In 2025, 574 people in Switzerland had their gender entry changed in the civil status register, according to provisional data published on Thursday. Such a change has been possible in the Alpine country since 2022. +Get the most important news from Switzerland in your inbox The Federal Statistical Office said authorities made 312 gender-entry changes from “man” to “woman” in 2025. Conversely, 262 entries were changed from “woman” to “man”. The greatest number of gender-entry changes took place in the canton of Zurich (120), whereas none recorded in the small eastern canton of Appenzell Inner Rhodes. According to the Statistical Office, more than half of the requests (56%) were made by people under the age of 25. Those under the age of 16 require the consent of their legal representative to request such a change. The Swiss register of persons recognises the genders male and female. The entry is made at birth and is mandatory: that is, it must be made even if the gender cannot be …
Category Archives: Allgemein
India passes transgender rights amendment, prompting concerns over compliance with Supreme Court precedent
President Droupadi Murmu on Tuesday assented to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026, a measure that Amnesty International says restricts the ability of transgender and gender-diverse individuals to self-identify. Aakar Patel, chair of Amnesty International India’s board, criticized the law, stating: “This regressive law dilutes safeguards and deepens state intrusion into the lives of transgender people.”
The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026, was passed by voice vote in both houses of Parliament on March 25, completing its legislative approval process. Opposition leaders raised concerns over the expedited process and urged that the bill be referred to a standing committee for broader consultation with stakeholders. Under the amended framework, transgender individuals are required to undergo a series of official verification procedures before their gender identity can be legally recognized by authorities.
The amendment introduces a narrower definition of “transgender,” limiting recognition to specified socio-cultural categories and biological variations. It also removes a separate definition of intersex persons, grouping them within the broader transgender category. Additionally, the law establishes criminal penalties for “compelling,” “forcing” or “alluring” a person or child to present as transgender, with punishments extending up to life imprisonment.
Legal observers note that the amendment departs from principles articulated by the Supreme Court in NALSA v. Union of India of 2014, in which the Court recognized gender identity as a matter of personal autonomy and affirmed the right to self-identification without mandatory medical intervention. The new framework replaces the Court’s recognition of self-identification with a system requiring certification by a medical board and subsequent recognition by a District Magistrate, raising concerns among critics about increased state oversight and potential inconsistencies with constitutional protections and international human rights standards.
The legislation was enacted despite objections from a Supreme Court-appointed expert committee on transgender rights, which had recommended withdrawing the bill and conducting further consultations with affected communities. The committee explicitly asked the government to withdraw the bill and engage in meaningful consultation with transgender communities. However, the government proceeded with the legislation.
Meanwhile, the Rajasthan High Court cautioned that legislative changes cannot dilute constitutional guarantees, particularly those recognized in prior Supreme Court rulings, signaling the potential for future legal challenges to the amendment.
