Transgender men win ID card legal challenge in Hong Kong top court

The Hong Kong Final Court of Appeal Monday ruled that policies requiring transgender men to undergo full sex re-assignment surgery (SRS) to alter gender markers on their Hong Kong ID cards are unconstitutional and quashed the decisions of previous courts.

After hearing the submissions from both sides in January, the court held that the Commissioner of Registration failed to adequately demonstrate that the challenged guidelines were the “only workable, objective and verifiable criterion for altering the gender marker.”

The commissioner also failed to justify interference with the appellants’ rights under Bill of Rights Article 14. Article 14 protects a person from being subjected to “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” The court held that “privacy is a concept inherently linked to a person’s dignity,” and protections under Article 14 also include the right to gender identity and the right to physical integrity. Restrictions around gender markers thus involve humiliation, distress and loss of dignity in routine activities such as the inspection of Hong Kong ID cards. The court noted that the incongruence between a transgender person’s ID card and their outward appearance often amounts to confusion and embarrassment.

While the commissioner argued that “a full SRS is the only workable, objective and verifiable criterion” for gender marker change, the court held that individuals should not be prescribed medical treatment which carries potential physical pain and future complications merely to promote administrative convenience or clarity. The court argued:

The Policy’s consequence is to place persons like the appellants in the dilemma of having to choose whether to suffer regular violations of their privacy rights or to undergo highly invasive and medically unnecessary surgery, infringing their right to bodily integrity. Clearly this does not reflect a reasonable balance. The Policy imposes an unacceptably harsh burden on the individuals concerned.

However, the court commented that it is not its place to rewrite the current policy.

In an interview with HK01, appellant Tse Henry Edward said that winning the case means he can live a “normal life.” Zephyrus Tsang, the Vice Chairperson of transgender advocacy group Quarks, described the outcome as a “victory” for both the transgender community and the wider LGBTQIA+ community. Tsang expressed his hope that the government will introduce gender recognition reform as soon as possible.

The post Transgender men win ID card legal challenge in Hong Kong top court appeared first on JURIST – News.

Interesting Article: Adam Ploszka, From human rights to human wrongs. How local government can negatively influence the situation of an individual. The case of Polish LGBT ideology-free zones

The latest issue of the International Journal of Human Rights (Vol. 27, no. 2, 2023) is out. Contents include:

• Adam Ploszka, From human rights to human wrongs. How local government can negatively influence the situation of an individual. The case of Polish LGBT ideology-free zones

ECtHR does not defend the rights of the “intended mother” in an Italian case

ECtHR – PREMIÈRE SECTION – DÉCISION – Requête no 35967/19 (Valentina BORTOLATO contre l’Italie)

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (première section), siégeant le 10 janvier 2023 en un comité composé de :

 Péter Paczolay, président,
 Gilberto Felici,
 Raffaele Sabato, juges,
et de Liv Tigerstedt, greffière adjointe de section,

Vu :

la requête no 35967/19 contre la République italienne et dont une ressortissante italienne, Mme Valentina Bortolato (« la requérante ») née en 1968 et résidant à Torreglia, représentée par Me A. Schuster, avocat à Trente, a saisi la Cour le 28 juin 2019 en vertu de l’article 34 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales (« la Convention »),

la décision de porter la requête à la connaissance du gouvernement italien (« le Gouvernement »), représenté par son agent, L. D’Ascia, avocat d’État,

les observations des parties,

Après en avoir délibéré, rend la décision suivante :

OBJET DE l’AFFAIRE

1.  L’affaire concerne l’impossibilité pour la requérante, à la suite de la rupture de la relation de couple, de maintenir une relation à l’égard des enfants nés en 2012 – deux jumelles – de son ex-compagne conçus par procréation médicalement assistée.

2.  La requérante est la mère intentionnelle de deux jumelles que son ex‑compagne C. avait conçues par procréation médicalement assistée en 2012.

3.  En 2017, après la séparation d’avec C., un accord fut conclu entre les deux femmes, selon lequel la requérante participait financièrement à l’entretien des enfants et pouvait exercer un droit de visite et d’hébergement pendant la moitié de la semaine.

4.  En juillet 2018, la requérante informa C. de vouloir présenter une demande d’adoption spéciale au sens de l’article 44 1) d de la loi no 184 de 1993. Toutefois, C. ne donna pas son consentement à l’adoption et empêcha toute relation entre la requérante et les enfants.

5.  Le 17 décembre 2018, la requérante saisit le tribunal pour enfants de Venise (ci-après « le tribunal »), et s’appuyant sur l’interprétation donnée par la Cour constitutionnelle dans son arrêt no 225 de 2016 des dispositions visant à protéger les intérêts de l’enfant, demanda au parquet d’intervenir conformément aux articles 333 et 336 du code civil, pour se voir accorder un droit de visite. Le parquet demanda au tribunal pour enfants d’octroyer la garde des enfants aux services sociaux afin d’organiser des rencontres avec la requérante.

6.  Par une décision du 17 avril 2019, le tribunal déclara le recours de la requérante irrecevable en raison de l’absence de légitimation de celle-ci, conformément aux articles 333 et 336 du code civil, mais accueillit le recours du parquet, en adhérant à ses requêtes formulées sur demande de la requérante. En particulier, le tribunal limita l’autorité parentale de C., et confia la garde des enfants aux services sociaux en les chargeant d’organiser des rencontres avec la requérante.

