Tag Archives: human-rights

Dangerous New Reporting Guidelines for US Annual Human Rights Reports

The U.S. State Department recently sent new instructions to all U.S. embassies to guide in the preparation of the State Department’s 2025 Human Rights Reports. (See our LinkedIn post on this here.) As expected, they are removing the section of the annual report that covers abuses against LGBTQI+ persons. But even more alarming, they are now requiring reporting on transgender medical care as a human rights abuse involving the “chemical or surgical mutilation of children.” In short, the reports are no longer even vaguely credible on LGBTQI+ issues and are now creating an anti-rights framework to legitimize attacks against our communities.

The Council for Global Equality (CGE) has long encouraged human rights groups to report abuses to U.S. embassies for inclusion in the annual human rights reports. Over the past years, based on those local partnerships and the work of a dedicated LGBTQI+ policy team at the State Department in Washington, the U.S. human rights reports became increasingly comprehensive and were used by the United States and many other governments to formulate policy and adjudicate refugee claims. Unfortunately, based on recent instructions and the last 2024 reports, we now know the next reports will no longer be credible on LGBTQI+ and related issues, and CGE fears that the continued submission of information to U.S. embassies could create risks for the community itself.

Given this new policy directive, we encourage groups to maintain cautious contact with trusted U.S. embassy staff, but we also urge groups to exercise extreme caution if you plan to submit information to U.S. embassies or the State Department, as we fear the information could be twisted or used against community interests. For refugee and asylum adjudication purposes only, there may be ways to submit relevant information on extrajudicial executions, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of LGBTQI+ persons, but please reach out to us (info@globalequality.org) or refugee groups directly to discuss how best to present and submit that information so that it is not cited inappropriately.

At the same time, we want to encourage all human rights groups to continue to document and share information widely on abuses targeting LGBTQI+ persons — that information is more important than ever given the current backlash. Many of you already have robust dissemination networks for your data, including other embassies and the European Union, but please feel free to reach out to discuss how to ensure your documentation reaches the broadest possible audience. And please note that the following CGE member organizations and allied human rights groups regularly compile human rights reports that document violations against LGBTQI+ people globally, which are often useful for policymakers in Washington and beyond: Amnesty International USA, Global Justice Institute, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, ILGA, Outright International, Synergía – Initiatives for Human Rights, and The Williams Institute. Please reach out to those groups directly or reach out to us to help make connections to share your documentation.

Repost: Alessandro Marcia, Rainbow Europe or Rainbow Washing? [LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy (2026-2030)]

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Repost: Alessandro Marcia, Rainbow Europe or Rainbow Washing? [LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy (2026-2030)]

Over the years, different EU institutions have tried to translate Phillip Ayoub and David Paternotte’s idea of a “Rainbow Europe” into law. In 2020, for instance, the European Commission published its first-ever LGBTIQ Equality Strategy under the banner of building a “Union of Equality”. This slogan was reproduced by Commission President von der Leyen in her 2020 State of the Union speech, when she promised that she “will not rest when it comes to building a Union of equality (…) where you can be who you are and love who you want”. Two years later, the Commission went even further by proposing a direct link between the EU founding values in Article 2 TEU and LGBTIQA+ rights in the context of an infringement action against a Hungarian law that censors Queer books and media.

Yet, recent developments have increasingly challenged this narrative. A survey conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in 2024 revealed that discrimination faced by LGBTIQA+ individuals remains dramatically high. In addition, a growing number of EU Member States have proposed or introduced legislation that directly targets LGBTIQA+ individuals (see, for instance, recent developments in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Italy). What a decade ago seemed to be Hungary’s isolated case is today a growing trend across the Union.

Against this backdrop, the European Commission just published its new LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy (2026-2030). In my view, however, this initiative represents a downgraded commitment of the European Commission towards the protection of Queer individuals.

High ambitions, limited results

In 2020, the European Commission adopted, by means of a Communication, the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy (2020-2025). Symbolically, this was a milestone: a Commission policy document explicitly and comprehensively dedicated to the protection of LGBTIQA+ individuals. This innovation also came during a legislative term marked by the unprecedented appointment of a Commissioner for Equality and the creation of a dedicated Commission unit on non-discrimination and LGBTIQA+ matters.

The Strategy was built around four major pillars: tackling discrimination against LGBTIQ people, ensuring LGBTIQ people’s safety, building LGBTIQ-inclusive societies and leading the call for LGBTIQ equality around the world. Each of these pillars identified a set of legislative and non-legislative initiatives to be achieved within a fixed timeline, thus serving as a roadmap for the Commission’s work over the entire mandate.

From a legal perspective, two legislative proposals stood out. The first one concerned the inclusion of both hate crimes and hate speech against LGBTIQA+ persons in Article 83(1) TFEU. This update would allow the Commission to introduce a proposal for a Directive on minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. The second initiative was the so-called “Equality Package”, a proposal intended to harmonise rules concerning parenthood in cross-border situations. This would have mandated the mutual recognition of parental bonds across the EU, including between same-sex parents and their children. Alongside these initiatives, the Strategy stressed the importance of overcoming the stagnation of the proposal for a Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive.