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Supreme Court strikes down Colorado conversion therapy ban as applied to talk therapy for minors
March 31, 2026 06:00:36 pm
The US Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy for minors violates the First Amendment when applied to counselors who use only talk therapy, a landmark decision with sweeping implications for how states regulate speech by licensed health care professionals. The court voted 8-1 to reverse a lower court ruling that had […]READ MORE ▸
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| POLICY NEWS Supreme Court rules against Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy (c) Supreme Court rules against Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy Today, the Supreme Court ruled against Colorado’s law banning licensed mental health care providers from practicing conversion therapy on minors. Conversion therapy refers to treatments provided to a person for the purpose of changing their sexual orientation or gender identity. Williams Institute research estimates that 698,000 LGBT adults have been exposed to conversion therapy, including 350,000 who had been subjected to the treatments as adolescents. Conversion therapy is a discredited and harmful practice. In an amicus brief filed with the Court in Chiles v. Salazar, Williams Institute scholars presented extensive evidence of the impacts of conversion therapy on LGBT people, demonstrating both its ineffectiveness at achieving its main purpose—making a person not LGBT—and the harms reported by those who have experienced the treatments. Major medical associations, including the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, oppose the practice and consider it unethical. The Court’s decision did not endorse conversion therapy or address whether the practice is harmful or ineffective. In fact, it gave almost no consideration to the potential for harm or Colorado’s interest in protecting its residents from those harms. Instead, the Court narrowly focused on whether the law infringed upon the free speech rights of the petitioner, Kaley Chiles. Specifically, the Court considered whether the law regulated conduct, which the state has more leeway to restrict, or speech, which receives greater protections under the First Amendment. Eight justices joined the majority opinion that held that Colorado’s law regulates speech, rather than conduct. As a result, the Court held that the law should have been treated with more skepticism in the lower courts. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson disagreed with the majority and acknowledged the lasting psychological harm associated with conversion therapy. As she explained, “Ultimately, scientific evidence supports the conclusion that the anticipated harms from conversion therapy are twofold. First, conversion therapy stigmatizes the patient, telling them that their gender identity or sexual orientation is something to be fixed, rather than accepted. This rejection can lead to shame and guilt, which in turn can cause long-term emotional distress. Second, conversion therapy sets patients up to fail by giving them an unattainable goal.” The case will now return to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it will be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision. While bans like Colorado’s may not survive today’s decision, the case does not signal that conversion therapy is safe or effective, for minors or adults. The case also does not foreclose other avenues for survivors to take legal action against providers when they have been harmed or defrauded by the practice. Courts in several states, including California and New Jersey, have indicated that conversion therapy is a fraudulent commercial practice, allowing legal claims against providers under state consumer protection laws. In addition, the case does not require insurers to cover conversion therapy for minors. Several states, including New York and Minnesota, prohibit Medicaid or private insurers from covering conversion therapy. Despite today’s decision, there remain pathways to challenging or curtailing the practice of conversion therapy in the future. While the Court’s decision establishes that states cannot categorically ban therapists from using talk therapy to discourage a person’s identification as LGBT, it doesn’t undermine what the evidence shows. At the Williams Institute, we believe that this evidence will have its day in court. |
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Supreme Court strikes down Colorado conversion therapy ban as applied to talk therapy for minor
The US Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy for minors violates the First Amendment when applied to counselors who use only talk therapy, a landmark decision with sweeping implications for how states regulate speech by licensed health care professionals.
The court voted 8-1 to reverse a lower court ruling that had upheld the law, finding that Colorado’s statute discriminates based on viewpoint by allowing counselors to affirm a minor’s sexual orientation or gender identity but prohibiting them from helping clients who wish to change those things.
Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the majority, said the law “censors speech based on viewpoint” and cannot survive under the First Amendment simply because the state labels talk therapy as professional conduct.
“The First Amendment is no word game,” Gorsuch wrote. “And the rights it protects cannot be renamed away or their protections nullified by mere labels.”
The case was brought by Kaley Chiles, a licensed mental health counselor who argued that Colorado’s 2019 law prevented her from helping clients reach their own stated goals through conversation alone.
Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred but wrote separately to note that a viewpoint-neutral law restricting speech in medical settings would present “a different and more difficult question.”
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was the lone dissenter, warning the ruling could make speech-based medical treatments “effectively unregulatable” and that the decision “plays with fire.”
Jackson argued the court had long recognized that states may regulate the practice of medicine, including treatments delivered through speech, without triggering heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Twenty-five other states have enacted similar conversion therapy bans. The decision is expected to prompt legal challenges to those laws across the country. However, its practical reach will depend on how lower courts apply the ruling’s distinction between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral restrictions on professional speech.
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Register now for the SOGI Law Summer School – early bird rate available until 16 April 2026!
We are excited to announce the hashtag#SexualOrientation and hashtag#GenderIdentity in hashtag#internationallaw (hashtag#SOGILaw) summer school.
The five-day summer school on SOGI 2026 in International Law is held at Leiden University; in 2026 from 29 to 31 July in the Hague and continuing on 3 and 4 August in Leiden. The dates for 2026 have been chosen to allow participants to also take part in the WorldPride Human Rights Conference (5 to 7 August in Amsterdam) and other events of WorldPride, EuroPride and Pride Amsterdam (all from 25 July to 8 August).
