Tag Archives: education

Interesting Article – Repost: Laboratories of Authoritarianism [U.S. Supreme Court]

by Sarah Medina Camiscoli

In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the 1st Amendment Free Exercise Clause to grant conservative religious parents a constitutional right to remove their children from any classroom where a teacher includes LGBTQAI+ people in the curriculum. In effect, the Court has allowed public schools to discourage mutual tolerance, parents to opt out of Equal Protection, and fringe legal strategists to continue to use children’s constitutional rights as a test case for authoritarianism. Youth rights provide fertile ground for authoritarian policies as young people are a vulnerable population, their autonomy is almost entirely up to the discretion of their parents and the state, and lawmakers can easily cloak their desires to remake government institutions under the guise of care, protection, and parent rights. However, youth rights are not entirely separate from those of the rest of society – and the erosion of children’s rights becomes the foundation upon which other rights are eroded.

Constitutional test subjects

Today, a transgender girl in 4th grade can wake up to news anchors discussing how the highest court in the land ruled in Mahmoud v. Taylor that schools may not read books that include trans voices or celebrate families and friends who embrace girls like her. When that 4th grader arrives at school, she might see Mahmoud in action when her teacher hastily moves her peers to different classrooms before reading a book with trans characters because parents must provide “permission” for their children to even acknowledge trans lives. In many states, that same young person will learn that her doctor can no longer provide her with gender-affirming medical treatment because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Skrmetti v. United States. If that young person seeks a counselor to work through the psychic harm of these experiences at school or in doctors offices, the counselor might tell her that trans people do not exist, that her parents are causing harm by providing affirming education and healthcare, and suggest that she consider conversion therapy in a local church. And if the child and her guardian challenge that practice as unethical and harmful, that therapist might be able to assert that the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to develop a constitutional right to do so in Chiles v. Salazar. Keep in mind that this child cannot vote, run for office, and make campaign contributions (but, ironically, she can work certain jobs and pay taxes). This child is not learning in a healthy democracy. She is living as the constitutional test subject of legal strategists.

Scholars of authoritarianism discuss two “soft guardrails” of democracy: 1) “mutual toleration” — a shared understanding that people and parties with different views and values must respect one another as legitimate to promote and uphold democratic institutions; and 2) “forbearance” — the understanding that government actors must demonstrate restraint in their roles to promote checks and balances on state power. These “norms of toleration and restraint” are what keep people with different politics, values, and lifestyles from trying to destroy one another; and the place where they are most often taught and learned are in public schools. But the Court has allowed fringe legal strategists to decay those norms and attack public education, in many cases using children’s rights to further polarize political parties, dismantle social welfare, and entangle courts in culture wars. The Supreme Court has ruled in favor of these legal strategists to roll back a variety of children’s rights which in turn erode rights, resources, and liberties for everyone. Their success includes eroding bodily autonomy at the site of the constitutional rights of undocumented children (Azar v. Garza (2018)), attacking healthcare at the site of the constitutional rights of transgender children (United States v. Skrmetti (2025)), shrinking higher education at the site of constitutional rights of students of color (Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard (2023)), and now, decimating equal protection and public education at the site of constitutional rights of LGBTQAI+ elementary school students (Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)). Legal strategists have realized that the rights of vulnerable children provide the perfect site to experiment with culture wars and unquestioned obedience to authorities. Given the success of these experiments, I have developed the term laboratories for authoritarianism to describe how children’s constitutional rights have become a vehicle for fringe legal strategists to craft jurisprudence that undermines democracy and promotes authoritarianism.

Mahmoud v. Taylor provided a particularly powerful vehicle for this project as it attacked constitutional rights within public schools. Public schools are a battleground for democracy, as they are the single institution where the most people spend the most time in the United States. They serve as “the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny.” (Sotomayor, dissenting, at 1, Mahmoud v. Taylor). In eroding constitutional rights for such a vulnerable group in a stronghold of democracy, Mahmoud obstructs public schools from promoting mutual toleration or teaching an accurate understanding of the Constitution among some of our nation’s most vulnerable children.