7.  La cour d’appel rejeta l’appel de la requérante le 21 juin 2019.

8.  La requérante se pourvut en cassation. La Cour de cassation rejeta le pourvoi par un arrêt du 19 mai 2022.

9.  Entre-temps, par une décision du 15 novembre 2019, le tribunal nomma un curateur ad hoc pour les enfants et chargea un pédopsychiatre d’évaluer la situation des enfants au vu de la séparation d’avec la requérante.

10.  Depuis 2019 plusieurs projets de médiation ont été mis en place et un droit de visite a été assuré à la requérante. Plusieurs rapports des services sociaux furent déposés.

11.  Par une décision du 19 mai 2021, le tribunal ordonna que les rencontres protégées se poursuivent et que les services sociaux prévoient l’organisation de rencontres libres.

12.  C. interjeta appel. Le parquet demanda le rejet de l’appel. Par une décision du 18 mars 2022, la cour d’appel rejeta l’appel et souligna que la décision du tribunal pour enfants avait été adoptée sur demande du parquet, intervenu au sens de l’article 336 du code civil. La Cour prit également acte de ce que, selon les derniers rapports des services sociaux, des difficultés étaient apparues dans la mise en œuvre du projet de rapprochement entre les enfants et la requérante.

13.  Entre temps, la requérante saisit le tribunal de Padoue afin d’obtenir la reconnaissance du statut juridique de mère. Par une ordonnance du 9 décembre 2019, le tribunal de Padoue souleva une question de légitimité constitutionnelle concernant le statut juridique de la personne née en Italie suite à l’application de techniques de procréation médicalement assistée de type hétérologue pratiquées à l’étranger dans le cadre d’une relation procréative d’un couple formé par deux femmes.

14.  Par la décision no 30 du 28 janvier 2021, la Cour Constitutionnelle, tout en déclarant la question soulevée par le tribunal de Padoue irrecevable, constata une grave lacune dans la protection des personnes nées par procréation médicalement assistée hétérologue pratiquée par un couple de femmes, lacune que le législateur, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, devra combler dans les plus brefs délais, en identifiant les moyens les plus appropriés pour reconnaître les liens affectifs stables de ces mineurs, même envers la mère intentionnelle.

15.  La requérante invoque les articles 6, 8, 13 et 14 de la Convention en se plaignant de l’impossibilité de demander, devant une autorité judiciaire, la reconnaissance du droit de visite et de ce que l’impossibilité de reconnaitre les enfants conçus par procréation médicalement assistée uniquement pour les couples hétérosexuels, constitue une discrimination fondée sur l’orientation sexuelle.

APPRÉCIATION DE LA COUR

16.  La Cour rappelle qu’elle est maîtresse de la qualification juridique des faits et qu’elle n’est pas liée par celle que leur attribuent les requérants (voir, notamment, Radomilja et autres c. Croatie [GC], nos 37685/10 et 22768/12, § 126, 20 mars 2018). En l’espèce, elle estime plus approprié d’examiner les griefs formulés par la requérante exclusivement sous l’angle de l’article 8 de la Convention.

17.  La Cour estime qu’elle n’a pas à se prononcer sur les exceptions préliminaires de non-épuisement des voies de recours internes soulevées par le Gouvernement, la requête étant en tout état de cause irrecevable pour les raisons exposées ci-dessous.

18.  Elle rappelle que, si l’article 8 de la Convention tend pour l’essentiel à prémunir l’individu contre d’éventuelles ingérences arbitraires des pouvoirs publics, il engendre de surcroît des obligations positives inhérentes à un « respect » effectif de la vie familiale. Elle constate, ensuite, que le fait que le lien entre les enfants et la requérante est entravé ne résulte pas d’une décision ou d’un acte d’une autorité publique mais qu’il est la conséquence de la séparation de cette dernière d’avec la mère des enfants.

19.  La Cour renvoie aux arrêts dans les affaires Honner c. France (no 19511/16, § 50, 12 novembre 2020), V.D. et autres c. Russie (no 72931/10, §§ 125‑131, 9 avril 2019) et Moretti et Benedetti c. Italie (no 16318/07, § 60-71, 27 avril 2010), qui concernaient la question du maintien d’un lien familial de facto entre des adultes et des enfants, et qu’elle a examiné sous l’angle de l’obligation positive des États parties de garantir aux personnes relevant de leur juridiction le respect effectif de leur vie familiale.

20.  La Cour note que le grief de la requérante porte sur l’impossibilité de demander la reconnaissance du droit de visite à l’égard des enfants devant une autorité judiciaire et de faire valoir son droit reconnu par l’article 8 de la Convention en tant que « parent social ».

21.  La Cour observe, tout d’abord, que le droit italien prévoit la possibilité pour une personne ayant développé un lien familial de facto avec un enfant d’obtenir des mesures visant à la préservation de ce lien. À cet égard elle rappelle que la Cour constitutionnelle, dans sa décision no 225 de 2016, a statué que l’interruption injustifiée d’une relation significative établie et entretenue par le mineur avec un tiers (sans lien de parenté) pourrait relever de l’article 333 du code civil, qui permet au juge d’adopter des « mesures appropriées » lorsque le comportement de l’un ou des deux parents porte préjudice au mineur. Et ce sur l’appel du parquet (ainsi prévu par l’article 336 du code civil), également à la demande de l’adulte (non-parent) impliqué dans la relation en question.

22.  La Cour note que, dans le cas d’espèce, même s’il n’a pas été possible pour la requérante de saisir directement les tribunaux, le parquet, qui remplit un rôle institutionnel dans la magistrature, a agi pour donner suite à sa demande en sollicitant le tribunal de prendre des mesures dans l’intérêt des enfants. Le tribunal a donc pris une série de mesures finalisées à restaurer une relation entre les enfants et la requérante. Plusieurs rapports des services sociaux ont été déposés, une procédure de médiation a été mise en place, des rencontres protégées ont eu lieu et des rencontres libres seront à prévoir.

