Author Archives: Andreas R. Ziegler

Repost: A Nod, Not a Leap [specific vulnerabilities of women and gender diverse communities in Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) Advisory Opinion AO-32/25]

Repost: A Nod, Not a Leap [specific vulnerabilities of women and gender diverse communities in Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) Advisory Opinion AO-32/25]

Maria Antonia Tigre

On July 3, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued Advisory Opinion AO-32/25, its most wide-ranging and ambitious interpretation of State obligations in the context of the climate emergency to date. The opinion responds to a request submitted by Colombia and Chile, and is notable not only for its breadth, but also for its potential to reshape how international human rights law responds to the climate crisis.

This post focuses on one notable aspect of AO-32/25 that has not received attention in other commentary–the IACtHR’s engagement with gender issues. The questions posed to the IACtHR explicitly incorporated a gender lens, a feature still rarely seen in international environmental or climate litigation. Chile and Colombia asked, among other things, what measures should be adopted to ensure the protection of environmental and territorial defenders, “as well as women, Indigenous Peoples and Afro-descendant communities” in the context of climate change. Specific questions also highlighted the differentiated and intersectional impacts of climate harm, and called on the IACtHR to address “gender-based violence, discrimination,” and the guarantees needed to protect the work of women human rights defenders. Although the IACtHR ultimately reformulated the questions and removed explicit references to gender in several parts, it retained a broad reference in Question 3, which asks about “the scope of obligations to respect, guarantee, and adopt the necessary measures to ensure, without discrimination, … the rights of women … as well as other vulnerable population groups in the context of the climate emergency” (para. 28).

In a previous post analyzing the KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), we noted that the ECtHR missed the opportunity to engage with the legal implications of gender and age as intersecting determinants of climate vulnerability. Although the case centered on elderly women, and the ECtHR acknowledged scientific evidence showing their heightened vulnerability to climate-related harms, it ultimately sidelined gender as a legally relevant factor, treating it as part of the background rather than as a basis for rights and remedies. This reflects a broader gap in climate litigation, where gender—despite its centrality to lived experiences of climate harm—remains underexplored and legally underdeveloped. 

As we turn to the IACtHR’s AO-32/25, we ask: has this gap begun to close? Does the IACtHR, with its jurisprudence on gender and diversity, offer a more robust framework for understanding and addressing gendered dimensions of climate change? We find that the IACtHR has indeed taken an important step forward, both in recognizing gender as a key determinant of climate vulnerability and in identifying gender-responsive obligations on States. However, the IACtHR’s comments in this regard remain general and often gestural. The obligations identified are limited, narrow, and many relate to data gathering rather than substantial action. Thus, while AO-32/25 is a clear advance in addressing gender in climate litigation, it also reveals the extent of the work that remains to be done.    

The IACtHR identifies specific vulnerabilities of women and gender diverse communities

In AO-32/25, the IACtHR makes several important findings regarding gender and the rights of women in the context of the climate crisis.

Disproportionate Impact on Women

The IACtHR acknowledges that climate change has a disproportionate impact on women, particularly those living in poverty, rural areas, or communities that heavily rely on natural resources (para. 594). It emphasizes that climate impacts exacerbate existing gender inequalities, leading to heightened vulnerability in areas such as health, access to water, food security, and exposure to violence (para. 571). In the context of climate disasters, both sudden and slow onset, the IACtHR notes how women can be differentially affected, with women and girls being at greater risk of gender-based violence in the aftermath of disasters (para. 614). As primary breadwinners, caretakers of the family, and water collectors due to dominant understandings of gender roles, they are disproportionately affected by the impacts on food and water security, as well as the health of their household members (para. 420).

Intersectionality and Vulnerability

The IACtHR highlights the need for an intersectional approach that considers how overlapping factors—such as gender, race, Indigeneity, ethnicity, class, and age—shape exposure to climate harm (para. 592). It stresses that women, especially Indigenous and Afro-descendant women, face unique barriers to participation and access to justice, which States must actively address (para. 613). While intersectionality is embraced as a critical dimension of understanding risk and harm, the IACtHR, like other courts before it, takes very limited cognisance of gender as a critical concern in relation to certain other social demographics, specifically including being a child or young person. The discussion of the differentiated protection for children and adolescents, for example (para. 597-604), largely treats children as a universal category, undifferentiated by gender. The IACtHR merely mentions that gender is a relevant factor in the perception of impact with respect to the intersection of vulnerabilities, noting that girls and female adolescents are more vulnerable to climate impacts, deepening existing inequalities (para. 598, see here and here).