Denying marriage equality in public schools

The majority opinion first discourages public schools from promoting mutual toleration and understanding their constitutional rights by asserting the following message infringes on the religious liberty of parents: “Two people can get married, regardless of whether they are of the same or opposite sex, so long as they “love each other.” (Mahmoud v. Taylor at 23). According to the majority, celebrating the constitutionally protected marriage between people of the opposite sex is acceptable, but celebrating the constitutionally protected marriage between two people enshrined in Obergefell v. Hodges may cause “destruction” for religious communities. While the dissent describes this reasoning as pure “absurdity,” the decision will discourage public schools from affirming the constitutionally protected right to marriage equality or promoting mutual toleration of marriage traditions and norms across religious and cultural identities. In enshrining this absurdity in the Constitution, the Court also undermines the intolerance against the children of LGBTQAI+ couples explicitly rejected in Windsor v. United States (2013). In effect, the Court encourages public schools to erode mutual tolerance and constitutional literacy by invisibilizing the constitutional rights of LGBTQAI+ families, “mak[ing] it even more difficult for [] children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and their daily lives.” Amicus Brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas at 29 (citing Windsor).

Disregarding constitutional protections against discrimination

The majority further discourages public schools from promoting mutual toleration and accurate understandings of constitutional rights when recasting the following message as another unconstitutional burden on religious liberty: “Sex and gender are [not always] inseparable” (Mahmoud v. Taylor at 3). In terms of mutual toleration, the majority “fail[s] to accept and account for a fundamental truth: LGBTQ people exist. They are part of virtually every community and workplace of any appreciable size.” (Sotomayor dissenting, at 21). By asserting that the Free Exercise clause “requires the government to alter its programs to insulate students from that “message,” the Court forecloses the possibility of schools teaching public school students, especially those who currently or may later identify as LGBTQAI+, about their constitutional rights to Equal Protection.

For example, in Bostock v. Clayton County, the Court determined that it is impossible to discriminate against homosexual or transgender people without engaging in sex discrimination. See Brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 24. However, under Mahmoud, a school cannot affirm that gender and sex are separable, foreclosing the possibility of a public school student even conceptualizing the idea of LGBTQAI+ people existing with constitutional rights. To teach an accurate understanding of the Constitution and basic rights in this country, public schools would need to have the authority to explain that LGBTQAI+ people exist and that “the differential treatment by the state” as compared to heteronormative or cisgender should “amount[] to impermissible sex discrimination under Equal Protection.” Amicus brief for Students Engaged in Advancing Texas at 24. However, the Court instructs schools to neglect existing constitutional protections for isolated minorities like the LGBTQAI+ community and, in some ways, encourage students to further erode them. In doing so, the Court allows for the further decay of Equal Protection and mutual toleration — an indispensable guardrail for what remains of our democratic institutions.

Looking forward

While the majority emphasizes that the holding of Mahmoud v. Taylor applies specifically to the context of storytime with “impressionable children,” that is plainly untrue. The Court’s willingness to take up cases like Mahmoud, Skrmetti, and Chiles v. Salazar within a single year reveals a willingness to entertain experiments in democratic backsliding. More importantly, LGBTQAI+ families in and outside of public schools will continue to feel the impact of the constitutional rot of Equal Protection and mutual toleration for generations to come. In coming months, the Court will rule on whether to expand the Free Exercise Clause to therapy sessions. If it decides that it does, mental health counselors may hold a constitutional right to suggest conversion therapy to an LGBTQAI+ fourth grader in the same school where parents hold a constitutional right to facilitate a mass exodus when LGBTQAI+ lives are mentioned in the classroom. And if that is not enough, it is only a matter of time before one of the university complaints seeking relief from the Trump administration’s university funding freezes reaches the Court. Then, five justices will decide whether the government can also restrict college students from learning and celebrating topics too controversial for storytime in K-12 schools.

If the conservative fringe has focused on children’s constitutional rights as the site for its political-legal project, defenders of constitutional democracy must do the same.