23.  La Cour note donc que le parquet a représenté les intérêts de la mère « d’intention » de demander un examen judiciaire de la question de la préservation du lien qu’elle avait développé avec les enfants, possibilité dont elle a usé.

24.  La présente affaire se distingue donc de l’affaire V.D. et autres c. Russie, précitée, qui concernait notamment le cas d’une personne qui s’était trouvée privée de la possibilité de maintenir le lien familial de facto qui s’était développé entre elle et un enfant dont elle avait été tutrice pendant plusieurs années, après le retour de ce dernier chez ses parents. La conclusion de la Cour se fondait en particulier sur le fait que, le droit russe n’ouvrant pas cette possibilité aux personnes dépourvues de liens biologiques avec l’enfant, les juridictions internes avaient rejeté la demande de la requérante tendant à l’organisation de contacts, sans même examiner les circonstances de la cause ni caractériser l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.

25.  Quant au grief portant sur la discrimination subie en raison de l’impossibilité de reconnaitre les enfants conçus par procréation médicalement assistée par son ex-compagne, la Cour prend acte de ce que la requérante n’a pas tenté de reconnaître les enfants lors de leur naissance et n’a pas soulevé expressément la question de la discrimination devant les juridictions nationales. De plus, elle note que, comme le souligne le Gouvernement, même lorsqu’il s’agit d’un parent d’intention de sexe masculin, si le parent biologique s’oppose à la reconnaissance, il est également nécessaire d’introduire une action pour obtenir une déclaration judiciaire de paternité et/ou de maternité.

26.  À la lumière de ce qui précède, après une analyse approfondie des observations des parties, des décisions des juridictions internes et de la jurisprudence pertinente, la Cour considère que, eu égard aussi à l’ample marge d’appréciation dont il disposait, l’État défendeur n’a pas méconnu son obligation positive de garantir le respect effectif du droit de la requérante à sa vie familiale.

Il s’ensuit que la requête doit être rejetée en application de l’article 35 § 4 de la Convention.

Par ces motifs, la Cour, à l’unanimité,

Déclare la requête irrecevable.

Fait en français puis communiqué par écrit le 2 février 2023.

 Liv Tigerstedt Péter Paczolay
 Greffière adjointe Président

Es war einmal in Straßburg” – comment by Elisabeth Greif on the ECtHR judgement in Macatė v. Lithuania

Source: https://verfassungsblog.de/es-war-einmal-in-strasburg/

Ein Märchenbuch für Kinder, in dem gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen dargestellt werden, (vorübergehend) aus dem Verkehr zu ziehen und es anschließend als „schädlich für Kinder unter 14 Jahre“ zu kennzeichnen, verstößt gegen das in Art. 10 EMRK gewährleistete Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung. Dies hat die Große Kammer des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR) in ihrer richtungsweisenden Entscheidung Macatė v. Lithuania festgestellt. Der Gerichtshof betonte außerdem, dass die gleiche und gegenseitige Anerkennung von Personen unterschiedlicher sexueller Orientierungen der gesamten Konvention inhärent ist: Den Zugang von Kindern zu Darstellungen gleichgeschlechtlicher Beziehungen einzuschränken ist mit den Grundsätzen der Gleichheit, des Pluralismus und der Toleranz in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft jedenfalls dann nicht vereinbar, wenn die Einschränkung ausschließlich darauf beruht, dass verschiedengeschlechtliche Beziehungen als sozial akzeptabler eingestuft werden.

Gleichgeschlechtliche Liebe als Bruch zivilrechtlicher Exklusivität

Ende 2013 veröffentlichte die litauische Dichterin und Illustratorin Neringa Dangvyde Macatė das Märchenbuch Gintarinė širdis (Amber Heart). Sie interpretierte darin klassische Märchen in zeitgemäßer Form neu, um Kindern im Alter von 9-10 Jahren gesellschaftliche Themen wie etwa die Ausgrenzung von marginalisierten Gruppen nahe zu bringen. So führen Märchenfiguren in zwei der sechs Erzählungen eine gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehung: In The Three Princes‘ Search for Wisdom heiratet der jüngste Königssohn einen Schneider; die Prinzessin in The Princess, the Shoemaker‘s Daughter and the Twelve Brothers verwandelt sämtliche männlichen Brautwerber in Vögel und wählt stattdessen die Tochter des Schuhmachers zur Frau. Bereits kurz nach der Veröffentlichung kam es zu einer Beschwerde an das Kultusministerium, da das Buch angeblich zu „Perversionen“ anrege. Die vom zuständigen Ministerium um ihre Einschätzung gebetene Aufsichtsbehörde für ethischen Journalismus stellte fest, dass die Darstellung gleichgeschlechtlicher Beziehungen in Gintarinė širdis einen negativen und schädlichen Einfluss auf Kinder habe. Insbesondere verstoße die Darstellung gegen Abschnitt 4 § 2 (16) des litauischen Jugendschutzgesetzes, da sie von jenem Konzept der Ehe und Familie abweiche, das der litauischen Verfassung und dem litauischen Zivilgesetzbuch zugrunde liegt. Obwohl das Buch ein peer review durch Pädagog:innen durchlaufen hatte und die Veröffentlichung von der litauischen Universität für Pädagogik gefördert worden war, wurde der Verkauf des Buches nur wenige Monate nach seinem Erscheinen gestoppt. Seit der Vertrieb von Gintarinė širdis ein Jahr später wieder aufgenommen wurde, ist das Buch in Litauen mit einem Warnhinweis „schädlich für Kinder unter 14 Jahre“ versehen.

