This is a blog is related to my academic work in the International Academic Forum on SOGIESC Law but meant to serve anyone who wants to contribute to improve the protection of human rights worldwide. It is intended to keep interested readers informed about legal developments relating to sexual orientation, gender expression and identity and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). Hopefully, it will make it easier to find correct legal information about the developments in all regions of the world and, in particular, with regard to international law.
US Supreme Court turns away appeal of Texas library book ban
WASHINGTON, Dec 8 (Reuters) – The U.S. Supreme Court in a free speech case on Monday opted not to hear an appeal by a group of residents of a rural Texas county of a judicial decision allowing local officials to remove 17 books that these officials deemed objectionable from public libraries.
The justices let stand a lower court’s decision allowing the removal of books including ones dealing with themes of race and LGBT identity, from its public library system. The lower court rejected the argument made by the plaintiffs that removing the books was unlawful under the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment protections against government abridgment of free speech.
Dangerous New Reporting Guidelines for US Annual Human Rights Reports
The U.S. State Department recently sent new instructions to all U.S. embassies to guide in the preparation of the State Department’s 2025 Human Rights Reports. (See our LinkedIn post on this here.) As expected, they are removing the section of the annual report that covers abuses against LGBTQI+ persons. But even more alarming, they are now requiring reporting on transgender medical care as a human rights abuse involving the “chemical or surgical mutilation of children.” In short, the reports are no longer even vaguely credible on LGBTQI+ issues and are now creating an anti-rights framework to legitimize attacks against our communities.
The Council for Global Equality (CGE) has long encouraged human rights groups to report abuses to U.S. embassies for inclusion in the annual human rights reports. Over the past years, based on those local partnerships and the work of a dedicated LGBTQI+ policy team at the State Department in Washington, the U.S. human rights reports became increasingly comprehensive and were used by the United States and many other governments to formulate policy and adjudicate refugee claims. Unfortunately, based on recent instructions and the last 2024 reports, we now know the next reports will no longer be credible on LGBTQI+ and related issues, and CGE fears that the continued submission of information to U.S. embassies could create risks for the community itself.
Given this new policy directive, we encourage groups to maintain cautious contact with trusted U.S. embassy staff, but we also urge groups to exercise extreme caution if you plan to submit information to U.S. embassies or the State Department, as we fear the information could be twisted or used against community interests. For refugee and asylum adjudication purposes only, there may be ways to submit relevant information on extrajudicial executions, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of LGBTQI+ persons, but please reach out to us (info@globalequality.org) or refugee groups directly to discuss how best to present and submit that information so that it is not cited inappropriately.
At the same time, we want to encourage all human rights groups to continue to document and share information widely on abuses targeting LGBTQI+ persons — that information is more important than ever given the current backlash. Many of you already have robust dissemination networks for your data, including other embassies and the European Union, but please feel free to reach out to discuss how to ensure your documentation reaches the broadest possible audience. And please note that the following CGE member organizations and allied human rights groups regularly compile human rights reports that document violations against LGBTQI+ people globally, which are often useful for policymakers in Washington and beyond: Amnesty International USA, Global Justice Institute, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, ILGA, Outright International, Synergía – Initiatives for Human Rights, and The Williams Institute. Please reach out to those groups directly or reach out to us to help make connections to share your documentation.
On July 29, 2025, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (“the ECSC”)[1] delivered its judgment in the landmark decision of Randall Theodule & Ors v The Attorney General of Saint Lucia [2025] ECSC J0729-1 (“the ECSC decision”), where it declared sections 132 and 133 of Saint Lucia’s Criminal Code, Cap. 3.01 of the Revised Edition of the Laws of Saint Lucia (“sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code”) unconstitutional. Crucially, it insisted that by criminalising consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex and anal sex between men, even in private, sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code contravened various fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Saint Lucia (“the Constitution”). Beyond its formal vindication of their constitutional rights, the ECSC decision affirms the (constitutional) belonging of sexual minorities in Saint Lucia and propels a Commonwealth Caribbean renaissance on sexual minority rights.