LGBTQ+ and Gender-Diverse Communities

Significantly, the IACtHR recognizes the heightened vulnerability of gender diverse persons during and after climate-induced disasters, who face a greater risk of gender-based violence due to stigmatisation and discrimination (para. 618). In discussing the need for adaptation measures, the IACtHR underscores that when evaluating climate impacts, vulnerability, and risk, States must rely on exhaustive data and identify the rights and groups of people that are particularly vulnerable, including women, girls, and the LGBTIQ+ community (para. 389). However, the Court does not provide further detail on the differentiated impacts suffered by this community in the context of the climate crisis, nor does it specify what kind of data supports adaptation plans. This is particularly important since data collection regarding impacts on LGBTIQ+ and gender-diverse communities in the aftermath of disasters is often overlooked and neglected (see here).

Women Environmental Defenders

The opinion also addresses the situation of women environmental defenders (para. 571-572), affirming that States must take special measures to protect them from threats, violence, and reprisals (para. 566). The Court calls attention to the gendered nature of violence and persecution faced by these defenders and links their protection to the obligations under both the American Convention and the Escazú Agreement (para. 564).

The IACtHR identifies State obligations relating to women, girls, and gender-diverse communities

The IACtHR finds that States have heightened and specific obligations to ensure the substantive and procedural rights of those whose intersecting identities make them more vulnerable to discrimination and harm, including their gender identities. Most of these obligations are overly general and normatively thin; where they are more detailed, they relate to gathering information that is gender-representative and sensitive, including the duty to consult and involve women meaningfully in climate decision-making, and guarantee access to justice and effective remedies for gender-differentiated harms. 

The IACtHR expands on the content of the right to access to information, which imposes on states the obligation to establish systems and mechanisms to produce, compile, analyse, and disseminate information relevant to the protection of human rights in the context of the climate emergency (para. 505). According to the IACtHR, states must: (1) collect data (in relation to environmental impact assessments) on the effects of climate change on vulnerable individuals and groups, including the dimensions of gender (para. 496), (2) have a system of indicators to measure progress in implementing state strategies to move towards sustainable development that includes statistics on gender, among other factors that cause and deepen inequality in the context of the climate emergency (para. 508), and (3) collect, systematize, produce and analyze information on current and projected impacts of climate change (in the context of adaptation and disaster risk management) on people’s lives, personal integrity and health, considering gender (para. 512). 

With respect to environmental and human rights defenders, the IACtHR notes that States must collect and keep updated data on killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, and other harmful acts against environmental defenders, considering gender as a relevant and differentiating factor (para. 575). The IACtHR underscores that women defenders are faced with gender stereotypes that aim to delegitimize their work (para. 572). Furthermore, the IACtHR highlights the specific risks that women face due to the intersection of multiple axes of oppression (para. 572). Hence, the Court calls on States to include domestic mechanisms specifically designed to protect women defenders, as well as rural, Afro-descendant, and Indigenous women (para. 577).

Regarding gender-diverse individuals, the IACtHR identifies specific obligations, but these are primarily concerned with health and disaster response. The Court finds that States have an obligation to: “(i) ensure that LGBTIQ+ persons have access to health care free from discrimination by ensuring that health care personnel in these situations have the necessary diversity and inclusion training; and (ii) encourage the creation of safe spaces to prevent and effectively address any acts of discrimination and harassment of LGBTIQ+ persons in temporary shelters. Similarly, States have an obligation to ensure that health care provided to LGBTIQ+ persons during and after climate change-induced disasters is available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality.” (para 618). 

With respect to Indigenous and tribal communities, the IACtHR discusses the obligations to adopt a series of progressive measures to design and implement studies, registers, and statistical reports to obtain data on the impacts of climate change on access to their territories and means necessary to their subsistence, noting that they should include intersectional factors related to “gender, age, and disability self-identification.” (para. 606). The IACtHR recognizes explicitly the role of Indigenous women in the preservation and transmission of traditional knowledge, including their contributions to maintaining cultural identity, mitigating the risks and effects of climate change, protecting biodiversity, achieving sustainable development, and building resilience to extreme events.

Furthermore, the IACtHR stipulates that States must design and implement mitigation, adaptation, and reparation measures that are gender-responsive, ensuring that climate action promotes gender equality and does not reinforce structural discrimination.

In sum, the IACtHR establishes that the climate crisis is a gendered human rights issue and that States have affirmative duties to integrate gender equality into their climate responses, protect women’s rights, and remedy climate-related harms experienced by women and girls. It underscores that a gender and intersectional perspective should inform all actions undertaken in the context of the climate emergency (para. 614).