Schädliche Märchen?

The Princess, the Shoemakers Daughter and the Twelve Brothers ist eine Neuinterpretation des Märchens Die zwölf Brüder, das sich auch in der Sammlung der Kinder- und Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm findet. In der Version der Gebrüder Grimm befiehlt der König, seine zwölf Söhne zu töten, falls seine Frau als dreizehntes Kind ein Mädchen zur Welt bringt: „Er ließ auch zwölf Särge machen, die waren schon mit Hobelspänen gefüllt, und in jedem lag das Totenkißchen“. Dass in Macatės Neuerzählung vorkommende Sätze wie „I will love you for a lifetime – said the princess with a revealed heart“ und „the happy princess fell asleep with the shoemaker’s daughter in her arms“ eher geeignet sein sollen, die „ethisch-moralische Entwicklung“ von Kindern zu beeinträchtigen, als der dutzendfach und penibel geplante Infantizid in der Originalversion, scheint schwer vorstellbar. In dem wegen der zitierten Passagen verhängten Verkaufsstopp beziehungsweise dem – späteren Ausgaben beigegebenen – Warnhinweis „schädlich für Kinder unter 14 Jahre“ sah die Autorin der Märchen einen Verstoß gegen ihr Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung nach Art. 10 EMRK und erhob Beschwerde an den EGMR. Zusätzlich brachte die Autorin eine Verletzung des Diskriminierungsverbots im Sinne des Art. 14 EMRK vor.

Die Entscheidung Macatė v. Lithuania

Die Beschwerde wurde zunächst einer Kammer der zweiten Sektion zugewiesen. Diese gab die Rechtssache gemäß Art. 30 EMRK an die Große Kammer ab, da der Fall schwerwiegende Fragen der Auslegung der Konvention aufwerfe. Zum ersten Mal setzte sich die Große Kammer des EGMR damit auseinander, ob die Beschränkung der Verbreitung eines Buches, das gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen in einer an Kinder gerichteten und für sie verständlichen Sprache schildert, eine Verletzung von Art. 10 EMRK darstellt.

ILGA-Europe, ARTICLE 19 u.a. unterstützen die Beschwerde. Sie machten geltend, dass der Fall Macatė schwerwiegende Fragen hinsichtlich der Meinungsfreiheit und des Zugangs von Kindern zu Informationen aufwerfe: Art. 10 Abs. 2 EMRK und Art. 19 Abs. 3 des Internationalen Pakts über bürgerliche und politische Rechte erlauben Eingriffe in die Meinungsfreiheit nur in sehr engen Grenzen. Sie müssen gesetzlich vorgesehen und zum Schutz eines berechtigten Interesses notwendig und verhältnismäßig sein. Darüber hinaus dürfen sie auch nicht gegen die menschenrechtlichen Prinzipien der Gleichheit und Nicht-Diskriminierung verstoßen. Ein „Warnhinweis“ in Bezug auf Inhalte, die eine nach internationalem Recht vor Diskriminierung geschützte Gruppe betreffen, sei daher von vornherein verdächtig. Er drücke eine diskriminierende „Sorge“ aus, die auf Stereotypen und überkommenen Vorstellungen der „traditionellen Familie“ beruhe.

Auch die Große Kammer sah in der Beschränkung des Verkaufs von Gintarinė širdis und dem Warnhinweis einen Eingriff in die Meinungsfreiheit der Antragstellerin. Die Verfügbarkeit des Buches sei durch den kurzzeitigen Rückruf reduziert und dadurch die Reputation der Autorin beschädigt worden. Warnhinweise würden typischerweise dafür verwendet, um die Gefährlichkeit von Waren zu veranschaulichen. Der Hinweis auf dem Buch („schädlich für Kinder unter 14 Jahre“) erweckte den Anschein einer solchen Warnung. Er hielt die Autorin davon ab, ihre Ideen der beabsichtigten Zielgruppe der 9-10-jährigen Kinder zugänglich zu machen. Die Maßnahmen gegen das Buch zielten nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofs ausschließlich darauf ab, Kinder am Zugang zu Informationen zu hindern, die gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen als gleichwertig mit verschiedengeschlechtlichen Beziehungen darstellen. Durch eine solche Haltung würde eine Präferenz für bestimmte Beziehungsformen zum Ausdruck gebracht und verschiedengeschlechtliche Beziehungen als akzeptabler und wertvoller als gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen eingestuft. Gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen würden dadurch stigmatisiert. Die in Frage stehenden Maßnahmen sind daher mit den demokratischen Gesellschaften inhärenten Vorstellungen von Gleichheit, Pluralismus und Toleranz nicht vereinbar. Sie verfolgen kein rechtmäßiges Ziel im Sinne des Art. 10 Abs. 2 EMRK und verletzen daher das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung.