This year’s edition is directed again by Prof. Andreas R. Ziegler (President of the Swiss Society of International Law as well as a Full Professor at the University of Lausanne who was the leading force behind the publication of the hashtag#OxfordHandbookonLGBTILaw 2026 (hashtag#SOGIESC)) and Elias Tissandier-Nasom, PhD candidate at Leiden Law School. Professor Kees Waaldijk, the founder of this programme, continues to serve as honorary co-ordinator.
Curious about what this year’s edition has to offer?
Visit our website and register now: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/education/study-programmes/summer-schools/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-in-international-law-human-rights-and-beyond
From Laurel Hubbard to sex testing in five years: why the Olympics U-turned on transgender rules
The IOC’s shift in position on trans women in elite sports is seismic, but new president Kirsty Coventry is reflecting a changed political climate
Over 10 tightly worded pages, the IOC now states that the female category must be protected for fairness and safety reasons, and makes it clear that SRY screening – a sex test using saliva or a cheek-swab – will be used to determine biological sex.
More: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2026/mar/26/why-olympics-u-turned-gender-rules-sex-testing
Egypt: First Ruling to Vindicate Transgender Individuals Regarding the “Right to Health” and Compel the “Sex Reassignment Committee” to Complete Procedures
ENG: https://cairo52.com/2026/03/23/historic-legal-victory-in-cairo-52-lawsuit-first-ruling-to-vindicate-transgender-individuals-regarding-the-right-to-health-and-compel-the-sex-reassignment-committee-to-complete-procedures/
Cairo 52 Legal research institute March 23, 2026
Press Release
In a historic judicial victory and an unprecedented step toward securing the right to health and medical care, the Administrative Judiciary Court issued a ruling in favor of the Cairo 52 Legal Research Institute’s client. This ruling is the first of its kind to vindicate transgender individuals in Egypt regarding their fundamental right to health. It annuls the negative decision and the failure of the “Sex Reassignment Committee” at the Egyptian Medical Syndicate to complete the medical procedures for one of the Institute’s transgender clients, legally compelling the committee to complete the process.
Case Background, the Client’s Suffering, and Systematic Obstruction
The details of the case date back to when the plaintiff submitted an official request to the “Sex Reassignment Committee,” the legal body tasked with reviewing gender transition requests in Egypt, headquartered at the Medical Syndicate. The request was supported by precise medical reports and examinations confirming the client’s prolonged psychological and hormonal therapy, and the inevitability of surgical intervention as a necessary treatment to save their life and enable them to live normally. This was especially urgent given the stark contradiction between their physical appearance and the identity recorded in official documents, which had completely paralyzed their life.
Despite fulfilling all medical requirements and the unanimous consensus of the treating physicians on the necessity of surgical intervention, the request remained locked in government drawers for years without justification. This procrastination occurred alongside the Sex Reassignment Committee’s general suspension of receiving and reviewing requests from this community, which constitutes numerous grave constitutional violations, undermining the right to health, the right to equality, and the principle of non-discrimination. This intentional delay and freezing prompted the Institute to resort to the Administrative Judiciary Court to stop this blatant violation and demand the realization of the client’s constitutional right to health.
Legal Defenses Presented by the Cairo 52 Legal Team
During the litigation process, the Cairo 52 Legal Team submitted legal memoranda based on a set of fundamental defenses, most notably:
State of Medical Necessity and the Right to Health: The legal team emphasized that the client’s condition is a real, medically recognized organic and psychological condition requiring treatment. Surgical intervention in this context constitutes a “state of medical necessity that permits prohibitions” to save the patient, grounded in the Constitution’s guarantee of healthcare as a fundamental pillar of life.