The ECSC decision
The ECSC began by addressing certain preliminary objections raised by the Defendant. In this respect, it confirmed that section 1 of the Constitution – an “opening section” that enumerates, among others, the right to the protection of the law – conferred enforceable rights and was not just a “preamble”. In so concluding, the ECSC relied upon the holding of the Caribbean Court of Justice (“the CCJ”) in Nervais v The Queen and Severin v The Queen [2018] CCJ 19 (AJ) (“Nervais”), where the CCJ insisted that section 11 of the Barbados Constitution, “which substantially mirrors section 1 of the Saint Lucia Constitution”, was separately enforceable (paragraphs 94-96). The ECSC also concluded that the Claimants possessed the requisite locus standi to “challenge laws which criminalise homosexual conduct”, and did not have “to await prosecution…to experience a violation” (paragraph 109).
The ECSC thereafter considered, in extenso, whether sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code qualified as “existing laws for the purposes of section 2 of the Constitution Order” so as to be immunised from constitutional scrutiny (paragraph 140). Given Saint Lucia’s recent accession to the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ, the ECSC was bound to adopt the CCJ’s unique hermeneutical approach in McEwan and Others v The AG of Guyana [2018] CCJ 30 (AJ) (“McEwan”). Accordingly, after examining their legislative history, the ECSC concluded that sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code were not “existing laws” for the purposes of section 2 of the Constitution Order. With regard to section 132, the ECSC emphasised that it “was clearly a new enactment which created an offence not previously known to the criminal law”, and was therefore not inoculated from constitutional scrutiny (paragraph 149). As for section 133, the ECSC clarified that it “in large measure criminalised buggery between consenting homosexual adult males while decriminalising it in the case of consenting heterosexual couples”, and so was “not impervious to constitutional review” (paragraph 166).
Turning to the claims of substantive rights infringements, the ECSC conducted a thoughtful assessment of arguments advanced by both sides, and concluded as follows:
even where unenforced, sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code “abridged and emasculated” the Claimants’ fundamental right to liberty – which included sexual autonomy – since homosexual individuals were forced to engage in “private sexual expression…according to statutory dictates” rather than their orientation (paragraph 114).
the Claimants’ constitutional rights to freedom of expression and privacy were infringed by sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code since, as established by the South African Constitutional Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT10/99) [1999] ZACC 17 (“National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality”), “sexual conduct not only constitutes a form of expression, but one directly linked to the right to privacy” (paragraphs 118 and 172).
“by expressly and impliedly excluding heterosexual couples from…[their] ambit”, sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code “discriminated against homosexuals and therefore did not cohere with “all modern human rights instruments, which include sex or gender among the prohibited grounds of discrimination” (paragraph 172).
Having established violations of the Claimants’ constitutional rights, the ECSC considered whether there was any constitutionally sanctioned justification for the infringements. It answered this question in the negative (paragraph 173). Amidst virulent socio-cultural disapprobation of homosexuality, the ECSC emphasised that “the criminalisation of homosexual conduct may also have the tendency to deprive homosexual individuals of their right to the protection of the law.” It further identified “public humiliation, vilification and even physical attacks” experienced by homosexuals as a “concomitant effect” of the stigmatisation that criminalising homosexual conduct engendered. Those occurrences, it reasoned, were incompatible with the “dignity of certain categories of citizens” and “evolving standards of decency in a free and democratic society” (paragraph 188).
In conclusion, the ECSC held that sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional, having unjustifiably infringed the Claimants’ constitutional rights to, inter alia, the protection of the law, liberty, freedom of expression, and privacy. It therefore ordered their modification to exclude acts of “gross indecency” between consenting adults of the same sex and “buggery” between “consenting persons aged 16 or older in private” (paragraph 205).
Affirming the (constitutional) belonging of sexual minorities in Saint Lucia
Against that backdrop, the ECSC decision assumes particular significance for its decidedly counter-majoritarian stance in affirming the (constitutional) belonging of sexual minorities within Saint Lucia. Indeed, beyond any doctrinal significance, it challenges the enduring crisis of belonging experienced by sexual minorities in Saint Lucia due to their systematic exclusion from full membership and moral citizenship within the society. Despite the ECSC’s marked focus on constitutional rights-based doctrinal analysis, its references to notions of “dignity” and “evolving standards of decency in a free and democratic society” strongly implicate the importance of the Constitution’s preamble to human rights adjudication. Attorney General of Barbados v Joseph[2006] CCJ 1 (AJ) (“Joseph”) underscores the importance of judicial attention to the preamble when adjudicating human rights matters and insisted that the Constitution “as a whole has to be understood and interpreted” in light of the preamble as their words reflect, among other things, the “values…of constitutional democracies…” (paragraph 18 of the judgment of Wit J in Joseph). The CCJ has since reiterated this position, maintaining that courts must be guided by the “statements of fundamental principle” espoused by a constitution’s preamble when “adjudicating complaints of human rights infringements” (paragraph 61 of McEwan).