However, while these acknowledgments are important symbolically and represent a step forward compared to previous jurisprudence, the IACtHR’s treatment of gender remains overly general and normatively thin. The language used is wide-ranging and aspirational, but it lacks concrete guidance on what the affirmative duties involve in practice. For instance, AO-32/25 does not clarify the legal consequences for States that fail to adopt a gender-transformative climate policy, nor does it outline concrete steps for ensuring gender-responsive adaptation, mitigation, or access to remedies. The reference to intersectionality is notable, but the Court stops short of explaining how overlapping identities—such as indigeneity, poverty, or displacement—should shape legal obligations or institutional reforms.

Ultimately, while the IACtHR affirms the need for a gender perspective, its reasoning falls short of establishing meaningful obligations that would help translate that recognition into enforceable protections. In this respect, AO-32/25 marks progress, but not transformation—a symbolic step in the right direction, but one that leaves much of the substantive work to future litigation or state interpretation.

Reading AO-32/25 after the IACtHR’s Advisory Opinions on Gender and Diversity

To fully appreciate the significance of AO-32/25 on gender issues, it should be read in conjunction with the IACtHR’s prior advisory opinions on gender identity, equality, and diversity. Unlike other international courts, the IACtHR has developed a relatively rich and evolving approach to gender, notably through Advisory Opinion 24/17 (AO-24/17), which recognized gender identity and same-sex relationships as protected under the American Convention (see here). When these opinions are read together, a more nuanced understanding of gendered state obligations in the context of climate change emerges—one that goes beyond vulnerability tropes to acknowledge intersectionality, agency, and structural inequality.

AO-24/17 was, in critical respects, quite narrow. In relation to gender-diverse persons and transgender rights, the advisory opinion focused primarily on state obligations to recognise and facilitate name changes in accordance with gender identity. However, despite the fairly narrow scope of the questions posed by Costa Rica in requesting the opinion, the IACtHR recognised the broad discrimination and oppression that gender diverse and LGBTIQ+ persons face, and the fact that this discrimination is often State-mandated and specifically provided for in law. It also recognised that transgender persons face constraints and rights violations across every aspect of their lives, including in accessing housing, employment, health care, and contractual obligations, among others. Given this, in AO-24/17, the IACtHR emphasized the importance of identity recognition, including through enabling name change and other formal dimensions of recognition, as a crucial first step towards realizing the full human rights of trans and gender-diverse persons. 

Whereas in AO-24/17 the IACtHR recognized that gender and gender-based discrimination permeate all aspects of an individual’s life—including family, education, work, health, political participation, and personal autonomy—the discussion of gender in AO-32/25 is noticeably narrower in scope and ambition. Although the IACtHR affirms that the climate crisis has differentiated impacts on women and girls and acknowledges the need for a gender and intersectional lens (para. 614), its analysis is largely confined to the domains of health and disaster response. This represents a significant contraction from the broader framing in AO-24/17, where gender was treated as a structural axis of inequality with far-reaching implications.

Moreover, while AO-32/25 does mention LGBTIQ+ persons, it does so primarily within the context of access to healthcare and vulnerability during emergencies (paras. 317, 616), without elaborating on the multiple and intersecting forms of exclusion they may face in areas such as housing, land rights, employment, or access to justice—domains where climate impacts are also acutely felt. As such, the IACtHR seems to adopt a binary approach to gender, except for a couple of paragraphs that mention the LGBTIQ+ and gender-diverse communities. A more holistic application of the reasoning from AO-24/17 would have required the IACtHR to engage more deeply with how climate change exacerbates existing gender-based inequalities across social, economic, and political spheres.

For instance, AO-32/25 could have addressed how climate-induced displacement disrupts education for girls, increases risks of gender-based violence, or undermines women’s rights to land, property, and participation in decision-making. By limiting its gender analysis to only a few sectors, the Court missed an opportunity to build on its prior jurisprudence and to articulate a truly comprehensive gender-responsive framework for climate governance.

Conclusion

The IACtHR’s AO-32/25 is groundbreaking. Acknowledging the gendered dimensions of the climate crisis is a crucial step in recognizing the differentiated ways in which climate change affects people and closing the gender gap. Notably, the intersectional approach adopted by the IACtHR sheds light on the particular adverse climate impacts experienced by certain groups and individuals, an aspect that has been largely ignored in the broader scheme of climate litigation. However, while AO-32/25 presents a more meaningful engagement with gender and its relation to climate change than, for example, the ECtHR in KlimaSeniorinnen, it still falls short when addressing gender beyond women and girls. Given the IACtHR’s previous treatment of gender-diverse peoples’ rights, this feels like a missed opportunity to expand further and critically assess the gendered impacts of climate change in the region.

