Category Archives: Allgemein

English Football Association bans transgender athletes from women’s football

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English Football Association bans transgender athletes from women’s football

The English Football Association on Thursday stated that transgender women will no longer be allowed to play women’s football in England, announcing a change in its policy following a ruling by the UK Supreme Court last month.

The Football Association’s new policy will take effect on June 1. The association stated: “This is a complex subject, and our position has always been that if there was a material change in law, science, or the operation of the policy in grassroots football then we would review it and change it if necessary.”

The policy update is a response to the UK Supreme Court’s ruling on April 16, 2025, which stated that the term “woman” under the Equality Act 2010 referred to biological sex. This excludes individuals who had legally changed their gender to female through a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). Transgender people remain protected on the grounds of gender reassignment under Section 4 of the Equality Act. Additionally, they may invoke the provisions on direct discrimination and harassment as well as indirect discrimination. The court stated that “a certificated sex reading is not required to give them those protections.”

The Supreme Court emphasized that the ruling was only interpreting the Equality Act, stating:

It is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex, nor is it to define the meaning of the word “woman” other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010. It has a more limited role which does not involve making policy.

The UK’s Sports Councils previously expressed concerns over the fairness of transgender inclusion in domestic sport. Other sporting organizations, such as British Rowing, had already excluded transgender athletes from competing in the women’s category before the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The charity Stonewall criticized the Football Association’s decision on Thursday. The organization stated:

Trans people remain protected under the law and need to be treated with dignity and respect – and this announcement lacks any detail on how those obligations will be honoured. Hasty decisions, without a full understanding of the practical implications and before any changes to guidance have gone through the necessary consultation and parliamentary process, isn’t the answer.

The post English Football Association bans transgender athletes from women’s football appeared first on JURIST – News.

THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF VIOLENCE: HOW QUEER-FEMINIST STRUGGLES EXPOSE THE ARCHITECTURE OF CRISIS,12 May, 18:30-20:00 CEST Geneva Maison de la paix | Room S8

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THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF VIOLENCE: HOW QUEER-FEMINIST STRUGGLES EXPOSE THE ARCHITECTURE OF CRISIS
12 May, 18:30-20:00 CEST Geneva Maison de la paix | Room S8
 
Register: https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/choreography-violence-how-feminist-queer-struggles-expose-architecture-crisis
 
War crimes from Gaza to Lebanon and Sudan. The global resurgence of anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-feminist legislation. The tightening grip of border regimes, financial austerity, and corporate expansion. Across the world, we are witnessing not isolated crises but a synchronised choreography of violence, one in which militarised destruction, economic control, and moral repression move together, reinforcing each other in deliberate and strategic ways.   But why does violence against queer and feminist movements intensify alongside war and economic collapse? Why do sexual and gender panics flare up at the same moment states and corporations deepen repression and extraction? And how does the language of protection, morality, and security become a cover for systems of domination?   Bringing together scholars and activists, the Queer International Student Assembly (QISA), in collaboration with the Gender Centre and the Feminist Collective, is pleased to invite you to this seminar which serves as a soft launch for a larger forum in the fall, where we will continue these urgent discussions.   SPEAKERS Hossein Cheaito, PhD Researcher in Sociology and Anthropology, QISA co-president, Geneva Graduate Institute Aadarsh Gangwar, PhD Researcher in Sociology and Anthropology, Geneva Graduate Institute Paola Salwan Daher, Women Deliver.   The discussion will be moderated by Aditya Bharadwaj, Geneva Graduate Institute.

Trans people banned from toilets of gender they identify with, says UK minister

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Trans people banned from toilets of gender they identify with, says UK minister

Pat McFadden says ‘there isn’t going to be toilet police’ amid warnings about ‘incredibly dangerous’ consequences

;ore: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2025/apr/27/trans-people-banned-from-toilets-of-gender-they-identify-with-says-uk-minister

Article by Fulvia Ristuccia: (de) la Tour fait le cavalier [Advocate General de la Tour handed down his Opinion in C-713/23, Wojewoda Mazowiecki]

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Article by Fulvia Ristuccia: (de) la Tour fait le cavalier [Advocate General de la Tour handed down his Opinion in C-713/23, Wojewoda Mazowiecki]

On 3 April 2025, Advocate General de la Tour handed down his Opinion in C-713/23, Wojewoda Mazowiecki, a case that further advances the path opened by Coman on the protection of rainbow families through the exercise of free movement and EU citizenship rights. The referring court demanded clarification on the recognition and transcription of same-sex marriage contracted in another Member State between two nationals of the State where recognition was sought.