Within Saint Lucia’s constitutional context, some such preambular statements of fundamental principle include, most compellingly, a recognition and acceptance that “all persons have been endowed by God with inalienable rights and dignity”, and “…each person…is under obligation to observe and promote the rights, freedoms and values recognised in this constitution…” These are more than mere abstract ideals. On the contrary, they reflect a commitment– embodied in Saint Lucia’s supreme law – to the equality, human dignity, and empathy that criminalisation denies sexual minorities. Accordingly, in proclaiming statements of fundamental principle that emphasise the inherent dignity, worthiness of all constitutional subjects, the preamble of the Constitution solemnly champions the belonging of sexual minorities, as human beings endowed by God with inalienable rights and dignity.
Thus, by invalidating sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code, which exacerbated their crisis of belonging by perpetuating institutionalised discrimination, the ECSC decision has affirmed the (constitutional) belonging of sexual minorities in Saint Lucia with important constitutional implications. To this end, it has legitimised the statements of fundamental principles espoused by the Constitution’s preamble as well as its substantive provisions providing protection from discrimination irrespective of status. In particular, the ECSC’s references to the “dignity of…citizens” and “evolving standards of decency…in a democratic society” throughout its analysis demonstrates how preambular statements of fundamental principles can permeate and guide substantive rights adjudication, even without being explicitly invoked. Accordingly, the ECSC decision demonstrates that – consistent with the preambular vision for an inclusive Saint Lucian polity in which each person is endowed with dignity and ought to respect the rights of other persons – the Constitution must be construed as recognising and affirming the belonging of all persons, including sexual minorities.
Equally important, in rendering its decision vindicating the constitutional rights of sexual minorities, the ECSC has assigned constitutional significance to the socio-psychological concept of belonging, transforming it into a legally recognised form of membership within the Saint Lucian polity. By so doing, it has also validated the fundamental human need to belong, which is said to be “essential for human flourishing”.
As well, with its clear rejection of majoritarian conceptions of morality as a basis for criminalising conduct that is intricately connected to the expression by homosexuals of their full humanity and which does no harm to the society, the ECSC decision legitimises their claims to full moral citizenship. Its decidedly counter-majoritarian approach on the issue of sexual minority rights – as championed in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality – also positions dignity, equality, social inclusion, and belonging at the heart of Saint Lucian constitutionalism. Ultimately, while the ECSC decision cannot entirely resolve the persistent crisis of belonging experienced by sexual minorities within the Saint Lucian society, it dismantles one of the legal foundations upon which state authored exclusion has rested, and affirms their (constitutional) belonging and inherent dignity as rights-holders deserving of full moral citizenship.
The ECSC Propels a Commonwealth Caribbean Renaissance
Without question, the Commonwealth Caribbean has seen advancements in the promotion of sexual minority rights. Despite this, homosexuality and gender non-conformity remain notorious causes célèbreswithin Commonwealth Caribbean societies since “…homophobia permeates the region…” and is “part of the culture of the Caribbean”. Be that as it may, amidst this climate of exclusion, the ECSC decision as well as similar ones rendered in Belize, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Dominica herald a Commonwealth Caribbean renaissance concerned with dismantling colonial-era criminal laws legitimising and perpetuating discrimination against sexual minorities. In this regard, affirmative judicial interventions are particularly meaningful in a region where colonially transplanted laws have long denied sexual minorities their dignity, rights, and sense of belonging. However, beyond its substantive doctrinal contributions – clarifying the scope of constitutional rights as well as mitigating the debilitating effect of the “existing laws” or “savings law” clause, which precludes courts from declaring colonial-era laws to be violative of constitutional rights – the ECSC decision propels this Commonwealth Caribbean renaissance by building upon the progress advanced by regional judicial renderings on sexual minority rights. The message it conveys is pellucidly clear: majoritarian conceptions of morality should not, without more, determine who belongs.