Das ungenutzte Potential des Art. 14 EMRK

Obwohl die Große Kammer in ihrer Entscheidung feststellte, dass LGBTIQ+-Personen in Litauen nach wie vor in hohem Maße stereotypen Vorurteilen, Feindseligkeiten und Diskriminierung ausgesetzt sind, lehnte sie die Prüfung einer Verletzung von Art. 14 EMRK mit zwölf zu fünf Stimmen ab. In ihrer Joint Dissenting Opinion kritisierten die abweichenden Richter:innen, dass der Gerichtshof es verabsäumt habe zu klären, wie mit Fällen umzugehen ist, in denen diskriminierende Maßnahmen sich gegen bestimmte Inhalte und nicht gegen – antidiskriminierungsrechtlich geschützte – Merkmale der jeweiligen Urheber:innen richten. Richtungsweisend sei in diesem Zusammenhang die Entscheidung Berkman v. Russia: Hier hatte der Gerichtshof festgestellt, dass die Beschwerdeführerin wegen ihrer Unterstützung für LGBTI-Personen aufgrund der (nicht zwangsläufig ihrer eigenen!) sexuellen Orientierung diskriminiert worden war. Diesen Ansatz hätte die Große Kammer auch in Macatė anwenden sollen: Die Beschränkungen, denen das Märchenbuch unterworfen wurde, beruhten nämlich auf dem Beziehungs- und Familienbild, welches von der Autorin transportiert wurde und nicht auf ihrer sexuellen Orientierung. Damit hätte der EGMR klarstellen können, dass es für das Vorliegen einer Diskriminierung keine Rolle spielt, ob es sich bei dem antidiskriminierungsrechtlich geschützten Merkmal um ein persönliches Merkmal des:der jeweiligen Beschwerdeführerin handelt. Ein solches erweitertes Verständnis von Diskriminierung stünde auch im Einklang mit dem Geist der EMRK, insbesondere mit den Werten Pluralismus, Toleranz und Respekt für die Vielfalt von Beziehungen und Familienformen.

Diskriminierungsschutz im europäischen Kontext

Mit einer Erweiterung des Diskriminierungsschutzes in der von den abweichenden Richter:innen geforderten Weise hätte der EGMR wesentlichen Entwicklungen des (europäischen) Antidiskriminierungsrechts Rechnung getragen: Erstens dem u.a. von Susanne Baer, Ulrike Lembke und Doris Liebscher vertretenen Ansatz eines postkategorialen Antidiskriminierungsrechts, das Diskriminierung nicht als personales oder gruppenspezifisches Problem, sondern vielmehr als Ergebnis gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhänge und Strukturen begreift. Zweitens der vom EuGH zuerst in der Rs. Coleman vertretenen und in der Rs. CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD weiterentwickelten, in der Literatur meist als „Diskriminierung durch Assoziierung“ bezeichneten Rechtsfigur: Sie geht von einem Diskriminierungsverständnis aus, das Diskriminierungen wegen eines geschützten Merkmals als verboten begreift, unabhängig davon ob die betroffene Person selbst Träger:in dieses Merkmals (bzw. einer bestimmten Merkmalsausprägung) ist.

Homophobe Vorbehalte richten sich zunehmend (auch) gegen die Inhalte von Veröffentlichungen oder die Ziele von Veranstaltungen. Diese sind von der sexuellen Orientierung ihrer Urheber:innen (weitgehend) unabhängig. Das ändert jedoch nichts daran, das allfällige Beschränkungen ihren Grund in der Annahme der Überlegenheit bestimmter sexueller Orientierungen haben und andere sexuelle Orientierungen damit diskriminieren. Ein modernes Verständnis des Diskriminierungsschutzes muss dem Rechnung tragen. Art. 14 EMRK bietet dafür eine taugliche Grundlage. Es liegt nun am EGMR, die nächste Chance nicht ungenutzt verstreichen zu lassen.

Austria extends third gender entry

The third gender entry is open to more people than just intersex people, a court in Vienna has ruled.

More: https://www.queer.de/detail.php?article_id=44577&pk_campaign=Nwsl

Slovenia officially becomes first eastern European country to recognise same-sex marriage

https://www.thepinknews.com/2023/02/02/slovenia-same-sex-marriage/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mypinknews&pnespid=rKE_CSZIPv4UyObdqTGmQ5KXsRuzUIBodrmmn7dtrB5mmg4cEX38FqRQcP1I4ZO8bO12oNFHhA

Finland passes sweeping reform of gender recognition law and introduces self-ID for trans people

https://www.thepinknews.com/2023/02/02/finland-gender-law-self-id-trans-rights/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mypinknews&pnespid=r6V4EiIYLKAV3vLDpD6kApeNtUmgX5UnNfWw0.l2qQJm6ZM3IQSwqs7iuWmJK0Y94iYyA_fPQg

Article by Jannani M on Verfassungsblog

Source: https://verfassungsblog.de/the-indian-supreme-court-collegium-picking-its-battle/

In an unprecedented move, the collegium of the Supreme Court of India on the 17th and 18th of January, 2023, passed resolutions calling out the executive’s delay in the judicial appointments of five advocates – Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, Mr. Somasekhar Sundaresan, Mr. John Satyan, Mr. Amitesh Banerjee and Mr. Sakya Sen – by publicly countering the government’s objections against their appointment. In this piece, I discuss how the Supreme Court collegium has confronted the discriminatory treatment of persons who openly identify as a part of the LGBTQIA+ community in the process of judicial appointments by standing up to the executive’s bullying. The piece also looks into how the collegium has confronted the union government’s attempt to suppress dissent among advocates and why these resolutions are highly consequential.

What is the Supreme Court Collegium?

In India, the Supreme Court collegium is primarily in charge of appointments or transfer of judges in the High courts and the Supreme Court. The collegium consists of the Chief Justice of India and the four most-senior judges of the Supreme Court of India. This collegium recommends names of persons qualified to be judges to the Central Government and the latter may accept such recommendation or raise objections and request clarifications from the collegium. According to the Memorandum of procedure of appointment of High Court Judges, in case any of the recommendations are sent back with objections, the Chief Justice of India has to review the recommendation and reasons mentioned by the Union. It is important to note that the Central Government is bound to accept the recommendations upon reiteration by the Supreme Court.