The post Laboratories of Authoritarianism appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Jeremiah Chin: Silencing Children’s Rights (Repost from Verfassungsblog) – United States

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Jeremiah Chin: Silencing Children’s Rights (Repost from Verfassungsblog) – United States

The U.S. Supreme Court decided Mahmoud v. Taylor on June 27, 2025. In doing so, it dramatically expanded parental rights over students and education without concern for the rights of children or consideration of pedagogy and curriculum. While the current era of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has repeatedly blurred lines dividing religious groups and state power under the First Amendment, Mahmoud rewrites the First Amendment for children entirely. The Court concluded that the government burdens the religious exercise of parents by failing to provide mandatory notice and opt-out policies when school materials include Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender (LGBTQ+) topics. Instead of addressing the plurality of views around sexual orientation and gender, the Court indirectly, but unsubtly, installs a traditional values framework that imposes norms of heterosexuality, religious fundamentalism and parental micromanagement of curriculum. This simultaneously threatens the expression, learning, and community built in schools for everyone.

The stories of Mahmoud v. Taylor

Decided on June 27, 2025, Mahmoud v. Taylor represents a struggle between religious parents and secular public education over curriculum in Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) in Maryland. Maryland incorporated several suggested texts for instructors that would include LGBTQ+ characters to better reflect the diverse community of students and parents within the district. Several parents objected on religious grounds, requesting the school provide notice and offer an opt-out option when such materials are used in the classroom. At first, MCPS was willing to provide the option to parents but found the measures administratively unfeasible and potentially stigmatizing to students, concluding that no notice or opt-out was required because parents had access to book lists prior to every school year.

The different justices’ retellings of the case reveal their radically different framings of the facts. In the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Samuel Alito describes the origins of the conflict as rooting “in the years leading up to 2022”, when the MCPS “apparently ‘determined that the books used in its existing English and Language Arts curriculum were not representative of many students and families in Montgomery County’” because they did not include LGBTQ characters. According to Alito, this prompted the school district to include five storybooks for children between 5 and 11 years old. The pointed use of “apparently” and the lack of context make the MCPS decision appear abrupt and arbitrary rather than a good-faith effort by the school district to provide a more robust curriculum.

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, in turn, reveals that the Court’s framing obfuscates a long effort by MCPS in reconciling the fact that “certain perspectives…were absent from its English language curriculum,” and only the latest in a broad effort to promote a “fully inclusive environment for all students’ by using instructional materials that reflect [the] diversity of the global community, including persons with disabilities, persons from diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, as well as persons of diverse gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.” Justice Sotomayor’s telling of the facts focuses on the MCPS Board, subject matter experts, and teachers building a diverse and inclusive curriculum. Justice Alito’s framing in turn assumes the position of the plaintiffs, a religiously diverse coalition of parents whose sincerely held religious beliefs’ most apparent common thread is anti-LGBTQ bias.

Though Justice Alito is rhetorically deeply concerned with impressionable “young children, like those of [the plaintiff parents],” he spends little time talking about the rights, experiences, or issues faced by children in the classroom. Instead, he accuses the dissent of trying to “divert attention from…children subject to the instruction” by emphasizing the texts, characters, and importance of the curriculum. According to Justice Alito, the dissent takes on a “deliberately blinkered view” and is “air-brushing the record” by arguing that the inclusion of books with LGBTQ characters is “just about exposure and kindness.” Justice Alito’s framing of the issues for the majority views the books as “impos[ing] upon children a set of values and beliefs that are ‘hostile’ to their parents’ religious beliefs.” In this light, the mere inclusion and existence of these five books with LGBTQ characters and themes and instructional guidance for teachers presents an existential threat to religion. These books only make up a small percentage of the curriculum – with guidance for classroom discussion that affirms that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and other people exist and have rights to exist.