[1] The ECSC has unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine legal matters in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the British Virgin Islands.
JOB OPENINGS at the UCLA School of Law Williams Institute
We’re hiring! Join our team Executive Director The Williams Institute is seeking an Executive Director to help guide our next chapter. Candidates should have a passion for rigorous research on sexual orientation and gender identity law and public policy, a strong appreciation for the Institute’s voice and values, and deep understanding of the policy issues facing LGBTQ communities. Ideal candidates will hold a J.D. or social science Ph.D., bring senior leadership experience, and have a proven record of innovation and collaboration across a broad range of partners and audiences. Deadline to apply: January 2, 2026 Daniel H. Renberg Law Fellow We are looking for a law fellow to engage in cutting-edge and high-quality research and analysis related to sexual orientation and gender identity law and public policy. The fellow will conduct legal and multidisciplinary research on the discrimination facing LGBTQ people, LGBTQ health, LGBTQ families, and the criminal justice system, among other topics. The position will be for a two-year term and will be based in Los Angeles, California. Deadline to apply: January 17, 2026
Tokyo High Court ruling upholds same-sex marriage ban
The Tokyo High Court on Friday issued the final pending appellate decision in Japan’s nationwide same-sex marriage litigation, holding that the country’s statutory framework limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not violate the Constitution of Japan. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of breach of constitutional guarantees to equality and individual dignity. It rejected their request for damages on the basis that no constitutional injury had been established.
The ruling stands in contrast to earlier high court judgments issued between 2021 and 2024. Courts in Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka, and in an earlier Tokyo appeal found aspects of the current marriage framework unconstitutional. Several of those courts held that Article 14(1) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and justified their decisions by Article 24’s requirement for marriage and family law to be based on “individual dignity” and the “essential equality of the sexes.” The latest decision, by contrast, concluded that the legislature retains broad discretion to define marriage, with Presiding Judge Yumi Toa affirming that provisions governing same-sex marriage ought to be thoroughly deliberated in the legislature.
The court also rejected the argument that denying same-sex couples access to marriage infringes Article 14’s equality guarantee, holding that distinctions grounded in the current civil code definition do not amount to unconstitutional discrimination.
Many municipalities and prefectures across Japan offer recognition through partnership certificates for same-sex couples. However, these frameworks do not provide the full legal rights associated with marriage, such as automatic parental recognition, inheritance, and spousal tax treatment.
The decision creates a direct conflict among courts, leaving Japan without a uniform interpretation of constitutional protections relating to marriage. Lawyers for LGBT & Allies Network (LLAN), which has previously translated major marriage-equality rulings, noted the significance of the divergence between this outcome and the 2024 Tokyo High Court judgment that held the ban unconstitutional.
The issue is now expected to proceed to the Supreme Court of Japan, a unified ruling would determine whether the Constitution permits or requires marriage equality and could clarify the relationship between Articles 14 and 24 in the context of contemporary family structures.
Lange mussten queere römisch-katholische Seelsorgende ihre sexuelle Orientierung geheim halten. Sie widersprach der katholischen Sexualmoral. Vor drei Jahren gab es Hoffnung, dass sich das ändert. Nun haben die Schweizer Bischöfe Stellung bezogen und es zeigt sich: Es ändert sich wenig.
Ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-713/23 Wojewoda Mazowiecki: Member States must recognise same sex marriages lawfully concluded in another EU country when couples exercise their freedom of movement
“Article 20 and Article 21(1) TFEU, read in the light of Article 7 and Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, on the ground that the law of that Member State does not allow marriage between persons of the same sex, does not permit the recognition of a marriage between two same-sex nationals of that Member State concluded lawfully in the exercise of their freedom to move and reside within another Member State, in which they have created or strengthened a family life, or the transcription for that purpose of the marriage certificate in the civil register of the first Member State, where that transcription is the only means provided for by that Member State for such recognition.“
__________________________________________
The Network of European LGBTIQ* Families Associations (NELFA) welcomes today’s ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-713/23, which confirms that Member States must recognise same sex marriages lawfully concluded in another EU country when couples exercise their freedom of movement.