The primacy of the Supreme Court collegium though is not expressly rooted in constitutional provisions but has been developed over time by various landmark judicial pronouncements. As previously highlighted in this blog by Medha Srivastava, the collegium does suffer from flaws which includes the lack of transparency in its decision-making process. Despite these limitations, it must be noted that several senior advocates have endorsed this system as one that is essential in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary from the executive.

Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation

Five years ago, India was at the cusp of witnessing history as Mr. Saurabh Kirpal’s name was recommended by the collegium for appointment to the bench. His appointment would make him the first “openly gay” judge in the nation. However, the Central Government did not accept the recommendation for years and due to the opaque nature of the process the public was unaware of objections to his appointment. This prompted the collegium of the Supreme Court to put on public record both the objections raised by the executive against Mr. Kirpal’s appointment and its rebuttal against it, in a recent resolution.

1. His partner is a swiss national (a citizen of a foreign country) and thus could pose a national security concern.
2. He is open about his sexual orientation, passionately advocates for the “cause of gay-rights” and is in an intimate relationship. The government stated that this is indicative of Mr. Kirpal’s “bias”.

The collegium, while rebutting the first objection stated that the partner was a citizen of a country which was not categorized as an ‘enemy’ country and thereby the individual conduct of Mr. Kirpal’s partner would not compromise national security. It points out that the use of national security as an objection to Mr. Kirpal’s appointment is inherently aimed at discriminating against him on the basis of his sexual orientation considering that there are some persons in top leadership positions in the country with spouses who are foreign nationals.

Addressing the second objection, the collegium openly declared that not elevating a candidate on the grounds of his advocacy for rights or his sexual orientation would be “manifestly contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court”. It goes a step ahead and even states that the advocate’s openness about his sexual orientation “goes to his credit” and his appointment to the bench would add to the diversity of the high court and bring about inclusion. This effectively countered the narrative of the Central Government which claimed that his involvement with the LGBTQIA+ movement in India is indicative of his “bias and prejudice”. The collegium also lauded his overall merit and highlighted the value addition that his experience would bring to the bench.

Thereby, in responding to the two objections, the Supreme Court has torn down the facade of the seemingly neutral “national security” concerns or accusations of “bias” and has effectively gone to considerable length to implement the judgment in Navtej Johar v. Union of India in judicial appointments which acknowledged that no person shall be subjected to direct or indirect discrimination against irrespective of their sexual orientation.

Protecting the Right to Dissent

Regarding the appointment of two advocates, Somasekhar Sundaresan and John Satyan, the collegium’s recommendation was objected on account of their criticism against the government. Mr. Sundaresan was accused by the Department of Justice for being a “highly biased opinionated biased person” for his “selective” criticism against the government’s policies. The appointment of Mr. Sathyan on the other hand was objected on the basis that he had shared a news article that was critical of the prime minister.

It is important to note that, prior to the elevation as judge of the Supreme Court, one of the sitting judges had praised the prime minister as a “hero”. Some former members of the judiciary were also elevated despite apprehensions regarding their political views. Thereby, holding a political opinion prior to elevation has in the past not necessarily stopped persons from being appointed as judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts.

In effect, the objections raised against Mr. Sundaresan and Mr. Sathyan in the respective Intelligence Bureau reports have the effect of curbing dissent against the government from members of the bar who aspire to be a part of the bench. The Supreme Court collegium in its recent resolution responding to the objections rightly points out that such a move by the Department of Justice compromises the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. It also states that voicing such opinions in no way compromises the suitability and the integrity of the person who is to be appointed as a judge. By doing so, it resists the attempt of the Central Government in creating a chilling effect on free speech by protecting the right to dissent which the head of the collegium, Justice Chandrachud had earlier referred to as the “safety valve of democracy”.

Conclusion

On the 24th of January, 2023, the law minister flagged national security concerns over the extracts of the Intelligence Bureau report being referred to by the Supreme Court collegium in its resolutions (which is publicly accessible). However, it may be pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, has categorically held that the state cannot receive a “free pass” to justify its actions by using national security as a shield.

By virtue of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in the Second Judges Case, the Central Government is bound to approve the appointment of the persons whose name has been reiterated by the Supreme Court collegium. The reiteration comes at a time when the majoritarian union government has been attempting to undermine the independence of the judiciary by trying to create inroads into the process of appointing judges and de–legitimizing well–recognized constitutional safeguards developed overtime by judicial precedents to protect citizens’ rights against the state’s encroachment into fundamental rights and civil liberties. It sends a strong message that this collegium and especially the Chief Justice are unafraid to pick the right battles to ensure that equality of citizens, freedom of speech and expression and the autonomy of the judiciary are guarded.

USA: Colorado court denies appeal of baker who refused to bake cake for transgender woman

The Colorado Court of Appeals Thursday denied a baker’s appeal over his refusal to bake a transgender birthday cake. Masterpiece Cakeshop, run by Jack Phillips, was denied an appeal following the trial court’s ruling that the shop discriminated against Autumn Scardina when they refused to bake and sell her a blue and pink birthday cake. When ordering the cake, Phillips agreed to provide the custom cake until Scardina shared the symbolism of her color choice—that it represented her transgender identity.

After determining that the colors of the cake, along with no symbols or writing, did not violate Phillips’ freedom of religion, the trial court ordered Phillips to pay a $500 fine. Phillips attempted to pay the fine while still contending that his bakery did not violate the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). Scardina refused the payment, and the trial court held that the fines did not negate Scardina’s original discrimination claims. The trial court did not offer a final judgement, but dismissed the case.