The post A Nod, Not a Leap appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

A staunch defence of the ‘right to relate’: Kees Waaldijk receives ovation at farewell lecture

A staunch defence of the ‘right to relate’: Kees Waaldijk receives ovation at farewell lecture

Published on 15 July 2025

Kees Waaldijk has worked for many years to map the rights, or lack thereof, of the gay and lesbian community across the world. As he bids farewell to the faculty, those rights are under renewed pressure. How does he reflect on his career?

More: https://www.staff.universiteitleiden.nl/news/2025/07/a-staunch-defence-of-the-right-to-relate-kees-waaldijk-receives-standing-ovation-at-farewell-lecture

Repost: [Völkerrechtsblog] In Defence of Digital Satire

Repost: [Völkerrechtsblog] In Defence of Digital Satire

The European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision in Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia raises pressing questions about the protection of satirical speech in digital spaces. One of the applications considered in the judgment was Petrov v. Russia, which centres on a video titled “Gay Hunt,” posted by D.K on Instagram during a constitutional referendum campaign. The video, a piece of dark political satire, presents a dystopian vision of state-sponsored homophobia in 2035 Russia. The Court ultimately held that the video, on account of its satirical framing, remained within the bounds of protected expression under Article 10 of the Convention.

[click here to see full article]

Belgium – Criminal conviction for sexist and homophobic violence: first recognition of the offence of sexism in a physical assault

Belgium – Criminal conviction for sexist and homophobic violence: first recognition of the offence of sexism in a physical assault

Application of the anti-sexism Act of 22 May 2014 and the aggravating circumstances based on discrimination as defined by the Anti-Discrimination Act of 10 May 2007 in a context of intersectional violence

More: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/6329-belgium-criminal-conviction-for-sexist-and-homophobic-violence-first-recognition-of-the-offence-of-sexism-in-a-physical-assault

Poland – New regulation extending protection against hate speech put on limbo by the President

Poland – New regulation extending protection against hate speech put on limbo by the President

Adoption of provisions extending protection against hate speech by expanding the list of protected characteristics to include sex, age, and sexual orientation was appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal by the President, which, in practice, puts the new regulation in a limbo

More: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/6330-poland-new-regulation-extending-protection-against-hate-speech-put-on-limbo-by-the-president

North Macedonia – Revision of several education laws raises concern over regress on gender equality

North Macedonia – Revision of several education laws raises concern over regress on gender equality

Parliament adopted amendments to three laws, decreasing protection of gender equality and gender identity

More: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/6326-north-macedonia-revision-of-several-education-laws-raises-concern-over-regress-on-gender-equality

Williams Institute: Watch our webinar on LGBTQ cases at the Supreme Court [United States]

Williams Institute: Watch our webinar on LGBTQ cases at the Supreme Court [United States]

Thank you to everyone who joined us yesterday for our webinar featuring UCLA Law professor Cary Franklin, the McDonald/Wright Chair of Law and Williams Institute Faculty Director. The webinar discussed two recent Supreme Court cases related to LGBTQ rights: United States v. Skrmetti and Mahmoud v. Taylor. Professor Franklin provided an in-depth analysis of the decisions, highlighting their broader implications for LGBTQ rights and the legal landscape ahead.

If you missed the webinar, you can watch it below, on our website, or on our YouTube page.

Interesting Article – Repost: Laboratories of Authoritarianism [U.S. Supreme Court]

Interesting Article – Repost: Laboratories of Authoritarianism [U.S. Supreme Court]

by Sarah Medina Camiscoli

In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the 1st Amendment Free Exercise Clause to grant conservative religious parents a constitutional right to remove their children from any classroom where a teacher includes LGBTQAI+ people in the curriculum. In effect, the Court has allowed public schools to discourage mutual tolerance, parents to opt out of Equal Protection, and fringe legal strategists to continue to use children’s constitutional rights as a test case for authoritarianism. Youth rights provide fertile ground for authoritarian policies as young people are a vulnerable population, their autonomy is almost entirely up to the discretion of their parents and the state, and lawmakers can easily cloak their desires to remake government institutions under the guise of care, protection, and parent rights. However, youth rights are not entirely separate from those of the rest of society – and the erosion of children’s rights becomes the foundation upon which other rights are eroded.