The case concerned two Polish citizens who married in Germany and asked for their marriage certificate to be transcribed into the Polish civil register. Polish authorities refused, citing domestic law that bans marriage for same sex couples. The Court found that this refusal violates EU freedom of movement and the right to private and family life, making clear that Member States cannot deny the marital status that couples have legally acquired elsewhere in the Union.
The judges confirmed that such recognition does not force a Member State to introduce marriage equality in its national legislation. What it does require is equal treatment in procedures that already exist. If a country provides a single route to recognising foreign marriages, it must apply that route without discrimination based on sexual orientation.
NELFA strongly welcomes this decision. It affirms what we have been saying for years. Rainbow families must not lose their rights when crossing borders inside the European Union. Our members span countries with very different legal systems, and we constantly see the harm caused when children and parents move from a country that recognises their family to one that denies it. Today’s ruling sends a clear message that EU law stands firmly on the side of family unity and legal continuity.
This judgment also highlights the urgency for many Member States to update their laws and administrative procedures so they no longer create obstacles for LGBTIQ* families. The Court’s reasoning mirrors what civil society, legal experts and the European Court of Human Rights have repeatedly stressed. In 2023, the Strasbourg Court held that Poland failed to provide any legal framework for same sex couples, reinforcing the need for structural change.
NELFA will continue to advocate for full recognition of rainbow families across the EU, including parenthood recognition, access to parenthood rights, and the removal of discriminatory barriers in cross border situations. This ruling is another strong building block that moves Europe closer to a Union where all families are treated with dignity and respect, everywhere.
Uganda secures $2 billion in World Bank financing as lending resumes [following a nearly two-year suspension triggered by the country’s controversial anti-LGBTQ legislation]
EU launches infringement procedure against Slovakia constitutional reform [family and gender questions]
The European Commission on Friday formally launched an infringement procedure against Slovakia over constitutional reforms preserving its national identity in matters such as gender and family law. In reference of the decision, the Commission cited the amendments’ alleged violation of the fundamental principles of European Union (EU) law.
“[These reforms] contravene the principle of the primacy of EU law, which is a fundamental element of the EU legal order, together with the principles of autonomy, effectiveness, and uniform application of Union law. Even when a Member State amends its constitution, such an exercise of national competence cannot circumvent the need to comply with fundamental principles of Union law,” the Commission stated in a press release.
According to the principle of the primacy of EU law, when there is a conflict between an EU law and a national law of an EU member state, EU law will prevail. Although not enumerated in EU treaties, the EU court has judicially recognised the principle in several cases, including in the landmark cases of Van Gend en Loos (C-26/62) and Costa v ENEL (C-6/64).
The Commission also said it has sent a letter of formal notice about the infringement procedure to Slovakia, which now has two months to respond to the concerns. If Slovakia fails to provide a satisfactory response, the Commission may issue a reasoned opinion and refer the matter to the competent EU court.
In September, Slovakia adopted constitutional amendments allowing its domestic laws to take precedence over EU law in matters concerning national sovereignty, including family and gender. Article 7 of the Constitution particularly guarantees the non-application of international law, and thus empowers Slovak authorities to assess the extent of EU law application in Slovakia, including rulings of the EU Court.
Other constitutional amendments include the prohibition of sexual education for children without parental consent, the recognition of only the biological sex, and the limitation of adoption to married heterosexual couples. It also incorporates a guarantee of equal remuneration in work for men and women.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, responding to the notice, said, “I cannot imagine that any international organisation should dictate to us how many genders there should be and who can marry and who cannot.”
The legal proceedings follow the Commission’s previous urgent opinion, where they expressed concern over a conflict between EU law and the definitions of “national identity” and “cultural and ethical issues” under the drafted amendments.
The proposed amendments at the time also drew scrutiny from Amnesty International, which urged the Slovak government to reject the amendments, as they would harm the LGBTQ+ community. UN Special Rapporteurs additionally warned that the amendments were inconsistent with Slovakia’s international human rights obligations, including the rights to non-discrimination and sexuality education under international human rights law.