These two legislative proposals were built upon two legal bases – Articles 83(1) and 81(3) TFEU respectively – that provide a special legislative procedure, which requires the Council to act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. Despite the Parliament’s positive endorsement of these legislative initiatives (here and here), both proposals remain blocked in the Council due to the opposition of multiple Member States. Likewise, no progress has been made regarding the Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive, which has remained stuck in the Council since being proposed in 2008.

Furthermore, the Strategy also entailed a number of minor legislative initiatives. For instance, Directives 2024/1499 and 2024/1500 extended the remit of equality bodies (agencies in the Member States that support victims of discrimination) to discrimination based on sexual orientation in the field of employment. In parallel, the Strategy outlined some specific rules on LGBTIQA+ rights to be embedded into other pieces of EU legislation (the so-called “mainstreaming”). An example is the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act adopted in June 2024, which prohibits AI systems using biometric data to determine a person’s sexual orientation. However, while the Strategy proposed extending this provision also to gender identity, this does not appear in the final text of the AI Act.

Against this backdrop, both legislative proposals outlined in the Strategy – which address LGBTIQA+ individuals explicitly and directly – remain blocked in the Council. Similarly, the Member States failed once again to make progress on the Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive. In my view, this stagnation mirrors the divergent legal and political approaches of the Member States, as well as the highly politicised nature of LGBTIQA+ rights. In parallel, it seems that small-scale legislative intervention and the mainstreaming of LGBTIQA+ concerns into other pieces of EU law are more likely to be successful. This approach leaves less room for politicisation, while the ordinary legislative procedure (with its qualified-majority voting) allows bypassing the opposition of regressive Member States.

Equality, selectively enforced

Another key objective of the Strategy was to monitor the implementation of EU law by the Member States and initiate infringement procedures in cases where EU law had been breached in relation to LGBTIQA+ rights (see also the latest Implementation Report).

Throughout the timeframe of the Strategy (2020-2025), several regressive laws that target LGBTIQA+ individuals were enacted at the national level. In 2021, for example, Hungary passed a law that restricts access to books and other media that portray Queer experiences. In addition, just a few months ago, the Orbán-controlled Parliament adopted the so-called Freedom of Assembly Act, which enables authorities to classify Pride marches as violations of the Child Protection Act and, as a result, de facto limits the freedom of assembly. In a similar vein, Bulgaria has introduced a law that prohibits the discussion of LGBTQIA+ topics in schools, and, more recently, Slovakia passed a constitutional reform that recognises only two genders (assigned at birth), limits adoption rights to opposite-sex married couples and bans any discussion of Queerness in schools.

Initially, the Commission took a bold stance against Hungary’s attacks on the LGBTIQA+ community. Just three years ago, the Commission referred Hungary to the EU Court of Justice over its “anti-propaganda law”. Notably, besides raising a series of technical violations of EU law, the Commission argued that Hungary had infringed upon the Charter and the EU “founding values” in Article 2 TEU. This allegation has recently been endorsed by Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta. While the judicial enforcement of Article 2 TEU is a highly controversial question among scholars (see Bonelli and Claes; see also Spieker), this case symbolically demonstrated the European Commission’s commitment to protect Queer individuals from attacks on their rights at the national level.

But the very same Commission did not coherently act when faced with similar developments. For instance, some civil society organisations suggested that the Hungarian Freedom of Assembly Act, which also allows police authorities to use real-time AI biometric tools to identify Pride participants, violates the EU AI Act. Yet, the Commission has not taken any action so far. The same inaction can be noticed when it comes to Bulgaria and Slovakia.

In other words: the European Commission is engaging in – what I call – “selective enforcement” of EU law. Specifically, the Commission applies double standards, probably because of political factors such as President von der Leyen’s dangerous reliance on a more conservative-leaning majority, which now also includes political parties from the far-right fringe.

A downgraded commitment

On 8 October 2025, the Commission seemingly renewed its commitment by presenting a new LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy (2026-2030). But this Strategy does not follow the structure of the previous one. Instead, it is built around three broader, more ambiguous objectives: protect, empower, and engage LGBTIQA+ people.

First, the Commission emphasised its opposition to so-called conversion practices (i.e., practices aimed at “converting” an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity). This comes as a logical response to the European Citizens Initiative (ECI) that, just a few months ago, gathered over 1 million signatures in order to ban conversion practices at the European level. However, while the ECI suggested an EU-wide ban of these practices by including them in the list of crimes in Article 83(1) TFEU, the Commission did not follow that path. Instead, the Commission will fund a study to analyse the nature, prevalence, and impact of these practices on LGBTIQA+ people. Based on the results of this study, the Commission will supposedly promote a “structured dialogue” and focus on supporting the Member States in banning those practices, highlighting that they play a crucial role to this end.