The Opinion of AG de la Tour commendably advances the Coman trajectory by acknowledging that even EU Member States where same-sex marriage is not permitted must recognise a family bond lawfully established in another Member State – including for purposes beyond mere residence. Yet, akin to a knight’s leap in chess, the Opinion sidestepped the question of marriage transcription in civil status registry with a reasoning that does not seem entirely convincing. It insulates the national competence on civil status register from the reach of EU law, without a sound explanation, and is liable to create hurdles for LGBTIQA+ families seeking recognition.

Recognition of LGBTIQA+ rights beyond the right to move and reside

With Coman in 2018, the Court defined the term “spouse” in Article 2(2)(a) CRD as encompassing also same-sex married couples (Coman, para 35). Under that provision, the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen, lawfully married during genuine residence in another Member State, has a right to reside irrespective of whether the State of residence recognises same-sex marriage (Coman, para 36).

Coman constituted a first – crucial – step in the protection of LGBTIQA+ family rights through EU citizenship. Yet, as the Court stressed that the recognition of same-sex marriage is limited to the right to reside (Coman, para 40), it left many questions unanswered regarding the families’ rights for purposes beyond free movement (Tryfonidou and the Opinion of de la Tour himself in Mirin, para 96). The case Wojewoda Mazowiecki aimed at confronting the CJEU precisely with those issues.

Facts

Polish civil status authorities refused to transcribe the marriage certificate for a same-sex couple of Polish nationals (one of whom also with German nationality) married in Germany and residing in Poland. Since Polish law does not allow same-sex marriage, one of the spouses would be wrongly recorded under the heading “woman”. Moreover, according to the Polish authorities, registering such a marriage would be “contrary to fundamental principles of the Polish legal order”. Finally, in their view, refusal to register the marriage would not conflict with EU law, as the recognition was not being requested for the purposes of residence or passport issuance.

The referring court (the Polish Supreme Administrative Court), on appeal, asked the CJEU whether EU law (in particular Art. 20 and 21 TFEU, and Art. 7 and 21 EU Charter, and 2(2) CRD) preclude a Member State from refusing to recognize the marriage and transcribe it into the civil status registry, thus preventing the applicants from living under their marital status in their State.

The Opinion of AG de la Tour: one step ahead

The AG separated from the outset the question of recognition of the marriage from that of its transcription. Regarding the former, whilst Member States retain their competence on civil status, they have to exercise it in compliance with EU law and recognise the change of status legitimately occurred in the exercise of free movement under Article 21 TFEU (para 27).

The AG started by distinguishing the recognition of family ties (inter-personal status) from personal status (paras 28-30). Amendments to the latter, such as recognition of gender transition, must be transcribed in civil status records (Mirin para 57). Conversely, following Coman on same-sex marriage and Pancharevo on same-sex parenthood, Member States are required to recognise changes in inter-personal status, but only for purposes related to movement, residence, or the issuance of travel documents.

Going beyond the reasoning in those cases, the AG held that in situations falling within the scope of EU law – because the applicants exercised their right to free movement and lawfully got married in another Member State – the refusal to recognise that marriage constitutes a restriction to the rights under Article 21 TFEU (para 32). As in Coman, the applicants were invoking rights against their State of nationality in a circular migration context. However, unlike Coman, the issue at hand did not concern the definition of the term spouse and the residence right under the CRD applied by analogy, even though the CRD was referenced in the preliminary question. In fact, recognition of the marriage was not necessary for the right to reside since both applicants were Polish nationals. Rather, the question was whether a family bond, once lawfully established in another Member State, must be recognised and protected throughout the EU. The main concern, therefore, revolved around the right to return – based solely on Article 21 TFEU. For this right to be effective, it must include the ability to return to one’s Member State of origin after having genuinely exercised free movement (a point not addressed by the AG), and to live there with one’s family status fully recognised and protected.