Plea of Unconstitutionality Due to Suspected Discrimination and Deprivation of Transgender Individuals from Treatment: The team argued that denying or obstructing treatment specifically for transgender individuals constitutes clear discrimination and a violation of the principle of equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Depriving this group of their medical rights is an explicit violation of the constitutional right to health, which the state must guarantee to all citizens without discrimination.
The Negative Administrative Decision: The team stressed that the refusal of the concerned authorities to complete the examinations and issue the necessary permits constitutes an unlawful negative administrative decision, stripping the client of their right to life and rendering them “morally, socially, and legally dead.”
Plea of Unconstitutionality Regarding the Committee’s Composition (Flaw in Technical Competence): The legal team argued the invalidity of the “Sex Reassignment Committee’s” composition for violating the Constitution by including a religious member (a representative of Al-Azhar) in what is supposed to be a purely medical and technical committee. The defense asserted that religious jurisprudence is not a reference for evaluating a health condition, and that evaluation must be exclusively limited to scientific experts.
Reasoning and Verdict of the Court In its reasoning, the court did not uphold the defense’s plea regarding the unconstitutionality of the committee’s composition and the exclusion of the religious member. However, it vindicated the client in the substantive part of the lawsuit regarding the administration’s failure, concluding the following:
Condemning the Medical Syndicate’s Inaction: The court confirmed that the Egyptian Medical Syndicate failed to provide evidence of sending the client’s medical reports to Al-Azhar. The court considered this conduct an unjustified refusal to complete the prescribed procedures for examining the client’s case.
Clearing Al-Azhar of Responsibility: The court established that the Islamic Research Academy did not fail in its role; rather, it requested the completion of medical reports for several cases, including the client’s, but the Medical Syndicate failed to send them, thereby obstructing Al-Azhar’s role in providing a religious opinion.
The Verdict: Consequently, the court ruled to accept the lawsuit in form, and in substance, to “annul the contested negative decision” (which is the Medical Syndicate’s refusal to complete the procedures), with all its ensuing legal consequences. This legally compels the Sex Reassignment Committee to complete the examinations and present its medical opinion to Al-Azhar to seek a religious opinion as a procedural condition before issuing the final approval.
The Cairo 52 Legal Research Institute affirms that this ruling—despite our continuous reservations regarding the involvement of non-medical entities in health self-determination and the deprivation of individuals’ medical decision-making autonomy—represents a significant legal victory and an effective tool to advance the files of transgender individuals currently stuck in the drawers of government committees. The Institute calls on the Ministry of Health and the Medical Syndicate to promptly execute the ruling and to respect the constitutional right to health and bodily integrity without delay.
To know more about the situation of accessing healthcare for trans people in Egypt, read our study: Understanding the Needs and Challenges of Transgender People Accessing Gender-Affirming Healthcare in Egypt: A Mixed Methods Study.
Romania – Court of Appeal annuls decision of the national equality body and orders re-examination of the complaint in the case in which the institution failed to sanction refusal of printing leaflets due to lesbophobia
Romania – Court of Appeal annuls decision of the national equality body and orders re-examination of the complaint in the case in which the institution failed to sanction refusal of printing leaflets due to lesbophobia
More: https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/6498-romania-court-of-appeal-annuls-decision-of-the-national-equality-body-and-orders-re-examination-of-the-complaint-in-the-case-in-which-the-institution-failed-to-sanction-refusal-of-printing-leaflets-due-to-lesbophobia
Poland: the Supreme Court has confirmed the country’s legal obligation to recognise same-sex marriages concluded abroad
Poland: the Supreme Court has confirmed the country’s legal obligation to recognise same-sex marriages concluded abroad
The Court said that Poland’s refusal to recognise same-sex marriages concluded abroad is incompatible with EU law. It follows an earlier judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that required Poland to recognise same-sex marriages legally concluded in other EU Member States.
The case, ongoing since 2019, concerns a couple who were repeatedly refused transcription of their marriage certificate by the Civil Registry Office.
The Court has ordered the Civil Registry Office to transcribe the couple’s marriage certificate within 30 days once it receives the case files. This effectively closes the case and marks a significant legal breakthrough.