While whether and how to follow up on a successful ECI falls within the Commission’s discretion, this choice signals caution. The Commission limits its role to that of a simple facilitator of Member States’ action, rather than being an active player in banning these practices (through, for instance, a legislative proposal). To be blunt, Ursula von der Leyen is downgrading her commitment towards the LGBTIQA+ community. Notably, the more conservative-leaning composition of her Commission has led the Union to abandon its role as a central player in protecting and advancing LGBTIQA+ rights, leaving the Member States in the driver’s seat.

Second, the Commission is supposedly committed to overcoming the unanimity blockage in the Council with regards to the two legislative proposals presented as part of the previous Strategy, as well as the proposed Horizontal Anti-Discrimination Directive. The only real innovation in this regard is that the Commission is considering abandoning the proposal of the former Strategy to include hate crime and hate speech in the list of EU crimes in favour of a new legislative initiative based on the existing areas of crime covered by Article 83(1) TFEU. This would allow us to harmonise the definition of offences committed online to include those based on the sexual orientation and gender identity of a person, simply through the ordinary legislative procedure.

Third, the Strategy reiterates that the Commission will continue monitoring the enforcement of EU law by the Member States. However, this stands in sharp contradiction to the Commission’s silence and inaction on the several examples of national laws that directly target LGBTIQA+ individuals.

Conclusion

The Commission’s new Strategy represents a downgraded commitment towards LGBTIQA+ individuals as evidenced by the tools proposed. While the previous Strategy (2020-2025) put an emphasis on legislative intervention and the enforcement of EU law, the newly proposed Strategy focuses more on softer policy instruments, such as recommendations, working groups, and data collection. This is also evident from the language used in the new Strategy: the Commission recurrently emphasises the role of the Member States in protecting LGBTIQA+ individuals. In my view, this shift can be attributed to the more conservative-leaning majority supporting the second von der Leyen Commission and its reliance on far-right political parties.

Many civil society organisations have already argued (here, here and here) that this Strategy is not fit for a society where the rights and freedoms of LGBTIQA+ individuals are increasingly under threat. Over the next five years, the true test will be whether the Commission can translate the Strategy into (at least some) tangible progress towards a “Rainbow Europe”, or whether its cautious approach will ultimately be seen as rainbow washing – a symbolic commitment masking the absence of real change.

The post Rainbow Europe or Rainbow Washing? appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Interesting Article – Repost: Sarah Ouředníčková, A Door Opened, But Not Fully (Verfassungsblog 17.6.2025) [ECtHR, T.H. v. the Czech Republic – sterilisation as a precondition for legal gender recognition]

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Interesting Article – Repost: Sarah Ouředníčková, A Door Opened, But Not Fully (Verfassungsblog 17.6.2025) [ECtHR, T.H. v. the Czech Republic – sterilisation as a precondition for legal gender recognition]

On 12 June 2025, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgment in T.H. v. the Czech Republic, a case brought by a non-binary person, finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention for requiring sterilisation as a precondition for legal gender recognition. Legally, the Court walked a familiar path, citing its established case law and reasserting well-known principles. But this case marked an unspoken first: it involved a non-binary applicant. While the applicant’s identity was acknowledged in passing, the Court quickly reframed the claim in binary terms, referred to the applicant using masculine pronouns, and declined to engage with the broader questions of inhuman and degrading treatment or discrimination. The result is thus a mixed outcome: the judgment opens a legal door but offers little warmth to those standing outside the traditional gender binary.

Who’s knocking on Strasbourg’s door?

T.H. is a non-binary person, assigned male at birth, but having struggled considerably with their gender identity from their early age (for a more detailed introduction see our previous post on the underlying decision by the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC)). As the ECtHR noted, T.H. has undergone “hormonal treatment (to reduce testosterone levels) and some body aesthetic procedures” (§ 7) but has never undertaken a sex reassignment surgery. Therefore, the Czech authorities register and treat T.H. as a man. That is reflected inter alia in T.H.’s personal numerical code, also known as “birth number”, which has the male form.

This explains the procedural strategy: T.H. had approached Czech administrative authorities with a request to change the birth number to a “neutral” (which, admittedly, does not exist in Czechia) or at least a “female” form so that this unique identifier would not present T.H. as a male person and would not require a repeated coming-out in everyday situations where T.H.’s documents did not match T.H.’s appearance. And while the CCC presented the case as a technical litigation “about birth numbers”, this case really concerns much deeper issues, including dignity and recognition of persons belonging to minorities.

What did the Court say?