Despite being anchored in Article 21 TFEU, the core of the case arguably lies in the effective safeguard of the right to family life under Article 7 EU Charter (para 33), extending beyond a free-movement-only solution, as the recognition of the effects of the marriage is not limited to residence or the issuance of travel documents. Commendably, the AG examined the potential violation of fundamental rights – more thoroughly than the free movement aspects – focusing on the lack of any form of legal recognition for same-sex families. This echoes the ECtHR’s ruling in Przybyszewska and Others v. Poland (para 35), where such non-recognition was deemed incompatible with the Convention.

Consequently, the AG concluded that where a Member State does not provide a specific legal framework for rainbow families – thereby denying individuals the right to autonomously determine a fundamental aspect of their private and family life – it must, under EU law, at least “establish appropriate procedures for the recognition of ties established in another Member State” through the exercise of free movement (para 36). Remarkably, mutual recognition seems to compensate for the absence of domestic protection or even the explicit prohibition of same-sex marriage. This suggests that Treaty rights may chart an alternative route to safeguard the fundamental rights of rainbow families when national avenues are barred (see, on Coman, Belavusau). Moreover, in line with Coman, such an obligation does not violate the national identity of the Member State (para 36), and it is submitted that it offers a balanced solution: fundamental rights are protected through EU citizenship without requiring the Member State to provide for same-sex marriage domestically.

Two steps sideways

On the transcription of marriage in civil status records, Wojewoda Mazowiecki seems to serve as a test case for the evolution witnessed in Mirin, where the Court held that Member States have a strict duty of mutual recognition and transcription in civil status records of a gender transition recognised in another Member State. The AG acknowledged the obligations stemming from that case but distinguished the transcription of changes to personal status (e.g., gender identity or name) from those regarding inter-personal status (e.g., marriage, parenthood). Regarding family ties, de la Tour followed the stance he had anticipated in Mirin: the transcription of changes to inter-personal status does not ensue automatically from the obligation of mutual recognition (Mirin, Opinion, paras. 87 and ff.).

This conclusion takes two steps sideways from the first part of the Opinion. First, it distinguishes between the recognition of the effects of a marriage and the obligation to transcribe it – the latter applying only to matters of personal identity, and not to inter-personal statuses (para 38). Second, the AG asserted that transcription is not required unless the recognition of the marriage’s effects would be ineffective without it. In Poland, the administrative practice is such that transcription is the only way of proving a marriage. Hence, to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the right to family life without undue administrative obstacles, Polish authorities must transcribe the marriage (para 45). However, this obligation does not apply to all Member States, provided that they foresee alternative mechanisms to secure the rights under Article 7 EU Charter and that the “formality” of transcription is not necessary for the marriage to be proven and produce legal effects (para 46).

This turn in the reasoning is not persuasive for several reasons. The distinction between the transcription of changes to personal identity and those relating to family status is difficult to sustain. In both cases, “serious inconveniences” may arise. Family ties are inherently linked to “the personal and the social identity of the applicants as homosexual people wishing to have their relationships as couples legitimised and protected by law” (para 35, referring to ECtHR case law on the lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples).

Moreover, the Opinion insufficiently explains the reasons for the strong insulation of national competence over the transcription of civil status – which the Opinion itself describes as a “formality” – in contrast to the recognition, prescribed by EU law, of the substantive effects of the same-sex marriage. While the AG read the scope of Member States’ obligations through the lens of their administrative procedural autonomy, he failed to acknowledge the unconvincing practical consequences of recognition without transcription. How would that work in practice? The alternatives proposed (para 54) – i.e. presenting the marriage certificate, which does not require legalisation, or allowing the spouses to use the same surname – are not as effective as transcription. Would individuals be expected to carry their marriage certificate – duly translated, one might imagine – in their wallet at all times? De la Tour overlooked the hurdles that the lack of transcription of inter-personal status would cause in the daily life of individuals, as well as in the exercise of their (fundamental) rights as a family.

Even considering the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, this part of the reasoning remains doubtful. Noting that the applicants sought recognition of their marriage to exercise domestic rights (para 43), the AG highlighted that civil status records fall within national “exclusive competence”. However, the recognition of the legal effects of marriage does not fall within the scope of EU competences either, and still, Member States must exercise their retained competences in compliance with EU law, and, as the AG held, recognise the same-sex marriage lawfully contracted in another Member State – beyond free movement purposes. Accordingly, it is unclear why transcription should be treated any differently?