The hyperbolic disaster-framing by Justice Alito, therefore, concludes that because “the storybooks unmistakably convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender” and instructional materials “specifically encouraged teachers to reinforce this viewpoint” and discuss disagreements with students, the policy of inclusion, therefore, burdens the parents’ right to the free exercise of religion and is subject to strict scrutiny, which means that a government must demonstrate that its policy advances compelling government interests and is narrowly tailored to achieve those ends. The failure to permit an opt-out when including these LGBTQ storybooks thus unconstitutionally burdens the parents’ rights of control over their children. The Court disclaims that the Board’s proposed curriculum has any educational value. It simply states that it places an unconstitutional burden on the parent’s religious exercise if it is imposed without the chance for opt-outs. In doing so, it sidesteps any good-faith balancing of interests. Worse: It fails to recognize that including and discussing books from different perspectives in a school curriculum has value in an educational environment.

Faith, parents, and the first amendment

The Court’s broad reading of the parental rights to control the upbringing of their children paradoxically narrows the understanding of the First Amendment to be strictly a relationship between parents and the government. Fundamentally, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is a restriction on the power of the state. It proclaims that Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Later applied to State governments and municipalities, the amendment’s broad language reflects the importance the authors placed on resistance to state suppression of religious, expressive, and associational freedoms.

Theoretically, this freedom to believe, express, and associate should also apply broadly to a variety of perspectives. No single religion or type of speech is singled out, and the only subject of restriction is the state. That is, First Amendment rights should impose restrictions on the state, not compulsion for individuals to act, talk, believe, or associate in specific ways. But despite its expansive declaration of freedom that would prohibit governmental interference with expression or religion, the First Amendment has often faced limiting principles to facilitate the practical governance of a diverse, pluralistic society.

In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), the Court recognized that “neutral laws of general applicability” could be constitutionally imposed on religious conduct and beliefs. The decision prohibited members of the Native American Church from receiving unemployment benefits. The plaintiffs were Indigenous persons who practiced their faith by taking peyote as part of a traditional ceremony. Justice Scalia claimed that the policy in question, prohibiting persons taking drugs from receiving unemployment benefits, did not unconstitutionally burden the plaintiffs’ religious practice. The reason was that this practice was “unconnected” to other valid constitutional rights and to “any communicative activity, or parental right.” Neutral laws of general applicability are therefore presumed valid unless they compel expression or interfere with other constitutional rights, in which case they are subjected to closer scrutiny.

Even when neutrally worded and generally applicable, state laws that compel expression and conduct can be unconstitutional. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), for example, the Court struck down a state law requiring compulsory flag salutes and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance – practices that violated the beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness student whose faith prohibits pledging allegiance to symbols like the flag. State laws that compel school attendance, on the other hand, are generally constitutional. Exceptions to this are state laws that restrict parents’ rights to choose private religious schools over public schools (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925) and laws compelling school attendance that directly contradict religious beliefs (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1971).

Critically, none of these cases, which articulate the free exercise of religion and parental rights, give parents total control over their children. Both Barnette and Pierce emphasize the importance of public education in preparing children to participate in society and sustain democratic governance. The answer in these cases was not to isolate children but to ensure the curriculum was inclusive of their religious practices. In Barnette, for example, the Court did not bar schools from including the pledge in their curriculum – it simply held that students could not be compelled to recite it.

In Justice Alito’s account in Mahmoud, students are exposed to a curriculum and instructions acknowledging the existence and rights of LGBTQ individuals – an exposure he suggests amounts to a violation of religious tenets. Yet even on his own terms, the burden on parents lies in the mere exposure to viewpoints that may conflict with their beliefs, not in any form of compelled activity. No assignment requires students to affirm a particular viewpoint, and the schools do not evaluate students based on what they say, think, or believe. The stories are readily available and read to the class, accompanied by instructions for teachers on how to engage with students in a way that validates both the story and the student.

Viewpoint discrimination

The Court has often found that the answer to disfavored speech, or expression that might be contrary to the views of others, is still protected speech. As Justice Alito explained in Matal v. Tam: “giving offense is a viewpoint.” Freedom of speech and free exercise of religion under the constitution, therefore, must include even those ideas that some might find offensive, with limited exceptions for speech that imminently incites lawless activity (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969) or obscenity (though the Court struggles to find a solid definition of the concept). The requirement of neutral laws of general applicability guards against so-called content- or viewpoint-based regulations of speech.