The ECtHR found unanimously (and unsurprisingly) that the Czech requirement of undergoing surgery and sterilisation as a condition for legal gender recognition violates the right to respect for private life under Article 8. The Court reaffirmed that such a requirement imposes on certain persons “an insoluble dilemma”: it forces them to choose between preserving their physical integrity and gaining legal recognition of their gender identity (§ 58; see also X and Y v. Romania, § 165). The judges considered that while States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this morally sensitive area, that margin narrows considerably when fundamental aspects of personal identity and autonomy are at stake. However, the Court declined to examine the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 14, holding that the violation of Article 8 sufficed. It also refused to award any compensation for non-pecuniary harm, stating that the finding of a violation was itself sufficient. Only a partial reimbursement of legal costs was granted.

Misgendering as a fundamental form of disrespect

In a case centred on recognition, language is paramount. The Court acknowledges that T.H. identifies as non-binary (§ 6) and has requested to have their male unique identifier changed to, preferably, a neutral one or, at least, a female one (§ 7). However, the Court proceeds to use masculine pronouns throughout the judgment. It justifies this by stating that

“on the date of lodging of the application, the applicant was regarded for civil-law purposes as belonging to the male sex. For that reason, the masculine form is used in referring to him; however, this cannot be construed as excluding him from the gender with which he identifies.” (§ 4)

This misstep undermines the very dignity the Court ought to uphold. Even as the judgment affirms a right, its tone betrays a missed opportunity for respect.

First, pronouns are a crucial way of identifying with a gender for anybody and of affirming their gender identity. The use of preferred pronouns, including by judges, has a fundamental importance for the recognition particularly of trans and non-binary persons. Scholars such as Rosalind Dixon have emphasised the importance of the language used by judges for a sense of dignity and respect on the part of applicants. Similarly, Sarah Ganty has shown how the language and narratives used by judges – as (meta)narrators – can become part of the cultural processes reproducing (or tackling) inequalities. At the same time, the use of preferred pronouns does not prejudge the merits of the claim as to whether one’s gender should be recognised, as noted by dissenting Judge Šimáčková in the first Transgender Judgment of the CCC. In other words, by using the applicants’ preferred pronouns, nothing is lost but much is won in terms of respect.

Secondly, the justification of using pronouns based on the legal sex/gender of the person at the time of lodging the application is inconsistent with the Court’s usual approach of addressing trans applicants in accordance with their gender identity. It is true that the Court has sometimes used the pronouns according to the officially registered sex/gender including in the key case of A. P., Garçon and Nicot v. France which also dealt with the refusal to recognise gender without undergoing gender reassignment surgery and which the applicant in T.H. relied on. However, the Court usually uses the preferred pronouns, including in its other key cases such as Goodwin v. UK, as well as more recent cases dealing with the refusal to recognise gender without undergoing surgery such as the 2021 case of X and Y v. Romania or the 2022 case of A .D. and Others v. Georgia. The Court’s refusal to use the applicant’s pronouns in T.H. is thus a surprising and unwelcome setback.

Finally, the Court’s refusal to use the applicant’s preferred pronouns is even more surprising and disrespectful given that the Court used feminine pronouns when first communicating the case. Interestingly, even the Government consistently used feminine pronouns in its communication with other institutions, which makes the Court’s choice absurd. The Government continued to use feminine pronouns even in its press release about the judgment. In a rare reversal of roles, the respondent State has thus appeared more attuned to the lived identity of the applicant than the Court itself.

Vital avenues left unexplored

Focusing exclusively on Article 8 while ignoring potential violations of Articles 3 and 14 significantly narrows the judgment’s reach and we consider it a missed opportunity. Article 14, in particular, could have grounded a stronger, intersectional judgment addressing gender-based discrimination.

The Court noted that while the applicant relied on more provisions, it was up to the Court – as the “master of the characterisation” – to decide under which Article(s) a complaint is to be examined (§ 46). It argued that since the applicant had not been subjected to any medical intervention against their will or any interference with their reproductive rights as well as “the nature of the proceedings brought by him before the domestic authorities and to the approach taken by it in similar cases”, referring to A.P., Garçon and Nicot and X and Y v. Romania, the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 8. However, in Garçon, the situation was different in that only one of the three applicants had raised Article 3 (see dissenting opinion in Garçon, § 3 and 21). Moreover, Article 3 was still relied upon by the Court in its reasoning. The Court established that mandatory gender reassignment surgery affects “an individual’s physical integrity, which is protected by Article 3” as well as Article 8 (§ 127) and results in “making the full exercise of their right to respect for their private life under Article 8 of the Convention conditional on their relinquishing full exercise of their right to respect for their physical integrity as protected by that provision and also by Article 3 of the Convention” (§ 131).

We do understand that the applicant in T.H. had not been subjected to forced sterilisation. However, the very fact that access to legal gender recognition remained contingent upon such a procedure arguably created a form of coercive pressure. In its Guide on Article 3, the Court states

“that a threat of torture can also amount to torture, as the nature of torture covers both physical pain and mental suffering. In particular, the fear of physical torture itself may in certain circumstances constitute mental torture” (p. 8).