Constitutional test subjects

Today, a transgender girl in 4th grade can wake up to news anchors discussing how the highest court in the land ruled in Mahmoud v. Taylor that schools may not read books that include trans voices or celebrate families and friends who embrace girls like her. When that 4th grader arrives at school, she might see Mahmoud in action when her teacher hastily moves her peers to different classrooms before reading a book with trans characters because parents must provide “permission” for their children to even acknowledge trans lives. In many states, that same young person will learn that her doctor can no longer provide her with gender-affirming medical treatment because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Skrmetti v. United States. If that young person seeks a counselor to work through the psychic harm of these experiences at school or in doctors offices, the counselor might tell her that trans people do not exist, that her parents are causing harm by providing affirming education and healthcare, and suggest that she consider conversion therapy in a local church. And if the child and her guardian challenge that practice as unethical and harmful, that therapist might be able to assert that the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to develop a constitutional right to do so in Chiles v. Salazar. Keep in mind that this child cannot vote, run for office, and make campaign contributions (but, ironically, she can work certain jobs and pay taxes). This child is not learning in a healthy democracy. She is living as the constitutional test subject of legal strategists.

Scholars of authoritarianism discuss two “soft guardrails” of democracy: 1) “mutual toleration” — a shared understanding that people and parties with different views and values must respect one another as legitimate to promote and uphold democratic institutions; and 2) “forbearance” — the understanding that government actors must demonstrate restraint in their roles to promote checks and balances on state power. These “norms of toleration and restraint” are what keep people with different politics, values, and lifestyles from trying to destroy one another; and the place where they are most often taught and learned are in public schools. But the Court has allowed fringe legal strategists to decay those norms and attack public education, in many cases using children’s rights to further polarize political parties, dismantle social welfare, and entangle courts in culture wars. The Supreme Court has ruled in favor of these legal strategists to roll back a variety of children’s rights which in turn erode rights, resources, and liberties for everyone. Their success includes eroding bodily autonomy at the site of the constitutional rights of undocumented children (Azar v. Garza (2018)), attacking healthcare at the site of the constitutional rights of transgender children (United States v. Skrmetti (2025)), shrinking higher education at the site of constitutional rights of students of color (Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard (2023)), and now, decimating equal protection and public education at the site of constitutional rights of LGBTQAI+ elementary school students (Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)). Legal strategists have realized that the rights of vulnerable children provide the perfect site to experiment with culture wars and unquestioned obedience to authorities. Given the success of these experiments, I have developed the term laboratories for authoritarianism to describe how children’s constitutional rights have become a vehicle for fringe legal strategists to craft jurisprudence that undermines democracy and promotes authoritarianism.

Mahmoud v. Taylor provided a particularly powerful vehicle for this project as it attacked constitutional rights within public schools. Public schools are a battleground for democracy, as they are the single institution where the most people spend the most time in the United States. They serve as “the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny.” (Sotomayor, dissenting, at 1, Mahmoud v. Taylor). In eroding constitutional rights for such a vulnerable group in a stronghold of democracy, Mahmoud obstructs public schools from promoting mutual toleration or teaching an accurate understanding of the Constitution among some of our nation’s most vulnerable children.

Denying marriage equality in public schools

The majority opinion first discourages public schools from promoting mutual toleration and understanding their constitutional rights by asserting the following message infringes on the religious liberty of parents: “Two people can get married, regardless of whether they are of the same or opposite sex, so long as they “love each other.” (Mahmoud v. Taylor at 23). According to the majority, celebrating the constitutionally protected marriage between people of the opposite sex is acceptable, but celebrating the constitutionally protected marriage between two people enshrined in Obergefell v. Hodges may cause “destruction” for religious communities. While the dissent describes this reasoning as pure “absurdity,” the decision will discourage public schools from affirming the constitutionally protected right to marriage equality or promoting mutual toleration of marriage traditions and norms across religious and cultural identities. In enshrining this absurdity in the Constitution, the Court also undermines the intolerance against the children of LGBTQAI+ couples explicitly rejected in Windsor v. United States (2013). In effect, the Court encourages public schools to erode mutual tolerance and constitutional literacy by invisibilizing the constitutional rights of LGBTQAI+ families, “mak[ing] it even more difficult for [] children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and their daily lives.” Amicus Brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas at 29 (citing Windsor).

Disregarding constitutional protections against discrimination

The majority further discourages public schools from promoting mutual toleration and accurate understandings of constitutional rights when recasting the following message as another unconstitutional burden on religious liberty: “Sex and gender are [not always] inseparable” (Mahmoud v. Taylor at 3). In terms of mutual toleration, the majority “fail[s] to accept and account for a fundamental truth: LGBTQ people exist. They are part of virtually every community and workplace of any appreciable size.” (Sotomayor dissenting, at 21). By asserting that the Free Exercise clause “requires the government to alter its programs to insulate students from that “message,” the Court forecloses the possibility of schools teaching public school students, especially those who currently or may later identify as LGBTQAI+, about their constitutional rights to Equal Protection.