“Today’s judgment is a victory for the many same-sex couples in Poland who have been deprived of marriage recognition for years and a first step towards equality,” said Marie-Hélène Ludwig, our Senior Strategic Litigation Advisor at ILGA-Europe.
“It also shows that domestic courts can swiftly implement CJEU judgments, contrary to what we have seen in other CJEU cases”.
Together with Polish civil society organisations and legal experts we will be closely monitoring compliance by authorities, as this ruling sets a precedent.
Read more
http://ilga-europe.org/…/poland-supreme-administrative…/
Interesting Repost: Uladzislau Belavusau, Sexual Citizenship via Free Movement [Verfassungsblog 13 March 2026 on the judgement of the Court of Justice of the EU in Shipov (C-43/24, 2026), issued on 12 March 2026]
Yesterday, in the judgment of Shipov, the Court of Justice decided how EU citizenship can shape the recognition of gender identity within the Member States. Yet not through anti-discrimination law, but through the constitutional logic of free movement. The Court of Justice held that EU law precludes national legislation preventing a Union citizen from changing gender-related data in civil-status records in relation to the exercise of free movement. While formally grounded in Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38, the case raises broader constitutional questions about the evolving relationship between citizenship, gender identity, and fundamental rights in the EU. Shipov follows the AG’s “minimal intrusion” logic and reinforces its reasoning by drawing heavily on Strasbourg jurisprudence. Finally, by linking gender identity to the effectiveness of EU citizenship, even under a relatively modest cross-border link, the Court further expands the role of Union citizenship as a vehicle for protecting personal identity and dignity.
Identity documents and the logic of free movement
The judgement of the Court of Justice in Shipov (C-43/24, 2026), issued on 12 March 2026, marks another step in the gradual constitutionalisation of sexual and gender identity within EU law. The Court held that EU law precludes national legislation preventing the amendment of gender-related data – including name and personal identification number – in civil-status registers of a Union citizen who has exercised free movement. In doing so, the Court treated identity documents not merely as administrative instruments but as essential legal tools enabling the effective exercise of EU citizenship rights. If the information contained in such documents no longer corresponds to a person’s lived identity, the resulting inconsistencies may create concrete obstacles in everyday cross-border interactions, ranging from border checks to employment procedures.
The decision continues a line of cases where the Court linked questions of personal identity to the effectiveness of EU citizenship rights. Earlier judgments such as Garcia Avello (C-148/02, 2003), Grunkin and Paul (C-353/06, 2008), Coman (C-673/16, 2018), and V.M.A. (C-490/20, 2021) similarly treated matters of personal status – names, marriage, or parenthood – as capable of restricting the effective exercise of free movement. Previously, I have commented extensively about the Coman case here on VerfBlog and elsewhere (with Dimitry Kochenov).
At first glance, however, Shipov appears doctrinally unusual. The dispute concerned only Bulgarian civil-status records. Unlike the earlier cases mentioned above, it did not involve the recognition of a legal status already established in another Member State (see para. 40 of the judgment). Yet the case was not entirely internal. The applicant had exercised free movement by residing in Italy, where she underwent hormone therapy and formed a stable relationship with an Italian national. Still, the cross-border element remained comparatively thin. The dispute itself concerned the amendment of Bulgarian civil-status records rather than mutual recognition of a status already created abroad. Furthermore, the domestic legal context was shaped by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court’s interpretative decision of 26 October 2021, which held that the constitutional concept of “sex” must be understood exclusively in a biological sense.
A cautious doctrinal route
In her earlier VerfBlog analysis of the Advocate General’s Opinion, Alina Tryfonidou highlighted the careful doctrinal strategy underlying the case. Rather than imposing a general obligation on Member States to introduce gender recognition procedures, the Advocate General, Jean Richard de la Tour, adopted a more limited approach. EU law requires identity documents to enable the effective exercise of free movement. If those documents cannot reflect a person’s gender identity without amending civil-status records, Member States must allow such amendments where necessary for the exercise of EU citizenship rights.