It is worth asking whether a person must actually undergo inhuman or degrading treatment in order for the Court to assess the situation under Article 3, if such a condition is not applied regarding torture under the same article. Instead, the Court should have fully examined the complaint under Article 3, given the severity of the required medical intervention including involuntary sterilisation; an intervention that is far from hypothetical for persons such as T.H. By refusing to engage Article 3, the Court missed the chance to affirm what the UN Special Rapporteur and others have made clear: forcing trans persons to choose between recognition and sterilisation is not just privacy infringement; it is inhumane.

Furthermore, the Court held there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 14 since it had found a violation under Article 8 (§ 62). This is the Court’s typical approach of sidelining Article 14 as a Cinderella provision and shying away from developing an equality and anti-discrimination jurisprudence. However, explicitly condemning discrimination can have powerful implications for oppressed and marginalised individuals. As in other trans rights cases, the Court opted for the safer terrain of individual privacy and self-determination, rather than confronting the structural discrimination that Article 14 is designed to expose. On the contrary, we have witnessed a mirrored attitude in Semenya v. Switzerland, a key Grand Chamber case about a famous South African professional athlete who had been forced to hormonally decrease her natural testosterone levels in order to compete in the female category. In Semenya v. Switzerland, the Court found a violation of Article 14 in connection with Article 8 while concluding that there was no need to examine separately the complaints under Article 8 alone.

A violation without remedy…

The refusal to grant compensation – despite acknowledging a violation – risks signalling that the harm endured is not materially recognised. This undermines the applicant’s lived experience and may discourage future litigation from marginalised groups. A violation without remedy rings hollow, especially for those already on the legal margins. Symbols matter.

…and with no legislative reform in sight

In a different case decided last spring, the CCC concluded that the sterilisation requirement was unconstitutional, quashed the respective legislative provisions with effect from 1 July 2025 and set a clear deadline for legislative reform by the end of June 2025. A draft law was circulated but has been criticised for introducing burdensome and medically unnecessary conditions, such as mandatory psychiatric assessments, hormone therapy, and a year-long waiting period. Even more troubling is the political inertia surrounding the bill. The Ministries of Justice, Health, and the Interior have each shifted responsibility to the others, resulting in a bureaucratic stalemate.

Thus, no legislation has been adopted – and with just two weeks remaining, none is realistically expected before the deadline expires. That means that although the sterilisation requirement will cease to apply as of July 2025 (as a consequence of the abovementioned CCC ruling), the legal framework for gender recognition will remain ambiguous and unregulated at statutory level. Ministerial guidelines might be issued at the last minute, but such measures lack the democratic legitimacy of legislation and can be easily altered to reflect shifts in political will. This looming legal vacuum – a situation the ECtHR was aware of (§ 26) – raises serious concerns for legal certainty.

A partial step forward

The judgment in T.H. represents a partial but important step in the ongoing development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on legal gender recognition. It reaffirms that requiring sterilisation as a condition for the recognition of one’s gender identity is incompatible with Article 8. It also emphasises the importance of judicial dialogue (§ 59), inviting national constitutional courts to share the responsibility for European human rights protection. However, the Court’s reasoning remains narrowly framed. By misgendering the applicant, reframing the case within a binary framework, and declining to engage with the potential implications under Articles 3 and 14, the Court missed an opportunity to address what the case was really about.

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Interesting Article: From Dialogue to Discord (Lena Kaiser on Verfassungsblog) [CJEU Commission v. Hungary]

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Interesting Article: From Dialogue to Discord (Lena Kaiser on Verfassungsblog) [CJEU Commission v. Hungary]

“For the for foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the Court should find that […], Hungary has infringed Article 2 TEU.’ ‘This negation of values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is the impalpable ‘something more’, which prompted the Commission to introduce the sixth plea.”

With these strong words, Advocate General Ćapeta concluded the first part of her Opinion regarding a violation of Article 2 TEU, which lies at the heart of the pending case before the CJEU – a case that bears, quite appropriately, the name “Valeurs de l’Union”. Although this assessment may have been expected – especially since AG Ćapeta is known as an Advocate General who interprets European law in a particularly progressive and dynamic manner – her words are likely to cause a stir. Even though this is not the final judgment, it is unprecedented for Article 2 TEU to be declared justiciable and found to have been infringed.

The upcoming judgment of the CJEU in case C-769/22 will be a landmark ruling for several reasons. First, it concerns the question of whether Article 2 TEU can serve – in the words of AG Ćapeta – as a self-standing ground for an infringement action (para. 32). This aspect touches upon the widely discussed issue of justiciability in European scholarship. Second, the case is about developing standards for identifying values of Article 2 TEU. Both involve fundamental questions, as Article 2 TEU deals with nothing less than the foundational principles of the European Union itself.