Notably, Slovakia ranks 36th out of 146 countries in the Rule of Law Index 2025 prepared by the World Justice Project.
Repost: Sarthak Gupta, Against the Harmful Digital Satire – Free Speech, Digital Algorithms, and Queer Harm in [ECtHR] Yevstifeyev v. Russia
Repost: Sarthak Gupta, Against the Harmful Digital Satire – Free Speech, Digital Algorithms, and Queer Harm in [ECtHR] Yevstifeyev v. Russia
13.10.2025
In a previous piece for EJIL: Talk, I examined the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) judgment in Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia, where the Court addressed two applications. The first concerned homophobic verbal assaults by a politician, which the Court rightly found to violate Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The second application, Petrov v. Russia, dealt with a satirical video depicting a ‘Gay hunt,’ which the Court held did not cross the ‘threshold of severity’ to trigger Convention protection. In my piece, I criticised the Court’s reasoning in Petrov, arguing that the judgment reflected an inconsistent application of the severity threshold, a problematic privileging of satirical context over violent content, and an inadequate consideration of collective harm to the queer community.
In response, a recent piece at Völkerrechtsblog has defended the Court’s reasoning in Petrov, contending that the video constituted protected satire and that the Court correctly applied the ‘reasonable reader’ standard while discounting audience hostility. This reply critiques that defence. While the defence raises valid concerns regarding doctrinal coherence and digital platform complexities, it ultimately overlooks how digital satire, when intertwined with harmful and homophobic tropes and symbolic violence, can perpetuate ‘structural harm’ and ‘discrimination’ under Article 14 of the Convention. This reply revisits three aspects: the misapplication of the ‘reasonable reader’ standard, the privileging of ‘intent’ over ‘effect’, and the misconstruction of the threshold of severity.
Not just ‘Digital Satire’
Before engaging with doctrinal standards, it is critical to examine the nature of the speech in Petrov. While it is cloaked in digital satire, the video also bears all the hallmarks of what scholars define as dangerous speech, referring to an expression that can increase the risk that its audience will condone or participate in violence against another group. In Petrov, the ‘Gay Hunt’ video dehumanises queer individuals through staged killings, slurs, and caricatures, turning satire into symbolic violence that normalises harm. To consider such an expression as satire solely ignores its role in encouraging hostility, particularly in Russia, where anti-queer prejudice is already normalised. The power of satire is its ability to render harmful narratives more palatable (See Godioli, Young, & Fiori). As Roman Zinigrad argues, when hate and harm are presented humorously, it becomes more likely to be accepted, even by those who would reject the same content if expressed seriously. The ECtHR’s failure to engage with this legitimising function of humour, its ‘digestibility’, renders its reasoning in Petrov especially problematic.
Consider a hypothetical scenario where a video titled ‘Jew Hunt’ is released on social media in which actors dressed as Nazi soldiers jokingly capture and execute Jewish characters, mocking the victims as part of an alleged parody of antisemitic regimes. Even if the creators claimed the intent was to ridicule historical bigotry, such a video would rightly trigger condemnation, outrage, and criminal liability under hate speech and Holocaust-related laws in multiple jurisdictions. The reason is simple: some narratives, even when presented as satire, carry such a historically violent and dehumanising charge that humour cannot sanitise them. These laws target not only the denial of atrocities but also their trivialisation, glorification, or approval, and a parody of persecution can fall squarely into that category. The digital satire in the ‘Gay Hunt’ video follows this template, yet it received judicial indulgence under the guise of parody.
The ECtHR itself recognised that humour can constitute symbolic violence when it perpetuates harmful stereotypes. In Canal 8 v. France, the Court upheld financial penalties against a broadcaster whose sketches, though humorous, stigmatized queer individuals and trivialised sexual harassment, particularly because unsuspecting individuals were “used” without consent. Similarly, in Féret v. Belgium, the Court held that xenophobic jokes during an election campaign could provoke public contempt and hate, while in Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, it emphasised the private status of those depicted and the importance of voluntary participation. Together, these cases demonstrate that the ECtHR weighs the real-world harms and risks of incitement behind ostensibly comedic content. By contrast, in Petrov, the ECtHR treated the ‘Gay Hunt’ video primarily as satire, downplaying the symbolic violence and risk of incitement.