This “minimal intrusion” logic is reflected in the judgment itself. The Court reiterates that matters of civil status remain within Member State competence. However, Member States must exercise that competence consistently with EU law when national rules affect the practical conditions under which Union citizens exercise their mobility rights (paras 37–39, 47 of the judgment).
The Court further reinforced its reasoning by drawing heavily on Strasbourg jurisprudence. Referring to Article 8 ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on gender identity, it emphasised that States must provide accessible procedures for legal gender recognition. Bulgaria had already been criticised in ECtHR judgments such as Y.T. v Bulgaria (2020) and P.H. v Bulgaria (2022) (paras. 49-52 of the judgement).
This reliance on Strasbourg allows the Court to situate its intervention within a broader European human-rights framework rather than presenting it as a purely EU-law innovation.
The shadow of McCarthy
Despite this cautious framing, the judgment still raises questions about the limits of EU citizenship. The relatively weak cross-border element inevitably invites comparison with McCarthy (C-434/09, 2011), where the Court rejected the application of EU law to a purely internal situation.
Formally, Shipov is distinguishable because the applicant had exercised free movement by residing in Italy. Yet the case still pushes EU citizenship into terrain where the cross-border element is more contextual than structural. The Court justifies its intervention by emphasising the role of identity documents as instruments of mobility. Discrepancies between a person’s lived gender identity and official documents may create practical obstacles when interacting with authorities, employers, or service providers across Member States.
Nevertheless, the judgment might have benefited from a clearer explanation of why such a comparatively thin cross-border element suffices. Without such clarification, the decision risks appearing difficult to reconcile with the stricter logic of earlier “purely internal situation” cases. The Court’s reasoning may therefore be understood as subtly recalibrating the threshold for the cross-border element required to trigger EU citizenship protections. Rather than demanding a fully developed cross-border legal status, the Court appears willing to intervene where national rules risk undermining the practical usability of identity documents across Member States. Whether this approach represents a pragmatic evolution of citizenship jurisprudence or a more controversial expansion of EU judicial authority will likely remain a subject of debate.
Why the Court chose citizenship rather than equality
Another striking feature of Shipov is the legal pathway chosen by the Court. The dispute concerns gender identity – an issue that might naturally fall within anti-discrimination law. Yet the Court does not rely on the Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC or on the equality provisions of the Treaties. Instead, the judgment relies on Article 21 TFEU (the fundamental right to move and reside freely within the EU), Directive 2004/38/EC (EU Citizens’ Rights Directive), and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (respect for private and family life).
This choice is constitutionally significant. Anti-discrimination protection under Article 19 TFEU typically requires legislative harmonisation, whereas free movement provisions operate directly. By framing the case through citizenship and mobility rather than equality law, the Court relies on one of the Union’s strongest constitutional tools.
From market citizenship to sexual citizenship
The broader significance of Shipov becomes clearer when placed within the evolving constitutional narrative of EU citizenship. Over the past two decades, the Court has increasingly relied on citizenship and free movement to address questions of family status and sexual identity, areas traditionally considered matters of national competence.
Shipov extends this logic to gender identity. The case illustrates what I have previously described as the emergence of EU sexual citizenship – a constitutional development in which EU citizenship becomes a vehicle for recognising sexual and gender identities across the Union. Rather than relying primarily on anti-discrimination law or harmonisation under Article 19 TFEU, the Court increasingly uses citizenship as the doctrinal gateway for protecting these identities. From this perspective, EU citizenship increasingly operates not only as a market-based status but also as a normative framework that shapes the recognition of personal identity across Member States. By addressing issues of family status, sexual orientation, and gender identity through the lens of mobility rights, the Court gradually constructs a constitutional space in which certain aspects of personal identity become indirectly protected by EU law.