This centrality of Article 2 TEU – which was already present during the oral hearing in November – is also reflected in Ćapeta’s approach. Notably, her Opinion opens with the examination of Article 2 TEU, while the Commission deliberately listed Article 2 TEU as the final plea in law – precisely to emphasize that Hungary’s violation of Article 2 TEU constitutes the crowning element of the case. The Commission repeatedly emphasized that the internal market provisions triggered the scope of the Charter, and that these systematic and serious infringements then contained a “something more” which led to a violation of Article 2 TEU. This is not a matter of legal hairsplitting. It matters how arguments are constructed and in what order they are presented.

After offering a substantive overview of Ćapeta’s Opinion regarding Article 2 TEU, this contribution will focus on two notable features of her reasoning: First, the use of the term “good society”, which introduces a concerning ethical dimension. Second, the criterion Ćapeta introduced for establishing a violation of Article 2 TEU – namely, the “negation of values”, which is insufficient and merely shifts the problem of developing concrete standards rather than solving it.

A Closer Look on Ćapeta’s Argument on Article 2 TEU

Because Ćapeta relies, inter alia, on significant Charter violations for finding an infringement of Article 2 TEU, she starts her analysis by examining fundamental rights (paras 45 ff.). She finds violations of Article 21, Article 11, Article 7, and Article 1.

In addition, she particularly advocates for the Court’s first-ever recognition of a violation of Article 2 TEU as a self-standing ground (paras. 142). Ćapeta rightly limits herself to the relevant question here – namely, whether Article 2 TEU can be applied as a self-standing ground for action within the scope of Union law – and leaves the broader debate over its autonomous application for a future case (para. 144).

Her Opinion on Art. 2 TEU is divided into two parts: First, she examines the much-debated question of the justiciability of Article 2 TEU (paras. 150 ff.). Specifically, this concerns whether Article 2 TEU can function as a self-standing ground to assess legality within infringement proceedings – rather than merely serve, as often in the past, to interpret or further define legal provisions. The subsequent question is under what circumstances Article 2 TEU may be infringed, with a focus on the development of applicable criteria (paras. 235). While the Member States unanimously supported the general justiciability of Article 2 TEU during the oral hearing – differing only as to whether Article 2 TEU can be applied on its own or concretized by other provisions – their submissions displayed a remarkable diversity of approaches regarding which criteria should be used to establish a violation of Article 2 TEU. In this respect, the Member States found themselves “united in diversity”.

In her discussion of justiciability, Ćapeta begins with a textbook-like explanation of Article 2 TEU’s function as the constitutional identity of the Union’s legal order. Moreover, she points out that Article 2 TEU is a legally binding provision, whose observance – according to Article 49 TEU – is a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Furthermore, in Repubblika, the CJEU established the principle of non-regression, according to which Member States – precisely because of their decision by choice to join a society and a Union based on Article 2 TEU – are obliged to maintain at least the level of protection of these values as existed at the time of accession (paras. 181 ff.). Ćapeta correctly argues that this principle of non-regression is not limited to the value of the rule of law but rather constitutes a value-based prohibition of regression, which applies equally to the values at issue here, such as human rights and equality (para. 183). After addressing arguments often misleadingly abbreviated in the literature – such as the claim that Article 7 TEU precludes justiciability (para. 196) – Ćapeta also finds, convincingly, that Article 2 TEU is justiciable and can therefore serve as a self-standing ground (para. 233).

Ćapeta then poses the central question, which lies at the heart of the case: Which standards and criteria indicate a violation of Article 2 TEU? She sharpens this issue by asking how it is to be assessed whether a Member State has crossed the “red lines” (para. 234). Precisely because Article 2 TEU allows for constitutional pluralism, the boundaries of what has been agreed upon must be clear to the Member States. Ćapeta approaches this question abstractly first (para. 237): while rejecting criteria such as the number or severity of violations, she considers that the key criterion for finding a breach of Article 2 TEU is a “negation of values”. The number of infringements may, but does not necessarily have to, indicate a violation of Article 2 TEU (para. 248). She argues that violations of, for example, Union fundamental rights can still reflect constitutional dialogue, where values and their interpretation are negotiated. In her view, only a “negation of values” — not interpretative differences, even if they entail legal breaches — constitutes a violation of Article 2 TEU (para. 253).

Ćapeta ultimately concludes that, in the case at hand, there is no longer any legitimate constitutional dialogue, but rather a degree of discord so severe that it amounts to a “negation of values” (para. 255). The denial of equality for LGBTI persons, which forms the basis of all the breaches, is not something over which legitimate debate within constitutional dialogue can persist; instead, it amounts to a violation of Article 2 TEU – specifically with respect to human rights, human dignity, and equality (para. 273).

