples any form of legal recognition. As noted by partly dissenting judges Pavli and Motoc in the case of Fedotova v. Russia [GC], sexual orientation “was the sole basis for denying [same-sex couples] any form of legal recognition or protection of their bond as couples in committed relationships” (para. 4 of the partly dissenting opinion). Indeed, it was clear that that the Russian State exhibited bias against same-sex couples, as it relied on the prevailing negative perception among the majority of the Russian population towards same-sex unions to justify the complete absence of recognition (Fedotova v. Russia, para. 118). This was even more clear in the case of Buhuceanu v. Romania, where the respondent State deemed it appropriate to emphasize that the majority of Romanians disagreed with the idea that “gay, lesbian, and bisexual people should have the same rights as heterosexual people” (para. 50). They asserted that this disagreement constituted a “pressing social need” that could outweigh the need of recognition of same-sex couples (ibid.).
In Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, the Court reconsidered its position and finally accepted (as scholars long suggested) that Art. 14 speaks to the denial of legal recognition to same-sex relationships. The Court emphasized that while unmarried different-sex couples had the option to choose between marriage or maintaining a de facto family union, same-sex couples were “denied any such choice” (para. 68). Consequently, the Court maintained, similarly to its approach in Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy (2016, see para. 83), that it would be artificial to solely compare the situation of same-sex couples with unmarried different-sex couples. Unlike different-sex couples who opt not to marry for personal reasons but can still receive some legal recognition and protection in Ukraine due to their de facto family status, the applicants in this case had no access to marriage nor any alternative form of legal recognition. As a result, same-sex couples were subject to differential treatment due to the absence of legal recognition and protection. Given that the Ukrainian State failed to provide sufficient justification for this disparity, the Court concluded that Article 14 had been violated.
As is often the case with coming out, the European Court experienced some personal confusion and uncertainty during the process. Notably, just one week prior to the Maymulakhin and Markiv case, the Court had dealt with a similar issue in Buhuceanu v. Romania (May 23rd), where several same-sex couples lodged complaints regarding their inability to marry or form legally recognized partnerships. Confusingly, the Court approached these two cases in entirely different ways. In Buhuceanu, the Court focused solely on the practical dimension of legal recognition, namely the rights and benefits associated with it. It approached the complaint under the perspective of Article 8, rejecting a separate examination of Article 14. As I argue elsewhere, arguments grounded on equality considerations seemed to disappear entirely from the decision.
In Maymulakhin and Markiv, however, the Court adopted a completely different approach. It emphasized the “intrinsic value” of recognition as a symbol of inclusion and equality of same-sex couples, affirming in para. 64 that “allowing same-sex couples to be granted legal recognition and protection undeniably serves [the Convention’s] ideals and values in that recognition and protection of that kind confers legitimacy on [same-sex] couples and promotes their inclusion in society, regardless of sexual orientation. A democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation, being built on the equal dignity of individuals and sustained by diversity”. Furthermore, the Court noted that the core of the applicants’ grievance was “to be treated with equal dignity” and that “the State would confer a sense of legitimacy on their relationship by legally recognising its existence and by ensuring its adequate protection” (para. 77).
Both judgments evince different underlying logics, with one emphasizing the practical dimension of legal recognition in terms of rights and benefits (Article 8 analysis), and the other highlighting its symbolic value in terms of equality (Article 14 and Article 8 analysis). It might also be that the different outcomes hinged on the formulation of the complaint. Thus, the applicants in Maymulakhin and Markiv chose to directly invoke Article 14 in conjunction with Art. 8, rather than Article 8 alone, which was the case in Buhuceanu.
Adding further nuance, the composition of the Court differed between Maymulakhin (Fifth Section) and Buhuceanu (Fourth Section), with no overlap amongst the judges hearing each case. The apparent implicit inconsistency may eventually find its way to the Grand Chamber, especially considering that the latest GC judgment on same-sex couples and legal recognition, Fedotova v. Russia, employed arguments grounded in equality considerations but ultimately denied a separate examination of Article 14 (on this point see more extensively para. 5 of the partly dissenting opinion of judges Pavli and Motoc).
If the opportunity presents itself, the Grand Chamber should re-evaluate this stance. An equality-based approach to legal recognition is preferable to analysis based on Article 8 because it can address the broader societal implications and consequences of denying legal recognition to certain individuals or groups. For one, it acknowledges the fundamental importance of treating all individuals equally and ensuring that they have access to the same rights and benefits, regardless of their characteristics. At the same time, it recognizes that the impact of legal recognition extends beyond the immediate practical dimension and contributes to the advancement of the values underlying the ECHR, such as democracy, social justice and inclusion. Moreover, an equality approach serves a practical purpose, since Article 14 allows a comparative assessment between different-sex couples and same-sex couples in deciding the exact content of protection that should be granted with legal recognition.
In this regards, Judges Pavli and Motoc aptly noted in Fedotova v. Russia (para. 5 of the partly dissenting opinion) that:
“[…] laws have a moral dimension and they help shape a society’s moral views. They tell their beneficiaries that they are not invisible, that they are seen and valued as equal members of that society, irrespective of their differences. Conversely, national legal regimes that discriminate on impermissible grounds do the contrary: they tend to reinforce prejudice and social segregation, causing harm that goes above and beyond the violation of particular individuals’ Article 8 rights. There is, therefore, great inherent value in a Court judgment that confirms the “equal enjoyment of rights” is imperative.”