The Opinion does not convincingly justify this differentiation, which creates significant obstacles to the effectiveness of EU citizens’ rights. In the AG’s view, a general obligation to transcribe the marital status would “move from an approach based on the principle of free movement of a Union citizen that is limited to his or her identity, to an approach based solely on the right to respect for his or her family life”, which would be “incorporated into the right of free movement and residence and would be detached from any derived right” (para 57). However, as the Court repeatedly stated, in the exercise of free movement, EU citizens have a right to lead a normal family life (Lounes, para 52 and Lazzerini). Accordingly, that right is already “incorporated” into free movement law. Leaving Member States a margin to decide which degree of administrative burden can they impose on LGBTIQA+ families seems like an unnecessary formal compensation for the substantive obligation to recognise the marriage.

The AG laudably relied on Member States’ international commitments under the ECHR to reinforce EU Charter rights that touch upon politically sensitive areas (Spaventa). Nevertheless, the fact that transcription falls within the States’ margin of appreciation under the Convention – and is therefore not mandated by the latter (paras 51-52) – is of limited relevance. Under Article 52(3) EU Charter, EU law can go beyond the ECHR protection (compare to para 53). Furthermore, the margin of appreciation doctrine, as developed by the ECtHR, is not entirely congruent in this context. Unlike Orlandi v Italy, the issue at hand is not about the duty to enact domestic reforms to introduce a legal framework on same-sex marriage or partnership. Rather, the present situation concerns the obligation to recognise a family bond lawfully established in another Member State and ease the administrative burdens to ensure effective protection of the applicants’ rights, particularly non-discrimination and respect for family life (on the different nature of those obligations, see Nic Shuibhne and Bacic). Such a duty is grounded in EU citizenship and the logic of mutual recognition, which may simultaneously require more – such as recognition and transcription – and less – by not imposing domestic reforms – than what is demanded under the ECHR.

Conclusion

Overall, the Opinion seeks to find a balance between the different interests at stake: the fundamental rights of the applicants – and of the many families in similar circumstances – the politically sensitive concerns of certain Member States, and, ultimately, the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Despite taking a step ahead in a fundamental-rights-oriented direction regarding the recognition of same-sex marriage beyond the free movement purposes, de la Tour chose a rather cautious and unconvincing approach to transcription. By holding that the latter is not required under EU law unless recognition would be ineffective without it, the AG shifted laterally, evading challenging questions with significant practical and fundamental rights implications for individuals.

The post (de) la Tour fait le cavalier appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Greek Court Overturns Policy Allowing Blood Donation from MSM

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Greek Court Overturns Policy Allowing Blood Donation from MSM

April 08, 2025

Greece’s top administrative court has overturned a 2022 decree from the Ministry of Health that removed sexual orientation questions from the country’s donor history questionnaire, the Greek newspaper Kathimerini reported April 5. Prior to the ministerial decree, gay, bisexual and other men who have sex with men (MSM) had been permanently deferred from blood donation since 1977. 

In its decision, the Council of State ruled that the change bypassed expert recommendations and lacked a supporting scientific study. The court also found that the ministry disregarded earlier guidance from two advisory panels, which advocated for time-based deferral periods. The Ministry of Health must now reevaluate the policy to ensure it aligns with both scientific evidence and constitutional protections, according to the report.

See: https://www.aabb.org/news-resources/news/article/2025/04/08/greek-court-overturns-policy-allowing-blood-donation-from-msm

UN Commission on Ukraine accuses Russia of enforced disappearances, sexual assault against men and women, torture, and executing POWs (The Insider)

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UN Commission on Ukraine accuses Russia of enforced disappearances, sexual assault against men and women, torture, and executing POWs (The Insider)

March 20, 2025

On March 19, Erik Møse, Chair of the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, presented a report on crimes committed by the Russian military during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The commission interviewed almost 1,800 individuals, including victims and witnesses of the violations and crimes described.

Among its key findings was the conclusion that the armed conflict has resulted in over 12,000 civilian deaths and more than 29,000 injuries among civilians in Ukraine. The report also noted that Russian forces have also detained large numbers of civilians in all occupied regions of Ukraine, targeting local officials, civil servants, journalists, and others perceived as threats to their military objectives. Many prisoners of war were also subjected to enforced disappearances.