The Reasonable Reader Standard: Misapplied and Under-Theorised
Supporters of the Petrov judgment argue that the Court implicitly invoked the ‘reasonable reader’ standard, derived from cases like Sousa Goucha and Verlagsgruppe v. Austria, to assess whether the satirical video incited hatred. Yet the invocation in Petrov is at best implicit and at worst doctrinally unmoored. Unlike Sousa Goucha, where the satire was directed at a public figure and the Court carefully weighed the broadcast’s social function, Petrov involved a vulnerable minority group historically (and contemporarily) subject to marginalisation and violence all around the European states. The absence of any express discussion of how a ‘reasonable viewer’ in Russia, a country with institutionalised homophobia, would interpret satire that depicts the killing of a gay man renders the Court’s analysis dangerously superficial.
Crucially, the digital nature of the dissemination requires a recalibration of the ‘reasonable reader’ framework. One critical argument of the supporters of the Petrov judgment, that the audience was non-identifiable due to online circulation, overlooks how, in digital ecosystems, even heterogeneous exposure leads to foreseeable audience clusters. Instagram’s algorithms, like those of other major platforms, foster ideological micro-communities (see here and here). A post that engages with homophobic tropes is unlikely to circulate randomly; it is more likely to be shared within networks where prejudicial or exclusionary attitudes toward queer community already find resonance, thereby heightening the risk of discriminatory interpretation and endorsement.
In Féret, the ECtHR held that speech targeting members of a ‘less informed public’, though not named, was still identifiable, and the speaker could foresee its likely impact. This principle translates powerfully to digital speech, where hashtags, follower networks, reposts, and comment cultures render the audience predictable, even if not individually named. In this light, the legality of the original post cannot be assessed in isolation from its foreseeable digital trajectory. The Court’s neglect of this foreseeability principle in Petrov is a doctrinal and empirical gap. Moreover, digital speech is not only received by primary viewers but is continuously redistributed, reframed, and meme-ified by secondary users. This spread is not accidental but built into digital communication, which means that satirical hate content is likely to evolve into harsher forms once posted. What matters is not only the initial 120,000 views but also the predictable afterlife of the content in algorithm-driven echo chambers that fuel anti-queer violence.
The argument that Instagram provides an ideologically fragmented space where satire is unlikely to reinforce bigotry misconstrues how hate surfaces digitally. As shown in Petrov, the video generated hundreds of affirming comments endorsing homophobic violence. Zinigrad notes that this reception magnifies ‘harm’ by legitimising bigotry, especially where state narratives themselves reinforce discrimination. The presumption that digital platforms diffuse meaning, rather than concentrate bias, is a fiction unsupported by digital media research (see here, here, and here).
Intent v. Effect: An Overcorrection of Precedent
The defence of the Court’s judgment places excessive emphasis on the satirical intent of the video creator, citing Jersild v. Denmark, where a journalist was exonerated for broadcasting racist speech as part of critical reporting. However, Jersild involved explicit editorial distancing and a journalistic framework. In Petrov, the speaker was a comedian, not a journalist, and the violent fantasy against the queer community was not marked as parody in a way that would negate its harmful effect. This distinction is crucial because the ECtHR has consistently held that intent is not determinative when evaluating hate speech. In Erbakan v. Turkey, the Court affirmed that even religiously framed speech with political aims may be restricted if it incites division. Similarly, in Soulas v France, the Court upheld convictions despite the authors’ claim that their xenophobic writings were meant to provoke debate, not hatred.
In Belkacem v. Belgium, the Court upheld criminal sanctions against a video that incited hatred against non-Muslims, rejecting the defense that it was merely polemical. Likewise, in Perinçek v. Switzerland, the Court acknowledged that the expression denying historical atrocities, even under the guise of political cover, could provoke deep social harm and be limited accordingly. This logic applies with equal force to satirical denial or parody of queer suffering. In the digital context, intent becomes even less reliable as a safeguard. Digital speech is fast-moving and decontextualised, across varied interpretive lenses. Thus, a jurisprudence that privileges intent over effect is particularly ill-suited for digital platforms. The fact that the video was framed in satire does not dilute its real-world resonance as dangerous digital speech.