Phillips filed an appeal on the basis that the attempt to pay the fine, though rejected, rendered Scardina’s claim moot, that he did not in fact violate CADA, that the ruling violated his right to be free from compelled speech, and that CADA itself violates Phillips’ right to freedom of religion.

The appeals court rejected the contention that Phillips’ attempt to pay Scardina rendered her claim moot. The court reasoned that CADA was not designed primarily to compensate individual claimants, but rather to implement the broad policy eliminating intentional or discriminatory practices.

The court rejected the claim that Phillips did not violate CADA—finding that the baker’s original agreement to make the cake was only rescinded after finding out Scardina’s transgender status.

The appeals court also rejected the claim that baking the cake would constitute a violation of the right of freedom from compelled speech. Phillips’ testimony in court was that he would make the same cake for any other customer, and that the colors of the cake had no inherent meaning outside of its context. A pink and blue cake does not rise to the level of protected speech, and thus does not violate Phillips’ right to freedom from compelled speech, according to the court.

Finally, the claim that baking this cake would violate Phillips’ freedom of religion was rejected on the basis that the cake expressed no message, religious or secular.

This case follows a previous action against Masterpiece Cakeshop heard in the US Supreme Court in 2018, which ruled in favor of Phillip who refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.

The post Colorado court denies appeal of baker who refused to bake cake for transgender woman appeared first on JURIST – News.

Article by Lenka Křičková on Verfassungsblog

Source: https://verfassungsblog.de/battling-the-hydra/

Can a company refuse to conclude or renew a contract with a self-employed person because he is gay? And may contractual freedom prevail over the prohibition of discrimination in such a situation? The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently tackled these questions in case C- 356/21, J.K. v. TP. A short answer stemming from the judgment would be a resounding no. Yet, a further analysis is in order because the judgment also brings a significant shift in the ECJ’s anti-discrimination case law. We argue that by interpreting the scope of the EU anti-discrimination directives as covering the conclusion of contracts by self-employed workers, the ECJ has extended the protection against discrimination to unexpected areas. That raises questions about how the directives will be applied in practice when self-employed workers claim discrimination.

A perfect case for litigation

J.K. worked for TP, a Polish public television company, on the basis of consecutive short-term contracts for specific work within his independent economic activity. Specifically, he prepared various audiovisual materials, while working two one-week shifts per month. His contract was not renewed after he and his male partner published a YouTube video promoting the equality of same-sex couples. In response, he sued TP for discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The referring Polish court requested a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Directive). The ECJ was mainly asked to rule whether (i) the applicant’s activity constitutes self-employment falling within the Directive’s scope, and (ii) whether the protection against discrimination applies in relation to refusal to conclude or renew a contract with a self-employed person due to his sexual orientation. If so, the referring court was (iii) interested in whether such refusal could be justified by contractual freedom guaranteed by Polish law.

Strategically, one could hardly find a better case to litigate these issues. After 7 years of working for the company, the applicant’s contract was suddenly not renewed. The facts of the case show quite clearly that this happened because the applicant is gay, as the contractual relationship ended soon after he published the video and although his work had been positively evaluated shortly before. The image of a worker being disadvantaged particularly because of his sexual orientation arouses an instant sense of unfairness, since such unequal treatment is nearly impossible to justify. If the applicant were an employee, the Directive would, without any doubt, apply. Thus, it may seem inappropriate to not afford him protection against discrimination only due to the nature of the contractual relationship which otherwise closely resembles employment. Additionally, the case occurred in Poland, where the lives of homosexuals have become increasingly difficult, and a public television station owned by the state committed the alleged discrimination. Altogether, these circumstances made it relatively easy – almost irresistible – for the ECJ to interpret the Directive broadly, in order to protect the applicant and other people in similar positions.

In the end, that is what the ECJ did. It held that the Directive, according to its Art. 3, protects self-employed workers like the applicant and covers even the conclusion, renewal or termination of their contracts for specific work. Furthermore, under Art. 2(5) of the Directive, contractual freedom cannot justify discriminatory conduct in these situations.

However simple this conclusion may appear at first sight, we argue the case brings noteworthy novelties to EU anti-discrimination law. As we explain below, the ECJ for the first time clarified the Directive’s scope regarding self-employed people, while also creating new uncertainties about the practical application of the Directive.

Extending the scope of the EU anti-discrimination directives

The ECJ mainly had to interpret Art. 3 of the Directive. The key provisions state that the Directive shall apply in relation to “conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion” (Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive) and to “employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay” (Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive).

It may seem obvious that the Directive protects self-employed people like the applicant, since Art. 3(1)(a) explicitly mentions self-employment. The actual challenge for the ECJ was to explain what falls within the wording of Art. 3(1)(a) and what not. The ECJ decided to interpret the provision broadly.

In the judgment, the ECJ reasoned that the Directive’s scope extends beyond protecting workers as the weaker party in employment relationships and covers all occupational activities regardless of their legal form, including activities carried out by self-employed workers in order to earn their livelihood. Simultaneously, the ECJ distinguished occupational activities from mere provision of goods or services that the Directive does not affect. Additionally, although the national court should assess the facts of the case at hand, the ECJ clearly hinted that the applicant’s situation falls within the Directive’s scope.