“These crimes were carried out as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, in all provinces of Ukraine where areas came under Russian control, and in the Russian Federation,” Møse explained.

“The victims were often transferred to detention facilities in Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine or deported to the Russian Federation. In these detention facilities, they were subjected to other grave violations and crimes, including torture and sexual violence. Many persons have been missing for months, or years. Some have died. The fate and whereabouts of many remain unknown, leaving their families in agonizing uncertainty,” he added in a press release issued after the presentation to the UNHRC.

The commission concluded that the “enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity.”

FSB officers regularly used torture or ordered its use. “Personnel of the Federal Security Service exercised the highest authority when present in detention facilities. They committed or ordered torture during various stages of detentions, and in particular during interrogations, when some of the most brutal treatment was inflicted,” explained Vrinda Grover, another member of the commission.

Russian authorities systematically committed sexual violence as a form of torture against detainees. The majority of victims were men — but the commission has now documented new cases of rape and sexual violence, used as forms of torture against female detainees, who were subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. “Some women were raped during interrogation as a means to coerce, intimidate or punish them; others were subjected to forced nudity in the presence of male guards. This illustrates the gendered dimension of sexual violence in detention,” Møse continued. “A victim of rape told the Commission, ‘I can’t describe all of it… Those drunk, stinking men, tearing my clothes, treating me like I was a rubber doll… It was unbearable.’”

“A civilian woman who had been raped during confinement in a detention facility held by Russian authorities, stated that she pleaded with the perpetrators, telling them she could be their mother’s age, but they dismissed her, saying, ‘B*tch, don’t even compare yourself to my mother. You are not even a human. You do not deserve to live.’

We have concluded that Russian authorities committed the war crimes of rape and sexual violence as a form of torture,” Grover concluded.

The commission also investigated the growing number of incidents involving the killing or wounding by Russian forces of Ukrainian soldiers who had been captured or were attempting to surrender — a war crime. Some soldiers reported hearing orders not to take prisoners, but to kill them instead. For instance, a Russian deserter who spoke to the commission recounted hearing a battalion commander say: “We don’t take prisoners. Those Nazis should not be taken in captivity, they should be killed.”

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine is a United Nations-mandated body established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2022 — shortly after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

It is tasked with gathering evidence on crimes committed in Ukraine, identifying responsible parties, and assessing whether these crimes amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Its findings can be used in legal proceedings and could serve as evidence for future war crimes trials — including at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Source: https://theins.press/en/news/279811

Article by Sarthak Gupta: Back to Binary Basics [UK]

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Article by Sarthak Gupta: Back to Binary Basics [UK]

On April 16 2025, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (Supreme Court) delivered its decision on a fundamental question regarding the interpretation of the terms “sex” and “woman” under the Equality Act 2010 (EA) i.e., whether the EA includes trans women with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) issued under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA). The Court unanimously held that, under the EA, the meaning of the word “woman” must be restricted to “biological” women, and does not include trans women, even those who have legally changed their gender under the GRA. The decision risks undermining the UK’s equality law framework and marks a troubling regression in gender rights.

Women’s rights v. transgender rights

For Women Scotland (FWS), an organisation purporting to act for women’s rights, initiated this case as their second judicial review, challenging statutory guidance issued under Section 7 of the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018. The 2018 Act set a gender representation objective of 50% women in non-executive posts on Scottish public authority boards. Section 2 defines “woman” to include persons with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment who were “living as a woman” and undergoing transition processes. In their first judicial review, FWS successfully challenged this definition, with the Inner House ruling on February 18, 2022, that “transgender women” is not a protected characteristic under the EA and that the definition “impinges on the nature of protected characteristics, which is a reserved matter.” The Court declared the definition outside the Scottish Parliament’s legislative competence (paras. 15-18).

In response, the Scottish Ministers issued revised guidance on April 19, 2022, which operated on the premise that the Court had nullified the statutory definition of “woman”. The new guidance stated that under Sections 11 and 212(1) of the EA, and per Section 9(1) of the GRA, women with full GRC would count as women toward the Act’s 50% representation objective. The Scottish Government based this position on the notion that a trans woman with a full GRC has changed her sex in law from male to female (paras. 19-23). FWS then petitioned for judicial review in July 2022, arguing this revised guidance was unlawful and beyond devolved competence under Section 54 of the Scotland Act 1998 (paras. 21-22).