Within the LGBT community, there is a light-hearted saying that when somebody comes out, it seems like everyone else follows suit. In Proust’s “À la recherche du temps perdu” the protagonist’s discovery of the first homosexual character occurs in the fourth book, “Sodome et Gomorrhe”. Afterward, it seems that a multitude of characters within the story engage in various homosexual relationships or encounters.
One may wonder if, after this judgment, other Convention rights will eventually “come out”. Specifically, one may consider the implications of this judgment for Article 12, which guarantees the right to marry. Historically, the Court has consistently maintained that restrictions on the right to marry cannot be examined in light of Article 14 (from Schalk and Kopf v. Austria onwards, more explicitly in Oliari v. Italy, para. 193). However, it is plausible that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage constitutes an excessive restriction of a Convention right based on sexual orientation.
Some of the arguments presented by the Court in the Maymulakhin and Markiv case may hold relevance for future assessments of complaints under Article 12. This is particularly evident upon examination of the Court’s dismissal of the States’ justification for the protection of the traditional family, which is often invoked as a valid reason to oppose same-sex marriage. The Court affirmed that the recognition of same-sex couples does not impede different-sex couples from marrying or establishing a family based on their own understanding of the term (para. 77). Furthermore, the Court emphasized that securing rights for same-sex couples does not inherently weaken the rights of others or other couples (ibid.). These considerations may have implications for future evaluations of complaints related to Article 12.
USA: Texas governor signs law banning gender-affirming care for minors
Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed SB 14 on Friday, which bans gender-affirming care for minors and places restrictions on children already taking gender-affirming prescription drugs. The law becomes effective on September 1, 2023.
SB 14 provides that child health plans may not provide coverage for services intended to “transition a child’s biological sex as determined by the child’s sex organs, chromosomes, and endogenous profiles.” Additionally, the law makes it unlawful for healthcare providers to provide gender-affirming care if the care is for the purpose of transitioning the child or “affirming the child’s perception of the child’s sex if that perception is inconsistent with the child’s biological sex.” This includes gender-affirming surgeries and prescribing gender-affirming drugs. Physicians can lose their license for performing unlawful gender-affirming care, and the state attorney general can enforce the law by enjoining physicians before the care is provided.
Under the law, with the consent of the child’s parents or guardians, doctors can provide puberty suppression drugs for minors experiencing early puberty and can provide procedures and treatment for children with medically verifiable genetic disorders of sex development.
Minors can continue taking gender-affirming prescription drugs if they are part of a continuing course of treatment that began before June 1, provided that the minor attended 12 or more mental health counseling or psychotherapy sessions before the treatment started.
The law contains several provisions relating to physicians losing their ability to practice in Texas. Doctors are prohibited from practicing if they perform an abortion during the third trimester unless it is necessary to save the life of the woman, the “unborn child” has a severe, irreversible brain impairment or the woman is diagnosed with a significant likelihood of suffering imminent, irreversible brain damage or paralysis.
The ACLU has stated that it will file a lawsuit challenging the new law. In response to the bill, the ACLU stated:
Texas Senate Bill 14 bans the only evidence-based care for gender dysphoria for transgender people under 18 and aims to strip doctors of their medical licenses for providing their patients with the care they know to be medically necessary. Texas lawmakers have ignored the warnings of transgender youth, their families, and the medical establishment about the harms of this law.
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USA: Federal judge declares Tennessee’s anti-drag bill unconstitutional
Judge Thomas Parker, a judge for the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Friday ruled that Tennessee’s Adult Entertainment Act (AEA) is unconstitutional. In his opinion, Parker ruled that the AEA violates First Amendment rights. He stated that free speech does not extend to just words. Instead, the fundamental right covers an individual’s ability “to express one’s identity, and to realize self-fulfillment in a free society.”
The court analyzed the AEA using strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard of judicial review. Any law or policy that infringes on a fundamental right must pass strict scrutiny. The review requires that the challenged law supports a compelling governmental interest. The law must also be narrowly tailored to be as least restrictive as possible. Parker stated that while Tennessee has a compelling state interest in protecting the “physical and psychological well-being” of minors, the language of the AEA is “unconstitutionally vague and substantially overbroad.”
Parker took special exception to the AEA’s wording restricting the locations where performances are allowed. The statute criminalizes performances on public land or in a location in which the performance “could be viewed by a person who is not an adult.” The court ruled that since minors can be anywhere, the practical effect of the language was to criminalize performances in almost every space in the state.
Additionally, while the law does not expressly mention drag, “male or female impersonators” are. Parker criticized the legislature’s decision to classify a diverse group of performers in the same category as strippers and topless dancers. After detailing some past and recent legal and political struggles in the LGBTQ+ community, he stated, “this Court views categorizing ‘male or female impersonators’ as ‘similar entertainers’ in ‘adult-oriented businesses’ with skepticism.”
Parker previously enjoined the AEA in April. The District Attorney and Tennessee Attorney General’s Office have not yet commented on the ruling.
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International and Comparative SOGIESC Law - Professor Andreas R Ziegler 