Next, the ECJ held that “conditions for access” to self-employment include the conclusion of a contract for specific work (such as the applicant’s contract). This may arguably be considered the most important aspect of the case, although the ECJ downplayed it by devoting it considerably less space in the reasoning than to the other points. The ECJ merely stated that the conclusion of such a contract may be essential for the applicant as a self-employed person to pursue his occupational activity effectively. Such interpretation is certainly possible and reflects the ECJ’s case law on access to employment that the ECJ understands very broadly as well (including e.g. public statements ruling out recruitment of homosexual persons). However, the Polish government argued that “conditions for access to self-employment” only involve general conditions for entering and exercising the profession, not the self-employed worker’s subsequent contractual relationships. In the past, the Czech ombudsman or the UK Supreme Court, for instance, promoted the same view in their decision-making. Therefore, the broader reach of anti-discrimination law in this regard may come as a novelty in some Member States. It is a pity that the ECJ did not elaborate on this point more thoroughly.

Moreover, the ECJ added that Art. 3(1)(c) addressing “employment and working conditions” applies to self-employment, too. Thus, the Directive’s protection extends to the professional relationship in its entirety, including termination or non-renewal of the contract. Again, the ECJ chose the broadest available interpretation, despite Art. 3(1)(c) not referring to self-employment.

In our opinion, the ECJ sufficiently supported its reasoning with textual and teleological arguments, as well as with its previous case law (especially case C-587/20, HK/Danmark and HK/Privat). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the ECJ interpreted the Directive very broadly, as the Directive’s scope is now confirmed to extend to potentially unexpected areas where contractual freedom used to prevail. In addition, the same extensive interpretation should be given to the other EU anti-discrimination directives (prohibiting discrimination based on race, ethnic origin and sex) whose scope is defined by identical wording (see Art. 3 of the Directive 2000/43/EC, Art. 14 of the Directive 2006/54/EC).

Practical consequences

The ECJ’s decision-making often resembles fighting a hydra. Once the ECJ cuts one head off (provides one answer), two more heads (issues) emerge. That has certainly happened in this case. While the ECJ has clarified the Directive’s scope regarding self-employed workers, several new problems consequently arise.

First, the prohibition of discrimination now clearly applies to contracts of self-employed people, who are predominantly entrepreneurs. The ECJ has thus left the safe harbor of standard employer-employee relationships, where the protection of the weaker party rules, and entered the wild entrepreneurial waters of business-to-business (B2B) relationships, where contractual freedom is paramount. Yet, many B2B relationships conceptually differ from other areas falling within the scope of EU anti-discrimination directives, where special interest in regulation exists, typically because essential services (e.g. education, healthcare) or weaker parties (e.g. employment, consumers’ access to goods and services) are involved. On the contrary, it could be argued that entrepreneurship requires self-employed people to handle the tough environment of the free market themselves.

Second, the ECJ has tried to distinguish occupational activities from provision of goods and services, in order to limit the wide range of situations when self-employed people conclude work contracts and could thus claim discrimination. Without any guidance from the Directive’s text, the ECJ made up criteria that specify the occupational activities covered by the Directive. Namely, such occupational activities cannot consist of “mere provision of goods or services to one or more recipients” (para. 44), but need to be “genuine” and pursued within “a legal relationship characterized by a degree of stability” (para. 45). Regarding the applicant, the ECJ emphasized that he engaged in “a genuine and effective occupational activity, pursued on a personal and regular basis for the same recipient, enabling the applicant to earn his livelihood, in whole or in part” (para. 47).

By introducing these limits, the ECJ probably wanted to especially protect self-employed people like the applicant, whose contracts in many ways resemble employment. If that was the intention, however, the ECJ did not manage to fulfill it very effectively. For instance, looking at the criteria (quoted above) that the ECJ used to distinguish self-employment from provision of goods and services, none of them excludes business-to-consumer (B2C) relationships, once a self-employed person serves a particular customer regularly. Even B2C relationships often involve genuine and personal work which is carried out on a stable, long-term basis. Therefore, service-providers could sue their customers for discrimination, which is uncommon in anti-discrimination law, as the protection against discrimination usually works the other way round. It is hard to imagine how every ordinary Joe (likely ignorant of anti-discrimination law intricacies) with a professional cleaner or caretaker visiting every week may face discrimination claims. And, if so, why would discrimination be allowed if the same service providers worked for the customer only once or sent their employee to do the work? Quite possibly, the ECJ have not foreseen the possible consequences for B2C relationships, as neither the judgment nor the Advocate General’s opinion address them at all.

Last but not least, it is not clear how other provisions of the Directive will work in relation to self-employment. For example, Art. 3(1)(c) includes pay among employment and working conditions, but striving for equal pay in entrepreneurial relationships might prove to be very complicated in practice. Also, the shared burden of proof under Art. 10 of the Directive may create problems. Business deal negotiations usually do not look like a transparent recruitment of employees, so proving non-discrimination will probably be extremely challenging for the respondent.

Conclusion

All of this does not necessarily mean that the ECJ was wrong. The judgment could actually be perceived as a step in the right direction because it might help anti-discrimination law react to the digital transformation of the economy, and related changes in society and work relations. Broad protections against discrimination in self-employment make it significantly easier for all gig workers, who perform their jobs under various types of precarious contracts, to defend themselves against discrimination, irrespective of the precise legal nature of their work relationships.

Still, we find it important to point out that the judgment has silently brought a little game-changer into EU anti-discrimination law. Self-employed workers can now file anti-discrimination lawsuits in many situations that may have previously been considered as falling outside the Directive’s scope. And many alleged perpetrators of discrimination might be surprised that the Directive applies to their behavior. How well this will be accepted, particularly in Member States where anti-discrimination law does not exactly flourish, remains to be seen. In the meantime, the ECJ will hopefully have an opportunity to further clarify the newly emerged issues.