The Ethical Dimension in a “good society”

What stands out is Ćapeta’s reference to the idea of a “good society” (paras. 157, 177), whose vision is expressed in Art. 2 TEU, and which she invokes in the context of the Union’s constitutional identity. Obviously, this assessment contains an ethical dimension, which inevitably raises the question of what “good” actually means. The reason we find such an approach in Ćapeta’s Opinion lies in the specific nature of the case: this one does not focus on the rule of law – a value supported by extensive case law. Rather, the case concerns LGBTQI rights and the stigmatization of a minority, a context which (1) involves values that have not previously been central in the Court’s jurisprudence, and (2) touches a domain in which the Hungarian government itself has justified its actions as promoting the “good life”.

The narrative then also explains Ćapeta’s adoption of the term “good society”. By describing society as “good” – in reference to the European Society set out in Article 2 (2) TEU – she deliberately engages with this theme and offers a counter-narrative to the model promoted by the Hungarian government.

This ethical dimension is problematic for at least two reasons: Firstly, the use of the term “good” plays into the hands of those who consider Article 2 TEU to be non-justiciable due to its vagueness and abstractness, and who accuse the CJEU of using its case law to enforce a “European way of life” and of abusing Article 2 TEU as a homogeneity clause. The justiciability and legal force of the values in Article 2 TEU have long been controversial, not least because the term “values” could be understood as implying a primarily moral or ethical content. Even though the CJEU’s judgment on the rule of law conditionality has now confirmed at the highest level that Article 2 TEU is legally binding, the use of the word “good” risks reigniting old controversies.

Secondly, the assessment of what is “good” is inherently selective and unpredictable. While a case-by-case approach to Article 2 TEU helps avoid overly specific standards and maintains its character as a result-oriented norm, the reference to the term “good” further increases this selectivity.

Constitutional Dialogue versus Negation of Values

Equally striking are the distinct terms “negation of values” and “constitutional dialogue”, which Ćapeta employs in developing criteria for Article 2 TEU violations and distinguishes from one another.

She rightly observes that values are negotiated within a constitutional dialogue (para. 203) and that Article 2 TEU allows for different interpretations. This is also reflected in the case law of the CJEU, which considers Article 2 TEU as imposing only obligations of result. Although the Court has, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, necessarily given Article 2 TEU more substance this pluralism is also evident, for example, in the principle of non-regression, which does not establish concrete requirements for the Member States but, with its particular temporal reference point and reliance on each national legal order, has a pluralism-preserving effect.

Nonetheless, her choice of criteria is problematic: For her, the “negation of values” is the only relevant criterion, distinct from legitimate constitutional dialogue – a dialogue that may involve legal breaches, but, in the absence of negation, does not amount to a violation of Article 2 TEU. While the latter point is convincing, Ćapeta’s approach merely shifts the problem: the term “negation” is somehow interchangeable with “violation” and does not provide any further requirements or a set of criteria that would indicate such negation. According to Ćapeta, a considerable number of violations may indicate a negation of values, but do not necessarily do so. Likewise, serious violations are not, in and of themselves, sufficient indicators (para. 241).

The case for “systemic deficits”

The question is: Are we expecting too much? Certainly, the Court is under a great deal of pressure. Admittedly, this question represents both a significant, but also a minimal step forward. The underlying necessity stems from the principles of legal clarity and certainty: when a law is enacted, a standard is required to determine whether and when it has been infringed. This is a legitimate expectation that the Member States are entitled to have.

But this expectation may be better met with other criteria. Particularly, the conceptual notion of “systemic deficit” may offer an effective framework for identifying a ”negation of values”, and thus a violation of Article 2 TEU. What makes this concept appealing is its multi-layered nature, allowing for examination across various dimensions. While Ćapeta rightly notes that multiple infringements alone do not necessarily establish a breach of Article 2 TEU, the concept of systemic deficit provides various elements – such as the number and intent of violations, as well as a temporal and qualitative dimension that may be determined by reference to the essence of the values – to ensure legal certainty. Generally, no single criterion is sufficient to establish a violation of Article 2 TEU; rather, such a finding should be based on a holistic assessment and contextualization.

The notion of a systemic deficit can be understood as a mesh of interrelated elements: the more intense and intentional the infringements, and the more the violated legal norms can be seen as expressions of the essence of the values, the more likely it is that there is a negation of values. Under such circumstances, the space for legitimate constitutional dialogue – formed through the Union’s foundational and continued consensus in Art. 2 TEU, which itself is the product of deliberate choice – shifts into discord. This act of choice is also reflected in the accession of each new Member State under Article 49 TEU, which justifies not only the conditions required for the functioning of the Union’s legal order, but also the establishment of the principle of non-regression (para. 177). Ćapeta effectively recalls this choice and the Member States’ voluntary decision to join the Union (para. 155).

In any case, the suspense remains as to which arguments the CJEU will draw upon for its decision in full court.