Conclusion
Technically, Shipov may appear to be a free movement case. In reality, it forms part of a broader constitutional evolution. By linking gender identity to the effectiveness of EU citizenship, the Court further expands the role of Union citizenship as a vehicle for protecting personal identity and dignity. More broadly, the judgment reflects a recurring tension within EU citizenship jurisprudence: while matters of personal status formally remain within the competence of Member States, they increasingly become subject to EU constraints when they affect the practical conditions under which Union citizens exercise their rights of movement and residence. Questions of names, family relations, and now gender identity thus appear less as purely domestic matters and more as elements of the legal infrastructure that allows EU citizenship to function in practice.
Whether this development represents a cautious doctrinal adjustment or a more ambitious constitutional shift remains open to debate. What is clear, however, is that EU citizenship is increasingly shaping the recognition of sexual and gender identities across the Union – even where the cross-border element remains comparatively modest.
The post Sexual Citizenship via Free Movement appeared first on Verfassungsblog.
CJEU: Judgment in Case C-43/24 Shipova – free movement and lived gender
CJEU: Judgment in Case C-43/24 Shipova – free movement and lived gender
Today, the CJEU delivered its ruling in the case C-43/24 Shipova, marking a historic step forward for trans people’s rights across the EU.
The Court stated that under EU law provisions on freedom of movement and fundamental right to private and family life, member states have an obligation to legally recognise the lived gender of their nationals who have exercised their right to move and reside in another member state in their civil status registers; i.e. they must have a functioning process for legal gender recognition (“LGR”) in place. This is because, as the Court confirmed, identity documents and passports are key for EU nationals to enjoy freedom of movement, so in order to avoid “considerable inconveniences” in particular during identity checks or cross-border travel or in professional settings. Therefore, member states must provide identity documents and civil registry entries matching the person’s lived gender. The Court also recalled that tolerating discrimination against trans persons breaches their dignity and freedom. It also decided that national courts are not bound by supreme court’s decisions that run contrary to today’s judgment and EU law.
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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled Thursday that EU member states must update identity documents to reflect the gender identity of transgender citizens who have transitioned in another member state, finding that refusal to do so may violate the bloc’s guarantee of freedom of movement.
The court said discrepancies between a person’s lived gender identity and official identity documents can create practical difficulties during identity checks, travel, and professional activities, undermining the right to respect for private life under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to freedom of movement under Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The case concerned a Bulgarian national identified under the pseudonym “Shipova,” who moved to Italy and underwent social and medical gender transition before requesting that Bulgarian authorities update her birth certificate. Officials in Bulgaria denied the request, citing national legal interpretations that define sex strictly on biological grounds. The dispute was referred to the EU’s highest court to determine whether such a refusal conflicted with EU law after the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the possibility of legal gender reassignment for transgender people.
The court has previously addressed transgender rights in EU law. In the 1996 decision P v S and Cornwall County Council, the court ruled that discrimination arising from gender reassignment constitutes discrimination based on sex under EU equality law. The decision addresses tensions between EU rights and domestic laws in some member states where legal gender recognition remains restricted.
Bulgaria’s Supreme Court ruled in 2023 that national law does not permit legal gender changes. The CJEU noted that national courts must ensure that domestic rules do not prevent the effective application of EU law. The ruling follows a similar judgment issued by the CJEU in 2024 involving Romania, in which the court determined that authorities violated EU law by refusing to recognize a transgender man’s legal transition carried out in the United Kingdom. In the current case, the CJEU emphasized that national courts must set aside interpretations of domestic law that conflict with binding EU legal principles.
Earlier this month, Advocate General Richard de la Tour issued a non-binding opinion advising the court that national authorities should not refuse recognition of gender identity where such refusal interferes with the exercise of EU free movement rights.
Under EU judicial procedure, CJEU rulings are binding on national courts when interpreting EU law. The Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation must therefore apply the court’s interpretation when resolving the dispute. The ruling may have broader implications for transgender individuals in several EU countries where legal gender recognition procedures remain restricted or unavailable. National courts across the European Union are required to apply the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law when similar questions arise, potentially influencing how member states reconcile domestic civil status laws with EU fundamental rights protections.
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