For example, in Bostock v. Clayton County, the Court determined that it is impossible to discriminate against homosexual or transgender people without engaging in sex discrimination. See Brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 24. However, under Mahmoud, a school cannot affirm that gender and sex are separable, foreclosing the possibility of a public school student even conceptualizing the idea of LGBTQAI+ people existing with constitutional rights. To teach an accurate understanding of the Constitution and basic rights in this country, public schools would need to have the authority to explain that LGBTQAI+ people exist and that “the differential treatment by the state” as compared to heteronormative or cisgender should “amount[] to impermissible sex discrimination under Equal Protection.” Amicus brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas at 24. However, the Court instructs schools to neglect existing constitutional protections for isolated minorities like the LGBTQAI+ community and, in some ways, encourage students to further erode them. In doing so, the Court allows for the further decay of Equal Protection and mutual toleration — an indispensable guardrail for what remains of our democratic institutions.

Looking forward

While the majority emphasizes that the holding of Mahmoud v. Taylor applies specifically to the context of storytime with “impressionable children,” that is plainly untrue. The Court’s willingness to take up cases like Mahmoud, Skrmetti, and Chiles v. Salazar within a single year reveals a willingness to entertain experiments in democratic backsliding. More importantly, LGBTQAI+ families in and outside of public schools will continue to feel the impact of the constitutional rot of Equal Protection and mutual toleration for generations to come. In coming months, the Court will rule on whether to expand the Free Exercise Clause to therapy sessions. If it decides that it does, mental health counselors may hold a constitutional right to suggest conversion therapy to an LGBTQAI+ fourth grader in the same school where parents hold a constitutional right to facilitate a mass exodus when LGBTQAI+ lives are mentioned in the classroom. And if that is not enough, it is only a matter of time before one of the university complaints seeking relief from the Trump administration’s university funding freezes reaches the Court. Then, five justices will decide whether the government can also restrict college students from learning and celebrating topics too controversial for storytime in K-12 schools.

If the conservative fringe has focused on children’s constitutional rights as the site for its political-legal project, defenders of constitutional democracy must do the same.

The post Laboratories of Authoritarianism appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Jeremiah Chin: Silencing Children’s Rights (Repost from Verfassungsblog) – United States

Jeremiah Chin: Silencing Children’s Rights (Repost from Verfassungsblog) – United States

The U.S. Supreme Court decided Mahmoud v. Taylor on June 27, 2025. In doing so, it dramatically expanded parental rights over students and education without concern for the rights of children or consideration of pedagogy and curriculum. While the current era of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has repeatedly blurred lines dividing religious groups and state power under the First Amendment, Mahmoud rewrites the First Amendment for children entirely. The Court concluded that the government burdens the religious exercise of parents by failing to provide mandatory notice and opt-out policies when school materials include Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender (LGBTQ+) topics. Instead of addressing the plurality of views around sexual orientation and gender, the Court indirectly, but unsubtly, installs a traditional values framework that imposes norms of heterosexuality, religious fundamentalism and parental micromanagement of curriculum. This simultaneously threatens the expression, learning, and community built in schools for everyone.

The stories of Mahmoud v. Taylor

Decided on June 27, 2025, Mahmoud v. Taylor represents a struggle between religious parents and secular public education over curriculum in Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) in Maryland. Maryland incorporated several suggested texts for instructors that would include LGBTQ+ characters to better reflect the diverse community of students and parents within the district. Several parents objected on religious grounds, requesting the school provide notice and offer an opt-out option when such materials are used in the classroom. At first, MCPS was willing to provide the option to parents but found the measures administratively unfeasible and potentially stigmatizing to students, concluding that no notice or opt-out was required because parents had access to book lists prior to every school year.

The different justices’ retellings of the case reveal their radically different framings of the facts. In the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Samuel Alito describes the origins of the conflict as rooting “in the years leading up to 2022”, when the MCPS “apparently ‘determined that the books used in its existing English and Language Arts curriculum were not representative of many students and families in Montgomery County’” because they did not include LGBTQ characters. According to Alito, this prompted the school district to include five storybooks for children between 5 and 11 years old. The pointed use of “apparently” and the lack of context make the MCPS decision appear abrupt and arbitrary rather than a good-faith effort by the school district to provide a more robust curriculum.