Mahmoud v. Taylor launders viewpoint discrimination through parental rights, allowing the regulation of classroom content through parental opt-outs while completely ignoring the students as learners, participants, or even people with rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Court built upon cases like Barnette and Pierce, highlighting the importance of children’s speech within schools and validating that students hold First Amendment rights in schools. It found the suspension of young persons for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War unconstitutional. Justice Abe Fortas explained for the majority that “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”

Justice Alito in Mahmoud extends this to parents. As he notes, the parent’s “right to free exercise, like other First Amendment rights, is not ‘shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate.’” This paraphrase of Tinker excludes the fact that students and teachers possess the same rights of free exercise, expression, and association in schools as well in not-so-subtle ways. A constitutionally mandated parental opt-out that the Court provides in Mahmoud defies the reasoning of West Virginia v. Barnette, which Justice Alito relies on as the foundation of his analysis of parental rights. In Barnette, Justice Robert Jackson explained, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Yet Justice Alito’s decision in Mahmoud allows parents to compel teachers and school officials to ensure their prescribed orthodoxy, meaning students no longer may discuss, express, or associate with LGBTQ storybooks as part of the official curriculum.

For those who come after

The Court’s opinion in Mahmoud v. Taylor sacrifices student’s First Amendment rights in the name of parental control. This enables parents to compel the speech and beliefs of students rather than let students develop their own thoughts, views, and beliefs – free to conform or disagree with the beliefs of their parents and classmates. This type of compelled speech would otherwise be prohibited. Mahmoud allows parents to compel the state to engage in viewpoint discrimination – something neither the parents nor the state could achieve alone, whether as a matter of constitutional law or practical enforcement.

Mahmoud decides on a vision of the future that is very much rooted in the past, severely restricting students from engaging with views that they may or may not share. Elsewhere, I have discussed how the history and traditional uses of originalism by the current Supreme Court bind us to narrow historical reasoning rather than an expansive historical understanding of the future – proposing Constitutional Futurism as a remedy to the originalism that has overturned reproductive rights, gun control, and now even children’s right to inclusive education and expression in Mahmoud v. Taylor. Justice Alito’s majority opinion endorses robust parental control over students, teachers and schools, when those parents already have curriculum oversight through ordinary democratic processes. The Court fails to recognize students – and children generally – as persons with rights, thoughts, and opinions that also deserve consideration. Rather than relying on tradition and compulsion, instruction can provide students with a way of questioning that can interrogate or even affirm their beliefs. This failure to recognize the personhood of children misses the expansive potential of future generations, all in the name of history and tradition.

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US education department to cut funding on Maine for gender-affirming school sports

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US education department to cut funding on Maine for gender-affirming school sports

The US Department of Education (DOE) announced Friday its plan to terminate the Maine Department of Education’s (MDOE) federal K-12 education funding for its noncompliance with US President Trump’s executive orders attacking “gender ideology” and gender-affirming educational practices.

The DOE concluded that MDOE has endorsed or allowed school policies allowing males to compete in female sports and occupy women-only intimate spaces. It additionally stated:

[O]ver at least the past two years and continuing in the current school year, at least three male student-athletes have competed in Maine high school girls’ athletic programs for at least five different high schools (so affecting many more times that number of high schools whose female athletes competed against the male athletes).

The DOE’s Office for Civil Rights launched its Title IX investigation of the MDOE on February 21, 2025, in response to Maine Governor Janet Mills challenging Trump to get the courts to make Maine comply with his executive orders. The DOE published its noncompliance finding on March 19 along with a proposed resolution agreement, notifying Maine that it will send a letter of impending enforcement action if Maine does not sign the resolution agreement within ten days from the finding.

In addition to ceasing the practice of its gender-affirming policy, the resolution agreement would have required the MDOE to make “each school district in Maine to submit to MDOE an annual certification of compliance [and] promptly notify OCR of any credible report that a school district is still allowing a boy to participate in girls’ sports.” It would have also required the MDOE to give recognitions to female athletes who did not receive them due to males participating in women’s sports.

On March 31, the DOE sent the MDOE a final warning letter instructing that it will take enforcement action if Maine does not accept the agreement by Friday.