This raised the central legal question whether references to “sex”, “woman”, and “female” in the EA should be interpreted in light of Section 9 of the GRA 2004 to include women with a GRC. The case specifically addressed only the status of the small minority of trans individuals with full GRC(s) (approximately 8,464 people out of 96,000 trans people in England and Wales and 19,990 trans people in Scotland), whose sex remains in law their biological sex. In the later decision by the Outer House of the Court of Session, on December 13, 2022,  Lady Haldane had dismissed FWS’s petition, holding that Section 9 of the GRA 2004 could scarcely be clearer in changing a person’s sex for all purposes, and that the EA was “drafted in full awareness of the 2004 Act” (para. 27). The Second Division of the Inner House subsequently refused FWS’s appeal, confirming that a person with a GRC “acquires the opposite gender for all purposes” unless specific exceptions apply, and that persons with GRCs possess the protected characteristic of sex according to their GRC as well as gender reassignment (paras. 28-29).

Decoding the UK Supreme Court’s decision

The Supreme Court allowed the second judicial review and held that “sex” (and related terms) in the EA meant a binary idea of “biological sex”. The Court reiterated that under Section 9(1) of the GRA 2004, the acquired gender of a person with a GRC is recognised “for all purposes”, unless an exception under Section 9(3) applies. Section 9(3) provides that this rule does not apply where another enactment (like the EA) has made a specific “provision” that displaces this effect. The Court emphasised that such displacement does not need to be explicit or by necessary implication – contextual and purposive analysis may also suffice (para. 156).

The Court held that the terms “sex” and “woman” in the EA are to be interpreted as referring only to “biological” sex and “biological” women. To determine the intended meaning of “sex” and “woman” in the EA, the Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of its structure and purpose. It stressed the importance of predictability, clarity, and workability in equality law, which is grounded in group-based rights tied to shared experiences and biological realities (paras. 153-154, 171-172). The Court reasoned that many provisions in the EA 2010 – such as those dealing with pregnancy, maternity, breast-feeding, and health and safety exemptions – could only be coherently interpreted by reference to biological sex, since only biological women can become pregnant or give birth (paras. 177-188). It is crucial to note that the Court’s analysis was not confined to sections of the EA closely tied to reproduction, but explicitly recognised that single-sex spaces and women’s sports – such as toilets, changing rooms, hospital wards, and sports clubs – will function properly only if “sex” is interpreted as biological sex, with the judgment expected to have far-reaching consequences in these areas (para. 235).

The Court firmly rejected the Scottish Ministers’ argument for a context-dependent or variable definition of “woman” that could accommodate trans as well as cis women within some provisions of the EA (para. 190). It held that allowing different meanings of “woman” in different parts of the EA would violate the “principle of legal certainty” and undermine the statute’s consistency (paras. 191-192, 195). It also dismissed the claim that excluding trans women from the sex-based definition would deprive them of legal protection since trans people are already protected under the separate characteristic of gender reassignment in Section 7 of the EA (para. 198-201).

The Court also considered the practical and legal implications of accepting a certified sex definition. It pointed out that most individuals with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment do not have a GRC, and there is no outward means for duty-bearers (like employers or service providers) to know who does based on appearance. This would make the law extremely difficult to apply and could result in de facto self-identification, thereby undermining women-only spaces and protections (para. 203). For example, services like rape crisis centres, women’s shelters, or single-sex schools would no longer be able to operate meaningfully as women-only services if legal “sex” included trans women (paras. 211-218, 226-228).

Parliament said “all purposes”, Supreme Court said “well, actually…”

The Supreme Court’s decision marks a critical shift in the legal framework governing gender and sex-based rights in the UK. First, it challenges Parliament’s intention in the GRA by limiting the scope of legal recognition for transgender individuals with GRCs, contradicting the “for all purposes” provision and creating legal incoherence. Second, the ruling significantly diminishes the practical value of GRCs by establishing that they do not extend to the definition of “woman” or “man” under the EA, where “biological sex” is considered the statutory meaning, leading to a fragmented legal landscape and policy revisions by public bodies. Third, the Court’s narrow interpretation of “sex” as strictly biological fails to account for the complex lived realities of transgender people, ignoring both the social and physiological aspects of gender identity and creating a binary-centric framework that does not reflect real-world experiences.