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, in turn, reveals that the Court’s framing obfuscates a long effort by MCPS in reconciling the fact that “certain perspectives…were absent from its English language curriculum,” and only the latest in a broad effort to promote a “fully inclusive environment for all students’ by using instructional materials that reflect [the] diversity of the global community, including persons with disabilities, persons from diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, as well as persons of diverse gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.” Justice Sotomayor’s telling of the facts focuses on the MCPS Board, subject matter experts, and teachers building a diverse and inclusive curriculum. Justice Alito’s framing in turn assumes the position of the plaintiffs, a religiously diverse coalition of parents whose sincerely held religious beliefs’ most apparent common thread is anti-LGBTQ bias.

Though Justice Alito is rhetorically deeply concerned with impressionable “young children, like those of [the plaintiff parents],” he spends little time talking about the rights, experiences, or issues faced by children in the classroom. Instead, he accuses the dissent of trying to “divert attention from…children subject to the instruction” by emphasizing the texts, characters, and importance of the curriculum. According to Justice Alito, the dissent takes on a “deliberately blinkered view” and is “air-brushing the record” by arguing that the inclusion of books with LGBTQ characters is “just about exposure and kindness.” Justice Alito’s framing of the issues for the majority views the books as “impos[ing] upon children a set of values and beliefs that are ‘hostile’ to their parents’ religious beliefs.” In this light, the mere inclusion and existence of these five books with LGBTQ characters and themes and instructional guidance for teachers presents an existential threat to religion. These books only make up a small percentage of the curriculum – with guidance for classroom discussion that affirms that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and other people exist and have rights to exist.

The hyperbolic disaster-framing by Justice Alito, therefore, concludes that because “the storybooks unmistakably convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender” and instructional materials “specifically encouraged teachers to reinforce this viewpoint” and discuss disagreements with students, the policy of inclusion, therefore, burdens the parents’ right to the free exercise of religion and is subject to strict scrutiny, which means that a government must demonstrate that its policy advances compelling government interests and is narrowly tailored to achieve those ends. The failure to permit an opt-out when including these LGBTQ storybooks thus unconstitutionally burdens the parents’ rights of control over their children. The Court disclaims that the Board’s proposed curriculum has any educational value. It simply states that it places an unconstitutional burden on the parent’s religious exercise if it is imposed without the chance for opt-outs. In doing so, it sidesteps any good-faith balancing of interests. Worse: It fails to recognize that including and discussing books from different perspectives in a school curriculum has value in an educational environment.

Faith, parents, and the first amendment

The Court’s broad reading of the parental rights to control the upbringing of their children paradoxically narrows the understanding of the First Amendment to be strictly a relationship between parents and the government. Fundamentally, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is a restriction on the power of the state. It proclaims that Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Later applied to State governments and municipalities, the amendment’s broad language reflects the importance the authors placed on resistance to state suppression of religious, expressive, and associational freedoms.

Theoretically, this freedom to believe, express, and associate should also apply broadly to a variety of perspectives. No single religion or type of speech is singled out, and the only subject of restriction is the state. That is, First Amendment rights should impose restrictions on the state, not compulsion for individuals to act, talk, believe, or associate in specific ways. But despite its expansive declaration of freedom that would prohibit governmental interference with expression or religion, the First Amendment has often faced limiting principles to facilitate the practical governance of a diverse, pluralistic society.

In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), the Court recognized that “neutral laws of general applicability” could be constitutionally imposed on religious conduct and beliefs. The decision prohibited members of the Native American Church from receiving unemployment benefits. The plaintiffs were Indigenous persons who practiced their faith by taking peyote as part of a traditional ceremony. Justice Scalia claimed that the policy in question, prohibiting persons taking drugs from receiving unemployment benefits, did not unconstitutionally burden the plaintiffs’ religious practice. The reason was that this practice was “unconnected” to other valid constitutional rights and to “any communicative activity, or parental right.” Neutral laws of general applicability are therefore presumed valid unless they compel expression or interfere with other constitutional rights, in which case they are subjected to closer scrutiny.

Even when neutrally worded and generally applicable, state laws that compel expression and conduct can be unconstitutional. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), for example, the Court struck down a state law requiring compulsory flag salutes and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance – practices that violated the beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness student whose faith prohibits pledging allegiance to symbols like the flag. State laws that compel school attendance, on the other hand, are generally constitutional. Exceptions to this are state laws that restrict parents’ rights to choose private religious schools over public schools (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925) and laws compelling school attendance that directly contradict religious beliefs (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1971).

Critically, none of these cases, which articulate the free exercise of religion and parental rights, give parents total control over their children. Both Barnette and Pierce emphasize the importance of public education in preparing children to participate in society and sustain democratic governance. The answer in these cases was not to isolate children but to ensure the curriculum was inclusive of their religious practices. In Barnette, for example, the Court did not bar schools from including the pledge in their curriculum – it simply held that students could not be compelled to recite it.