The DOE’s Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Craig Trainor commented in a press release:

The Department has given Maine every opportunity to come into compliance with Title IX, but the state’s leaders have stubbornly refused to do so, choosing instead to prioritize an extremist ideological agenda over their students’ safety, privacy, and dignity … Governor Mills would have done well to adhere to the wisdom embedded in the old idiom—be careful what you wish for. Now she will see the Trump Administration in court.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is a federal law prohibiting sex-based discrimination in any education program or activity receiving federal funds. President Trump issued Executive Orders 14168 and 14201 to enforce Title IX, notably by requiring girls’ or women’s school athletic opportunities and private spaces (e.g., locker rooms) to be reserved only for biological females. They further ordered federal funding to be cut from educational institutions that did not comply with the orders.

On the contrary, the MDOE supported its stance by stating that the Maine Human Rights Act adheres to Title IX by prohibiting discrimination in education on the basis of a protected class, including the class of “sexual orientation (which includes gender identity and expression)…”

The DOE also announced that it will be referring this investigation to the US Department of Justice for suit in federal court. These developments come after the Trump administration’s announcement to create a Title IX Special Investigations Team to combat “gender ideology” in schools.

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ECtHR: No need for second mother (not giving birth) to be automatically recognized as legal parent (even if genetically related) of child if adoption easily availble

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ECtHR: No need for second mother (not giving birth) to be automatically recognized as legal parent (even if genetically related) of child if adoption easily availble

AFFAIRE R.F. ET AUTRES c. ALLEMAGNE

(Requête no 46808/16)

ARRÊT du 12 novembre 2024

Art 8 • Obligations positives • Refus des juridictions de constater que le requérant, à qui la seconde requérante a donné naissance, est aussi l’enfant de la première requérante, sa mère génétique et la partenaire enregistrée de la seconde requérante • Enfant né en Allemagne d’une procréation médicalement assistée interdite dans ce pays et réalisée légalement à l’étranger • Art 8 applicable • État défendeur n’ayant pas manqué à ses obligations • Vie familiale des requérants non affectée de manière significative • Respect de la vie privée de la première requérante en l’obligeant à passer par la voie de l’adoption et en l’absence de difficultés particulières de vivre sa relation avec l’enfant au quotidien • Respect de la vie privée de l’enfant, l’adoption ayant été réalisée sans difficultés particulières et la première requérante ayant disposé préalablement de droits et devoirs à l’égard de l’enfant se rattachant à la parentalité de par son union légale avec la seconde requérante • Marge d’appréciation non outrepassée

“36. L’Index annuel de l’association ILGA-Europe (« Rainbow Map ») fait apparaître, sur la période de 2016 à 2024, les évolutions suivantes : le nombre d’États contractants prévoyant une reconnaissance automatique de la coparentalité (c’est-à-dire ne mettant aucun obstacle à la reconnaissance légale des enfants, dès la naissance, par leurs parents vivant en couple, quelles que soient l’orientation sexuelle ou l’identité de genre des partenaires) est resté stable à 9 États jusqu’en 2023 et est passé à 11 États en 2024 …”

[Google Translate]:

36. The annual Index of the ILGA-Europe association (“Rainbow Map”) shows, over the period from 2016 to 2024, the following developments: the number of Contracting States providing for automatic recognition of co-parenting (i.e. that is to say putting no obstacle to the legal recognition of children, from birth, by their parents living as a couple, regardless of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the partners) remained stable in 9 States until 2023 and increased to 11 states [of 46] in 2024 …

In thee cases Mennesson v. France et Labassee v. France (nos 65192/11 et 65941/11, 26 June 2014) the ECHR had held: “Given the implications of this serious restriction in terms of the identity of the applicant children and their right to respect for their private life, the European Court held that, in thus preventing the recognition and establishment in domestic law of the children’s relationship with their biological fathers, the respondent State had overstepped its permissible margin of appreciation. In view also of the importance to be attached to the child’s best interests in weighing up the interests at stake, there had been a breach of the applicant children’s right to respect for their private life.”