Threshold of Severity: Conceptual Inconsistency and Selective Application
The ECtHR has long recognised that negative stereotyping of a group can, under certain circumstances, implicate Article 8. In Aksu v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber held that such stereotyping may impact an individual’s ‘private life’ by undermining their self-worth and social standing. In Budinova and Chaprazov, and Behar and Gutman, the Court reiterated that public statements stigmatising vulnerable communities may meet the threshold of severity even when not personally directed. In Petrov, however, the Court found that the satirical video, though containing homophobic language and imagery, did not meet this threshold. It justified this conclusion on the basis that the video was not targeted at the applicant, that it formed part of a broader political debate, and that it parodied state-sponsored homophobia rather than promoting it. However, this rationale ignores how digital satire, especially when violent, can validate offline harm. The video’s indirect dissemination, through downloads, shares, and algorithmic visibility, amplified its reach among those predisposed to act on its message. The 714 comments were not abstract digital chatter; they were proof of uptake, alignment, and potential mobilisation.
The ECtHR’s contrasting approach in Canal 8 is instructive. There, the Court recognised that humour may constitute symbolic violence when it perpetuates stereotypes and normalises discriminatory behaviour. It upheld domestic sanctions, highlighting the importance of communication context, audience impact, and the absence of contribution to public discourse, all of which were equally present in Petrov, yet disregarded by the Court. The Court’s distinction between satire that parodies discrimination and speech that reinforces it becomes untenable when the satire adopts the very hateful language and imagery of persecution. In Lilliendahl v. Iceland, homophobic Facebook comments, despite being allegedly humorous, were found to justify criminal sanction. Likewise, in Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group v. Georgia, the Court faulted authorities for failing to prevent homophobic violence, emphasising that governments must not remain passive in the face of speech that risks enabling broader discrimination.
By contrast, the Petrov judgment adopts a ‘minimalist threshold’ and treats digital harmful satire as immunised from scrutiny regardless of context or consequence. This approach threatens to insulate future instances of coded hate speech that rely on irony, parody, or humour to veil discriminatory narratives. The result is a jurisprudence that undervalues digital speech’s virality, endurance, and harm.
ECtHR & Future of Digital Satire
In essence, the defence of Petrov adopts a conventional structure, intent-based analysis, satire defence, and a vague notion of audience neutrality. But in digital spaces, this framework collapses. The digital space has fundamentally reshaped the way harmful content, especially satirical expression, operates, circulates, and inflicts harm. In this environment, satire is not a neutral or universally understood literary device. It is a form of expression that can be rapidly decontextualised, algorithmically promoted, and socially legitimised, especially when targeting already marginalised communities. In this regard, the ECtHR’s rationale in Petrov neglects how digital architecture intensifies ideological clustering, how dissemination pathways are foreseeable, and how digital satire can operate as a vector for hate. To treat digitally harmful satire as legally benign based on outdated assumptions of audience unpredictability is not just an error; it is jurisprudential negligence. It is not enough to ask whether a video intends to offend or provoke; we must also ask what it does in the world it enters. That, ultimately, is the ‘threshold of severity’ the ECtHR should have measured, but did not.
Cite as
Sarthak Gupta, Against the Harmful Digital Satire: Free Speech, Digital Algorithms, and Queer Harm in Yevstifeyev v. Russia,Völkerrechtsblog,13.10.2025, doi: 10.17176/20251013-151517-0.
Author
SarthakGupta
Sarthak Gupta is a lawyer currently serving as a Judicial Law Clerk-cum-Research Associate to Justice Sandeep Mehta at the Supreme Court of India. He is a Helton Fellow at the American Society of International Law and an editor at the Global Freedom of Expression at Columbia University.
Executive Director The Williams Institute is seeking an Executive Director to help guide our next chapter. Candidates should have a passion for rigorous research on sexual orientation and gender identity law and public policy, a strong appreciation for the Institute’s voice and values, and deep understanding of the policy issues facing LGBTQ communities. Ideal candidates will hold a J.D. or social science Ph.D., bring senior leadership experience, and have a proven record of innovation and collaboration across a broad range of partners and audiences. Deadline to apply: January 2, 2026 
International and Comparative SOGIESC Law - Professor Andreas R Ziegler 