In Justice Alito’s account in Mahmoud, students are exposed to a curriculum and instructions acknowledging the existence and rights of LGBTQ individuals – an exposure he suggests amounts to a violation of religious tenets. Yet even on his own terms, the burden on parents lies in the mere exposure to viewpoints that may conflict with their beliefs, not in any form of compelled activity. No assignment requires students to affirm a particular viewpoint, and the schools do not evaluate students based on what they say, think, or believe. The stories are readily available and read to the class, accompanied by instructions for teachers on how to engage with students in a way that validates both the story and the student.

Viewpoint discrimination

The Court has often found that the answer to disfavored speech, or expression that might be contrary to the views of others, is still protected speech. As Justice Alito explained in Matal v. Tam: “giving offense is a viewpoint.” Freedom of speech and free exercise of religion under the constitution, therefore, must include even those ideas that some might find offensive, with limited exceptions for speech that imminently incites lawless activity (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969) or obscenity (though the Court struggles to find a solid definition of the concept). The requirement of neutral laws of general applicability guards against so-called content- or viewpoint-based regulations of speech.

Mahmoud v. Taylor launders viewpoint discrimination through parental rights, allowing the regulation of classroom content through parental opt-outs while completely ignoring the students as learners, participants, or even people with rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Court built upon cases like Barnette and Pierce, highlighting the importance of children’s speech within schools and validating that students hold First Amendment rights in schools. It found the suspension of young persons for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War unconstitutional. Justice Abe Fortas explained for the majority that “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”

Justice Alito in Mahmoud extends this to parents. As he notes, the parent’s “right to free exercise, like other First Amendment rights, is not ‘shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate.’” This paraphrase of Tinker excludes the fact that students and teachers possess the same rights of free exercise, expression, and association in schools as well in not-so-subtle ways. A constitutionally mandated parental opt-out that the Court provides in Mahmoud defies the reasoning of West Virginia v. Barnette, which Justice Alito relies on as the foundation of his analysis of parental rights. In Barnette, Justice Robert Jackson explained, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Yet Justice Alito’s decision in Mahmoud allows parents to compel teachers and school officials to ensure their prescribed orthodoxy, meaning students no longer may discuss, express, or associate with LGBTQ storybooks as part of the official curriculum.

For those who come after

The Court’s opinion in Mahmoud v. Taylor sacrifices student’s First Amendment rights in the name of parental control. This enables parents to compel the speech and beliefs of students rather than let students develop their own thoughts, views, and beliefs – free to conform or disagree with the beliefs of their parents and classmates. This type of compelled speech would otherwise be prohibited. Mahmoud allows parents to compel the state to engage in viewpoint discrimination – something neither the parents nor the state could achieve alone, whether as a matter of constitutional law or practical enforcement.

Mahmoud decides on a vision of the future that is very much rooted in the past, severely restricting students from engaging with views that they may or may not share. Elsewhere, I have discussed how the history and traditional uses of originalism by the current Supreme Court bind us to narrow historical reasoning rather than an expansive historical understanding of the future – proposing Constitutional Futurism as a remedy to the originalism that has overturned reproductive rights, gun control, and now even children’s right to inclusive education and expression in Mahmoud v. Taylor. Justice Alito’s majority opinion endorses robust parental control over students, teachers and schools, when those parents already have curriculum oversight through ordinary democratic processes. The Court fails to recognize students – and children generally – as persons with rights, thoughts, and opinions that also deserve consideration. Rather than relying on tradition and compulsion, instruction can provide students with a way of questioning that can interrogate or even affirm their beliefs. This failure to recognize the personhood of children misses the expansive potential of future generations, all in the name of history and tradition.

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UK: Football Assocation requires trans men to say they are ‘biologically female’

UK: Football Assocation requires trans men to say they are ‘biologically female’

  • 8 July 2025

The Football Association’s updated requirements for transgender men who want to play in male sport requires players to agree they are a “biological female” and “have a greater risk of injury when playing against adult biological males”.

The FA changed its rules on trans people’s participation in English football earlier this year following the UK Supreme Court’s ruling on 16 April that the legal definition of a woman is based on biological sex.

While transgender women have been banned from female football in FA-affiliated competitions since 1 June, trans men are still allowed to play in men’s matches.

However they must fill out a statement, available from the FA since June following the policy coming into place, declaring they are transgender and more liable to be injured than other players.

More: https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/articles/cvg89449lv7o