The Great British Bake-Off of legal logic

One of the fundamental canons of statutory interpretation is to give effect to Parliament’s intention. The GRA was enacted as a direct response to the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) ruling in Goodwin v UK (2002), which found that the UK’s failure to recognise in law the acquired gender of “transsexual” people violated their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. Parliament’s clear legislative intent was to enable trans people with a GRC to be legally recognised in their acquired gender “for all purposes”, thereby granting them access to the same rights and protections as cisgender individuals of that gender. A transgender person – including someone who has obtained a GRC – may retain biological and physical characteristics of what the Court seems to describe as “biological sex”. The true intention behind section 9(1) of the GRA 2004 was to provide legal recognition and an appropriate framework for such people for all purposes, without exception, unless expressly stated in the law. As the EA contains no express or necessarily implied exception to section 9(1), this should mean that the legal sex of a person with a GRC should be recognised as their acquired gender throughout the Act. However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation, in effect, reads the EA as cutting across the GRA in contexts concerning “sex” discrimination and “sex-related” services.

This judicial construction contradicts the clear legislative purpose of both Acts and undermines the comprehensive legal framework Parliament sought to establish to protect transgender individuals. By doing so, the Court creates legal incoherence where trans people are recognised in some legal contexts but starkly excluded in others. This approach is inconsistent with anti-discrimination protections, undermining the very purpose of the EA to ensure fairness and equality for all protected groups, and thus the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

Too trans for some rights, not trans enough for others

In terms of gender recognition reform, the Court’s interpretation impacts the legal weight of GRC(s). While the GRC process remains in place – allowing individuals to change the “sex” on their birth certificate and be legally recognised in their acquired gender for many administrative and legal purposes – the Court has now drawn a clear boundary: This recognition does not extend to the definition of “woman” or “man” under the EA where “biological sex” is the statutory meaning. This shift has profound practical implications. Previously, obtaining a GRC was seen as the definitive legal step for trans people to be recognised in their acquired gender across all areas of life, including anti-discrimination law. Now, the Supreme Court’s decision means that, for the purposes of the EA, a trans woman with a GRC is not considered a “woman” in contexts where the EA’s sex-based provisions are triggered – such as access to women-only spaces, participation in women’s public boards, or eligibility for women’s quotas.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s concern about practical implementation (see paras. 203, 211-18) that service providers cannot visually distinguish GRC holders creates a false dilemma that was previously addressed by the Scottish Court of Session, which recognised that many protected characteristics (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and religion) are not visually apparent yet remain workable in practice. The Court’s rationale that recognising trans women’s legal sex would undermine women-only spaces relies on unsupported assumptions about safety risks rather than evidence. By prioritising hypothetical implementation concerns over Parliament’s clear intent in both the GRA and EA, the Court effectively creates a hierarchy of rights where practical convenience trumps the legal recognition explicitly granted by statute, an approach that fundamentally misunderstands how anti-discrimination frameworks routinely manage invisible protected characteristics through self-declaration.

The UK Court decision is likely to have a chilling effect. It has already prompted public bodies, such as the British Transport Police, to revise policies so that searches and other “sex-based” procedures are conducted according to the idea of “birth sex”. NHS officials and other service providers are also reviewing guidance on same-sex wards and facilities, with the expectation that trans women, even with a GRC, may be excluded from spaces now reserved for cis women. This creates a fragmented legal landscape where trans people are recognised in some contexts but excluded in others, diminishing the practical utility of the GRC.

Not beyond the binary

The Court’s interpretation of “sex” as strictly “biological”, excluding trans women – even those with GRC(s) – from the legal definition of “woman”, is narrow and binary-centric. This interpretation ignores the lived realities of transgender people, for whom gender “identity” is a deeply felt and integral part of their personhood, not merely a biological fact. It also seems to ignore the biological aspects for some people who are trans: hormonal and physiological changes, which are often visible. Instead, the Court’s reasoning prioritises an essentialist view of “sex” that fails to appreciate the bodily, social and legal complexities surrounding gender (see also Stein and Richardson).

As such, the Court fails to account for how transgender women may experience (intersectional) discrimination precisely because they are perceived as transgressing “sex” categories. The Supreme Court held that a transgender person who faces discrimination has multiple legal pathways for protection: They can claim discrimination based on the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if treated less favourably because they are trans, or they can claim direct sex discrimination if treated less favourably because they are perceived as being a woman (para. 253).

This approach, however, ignores the complex lived realities of transgender individuals whose experiences often involve both gender identity and sex-based discrimination simultaneously. The decision thereby entrenches exclusion and discrimination against trans people, rather than advancing equality in the way that the EA intended to do. Ultimately, the Court’s approach introduces profound ambiguities into equality law by suggesting that legal recognition of transgender people is conditional and partial. This threatens to legitimise discriminatory practices in healthcare, employment, and public services where transgender people already face substantial barriers. Extensive legislative intervention will be required to restore meaningful protections. More concerningly, the judgment may embolden efforts to restrict transgender rights further.

The post Back to Binary Basics appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Poland president asks constitutional tribunal to review criminal amendment on LGBTQ+ hate crime

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Poland president asks constitutional tribunal to review criminal amendment on LGBTQ+ hate crime

Polish President Andrzej Duda sent a bill to the Constitutional Tribunal Thursday for review, seeking to expand on hate crimes provisions by adding sexual orientation, gender and other categories to the list of protected groups. The tribunal will consider whether the bill violates the constitutional right to free speech.

The current Polish Penal Code includes Article 119 which prohibits hatred based on “the victim’s national, ethnic, racial, political or religious affiliation.” Any violence, threats or insults motivated by such traits is punishable by imprisonment for 3 months to 5 years.

In November 2024, the government approved the bill that expanded the provision to criminalize hate crimes based on other characteristics–sexual orientation, gender, age and disability. The Ministry of Justice stated that provisions in existing legislation “do not provide sufficient protection for all minorities, especially those vulnerable to discrimination, prejudice and violence.” The UN Human Rights Council had also expressed concern over the fact that Poland’s hate crime legislation did not include such categories.

In early March 2025, the parliament approved the bill and sent it to the president, who had the right to sign it, veto it or send it to the Constitutional Tribunal. On Thursday, Andrzej Duda said he had sent the bill to the tribunal to verify its compliance with the Constitution.

Duda said he had sent the bill to the tribunal because of doubts that the new provision violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could lead to its abuse and the creation of preventive censorship. He noted that the use of criminal law is justified only when other means of achieving the desired goal are insufficient, but “the drafters have failed to demonstrate that the existing safeguards are insufficient.”

LGBT+ rights advocates condemned the president’s action. Director of the Campaign Against Homophobia, Mirosława Makuchowska, told a local news agency that the decision removes legal protection against hate speech for several at-risk groups. She said, “Unfortunately, we expected this. The president has not shown himself to be tolerant or open.”

Among the populace, “traditional family values” zones are common, where representatives of the LGBTQ+ community are declared unwelcome. This creates an unfavorable atmosphere for representatives of sexual minorities, and contributes to the violation of their rights.

Duda himself has previously expressed his disagreement with what he and his party consider to be “LGBT ideology,” and promised to protect children from this ideology during the election campaign.

The European Court of Human Rights held in 2023 that Poland’s failure to recognize same-sex unions violates the European Convention on Human Rights. The government introduced a draft law in October 2024 to recognize same-sex civil partnerships, but whether the parliament and president will adopt the law remains to be seen.

The post Poland president asks constitutional tribunal to review criminal amendment on LGBTQ+ hate crime appeared first on JURIST – News.

Hungary – Legislative developments: proposed amendments to the Equal Treatment Act and the Fundamental law; fast-track amendment of the law on assemblies to ban the Pride

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Hungary – Legislative developments: proposed amendments to the Equal Treatment Act and the Fundamental law; fast-track amendment of the law on assemblies to ban the Pride

The anti-LGBTIQ campaign of the Hungarian Government continues with legislative measures

More: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/6282-hungary-legislative-developments-proposed-amendments-to-the-equal-treatment-act-and-the-fundamental-law-fast-track-amendment-of-the-law-on-assemblies-to-ban-the-pride