The post From Dialogue to Discord appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Interesting Article: Repost of “Somewhere Over The Rainbow” (Konstantinos Lamprinoudis on Verfassungsblog) [CJEU Commission v. Hungary]

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Interesting Article: Repost of “Somewhere Over The Rainbow” (Konstantinos Lamprinoudis on Verfassungsblog) [CJEU Commission v. Hungary]

In the original version of the world-renowned musical film “The Wizard of Oz”, the young protagonist Dorothy sings of her wish to escape her currently troubled world and flee to a better place “somewhere over the rainbow”. A similar vision of an ideal “rainbow land” – where all people can enjoy their rights without risk of discrimination – informs the European Commission’s aspiration to make the European Union a safe and inclusive space for sexual and gender minorities (“LGBTIQ”). It is thus no wonder that the Commission launched an infringement procedure against the Hungarian Law LXXIX of 2021 which restricts access of minors to content which “promotes or portrays divergence from self-identity corresponding to the sex assigned at birth, sex change or homosexuality” (known as the “child protection” or “anti-LGBTIQ” law). The procedure culminated to a landmark dispute before the EU Court of Justice in Commission v. Hungary, with the Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta delivered on 5 June 2025.

What is striking, at least at first sight, is the way in which this case has been framed: despite the blatantly discriminatory nature of Hungary’s legislation, the Commission’s arguments revolve around the violation of several internal market provisions relating to the free movement of services along with certain fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter as well as the values of Article 2 TEU. In my view, however, Commission v. Hungary constitutes a discrimination case in disguise, as Ćapeta’s Opinion confirms. I argue that non-discrimination considerations have been purposively “camouflaged” in the present dispute in order to effectively safeguard the rights of sexual and gender minorities under EU law, given the limited scope of LGBTIQ protection in EU non-discrimination and equality law.

Accordingly, my analysis here offers an EU equality law perspective on the case, leaving aside other important issues raised that have already attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, most prominently the Commission’s unprecedented use of Article 2 TEU as a standalone plea (see e.g. Kaiser, Spieker, Kaiser, Okunrobo, Bonelli and Claes, Riedl, and Rossi).

The limited scope of LGBTIQ protection under EU non-discrimination and equality law

Discrimination cases at EU level are traditionally adjudicated on the basis of EU non-discrimination and equality law. This comprises a set of Directives (the so-called “Equality Directives”) as well as Articles 20 and 21(1) of the Charter, and is notoriously founded on a hierarchy of discrimination grounds, in the sense that certain personal traits (racial/ethnic origin and sex) enjoy a higher level of protection than others (disability, age, sexual orientation and religion) (see Howard). Accordingly, when it comes to discrimination against members of the LGBTIQ community, the protection granted by EU law falls under different legal frameworks and thus varies depending on whether the discriminatory treatment is based on sexual orientation or sex.

More specifically, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (i.e. against gay, lesbian or bisexual persons) applies only in the field of employment and occupation pursuant to Directive 2000/78/EC. This is why all cases of discriminatory treatment of homosexuals adjudicated by the CJEU so far concerned solely employment matters (see Maruko, Römer, Hay, NH, Asociaţia Accept), including self-employed activities (see TP). In 2008, the Commission proposed a horizontal Directive which would extend the protection against discrimination irrespective of sexual orientation beyond the labour market. However, the proposal has not reached unanimity in the Council as required by Article 19 TFEU and remains blocked since then (see European Parliament), facing now the risk of being withdrawn due to lack of “foreseeable agreement” between the Member States (see Annex IV of 2025 Commission’s work programme).

As regards the protection of individuals against discrimination on the basis of their gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics (e.g. trans, non-binary, intersex individuals, etc.), the relevant point of reference is EU gender equality legislation. Following the Court’s ruling in P v. S (further confirmed in KB, Richards and MB), discrimination against trans persons arising from their gender reassignment has been recognised as a form of sex discrimination, with that case law being now codified in recital 3 of Directive 2006/54/EC and recital 5 of Directive (EU) 2024/1500. Hence, people who have undergone gender reassignment can benefit from equal treatment not only in the workplace (Directive 2006/54/EC and Directive 2010/41/EU), but also in a wide range of areas encompassing access to and supply of goods and services (Directive 2004/113/EC) as well as social security (Directive 79/7/EEC). However, as noted by Marcia, the protection against discrimination in this regard seems to be based on a “medicalised understanding” of gender identity, concerning only those individuals who have undergone surgical treatment. As such, the existing anti-discrimination protection excludes a significant percentage of the trans population as well as other gender minorities (e.g. intersex people). However, the CJEU’s recent judgment in Mousse suggests that sex discrimination may also extend to trans individuals who have not undergone a physical change of gender (see Opinion of AG Ćapeta in Commission v. Hungary, para. 62). In any case, although gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics feature explicitly among the list of traits defining “victims” of sex discrimination under Directive (EU) 2024/1500, it is still unclear whether all the persons affected are covered by the existing legal framework absent any case law on the matter (see European Parliamentary Research Service 2025).

As for Article 21(1) of the Charter enshrining the prohibition of discrimination on any ground including sex and sexual orientation (but not explicitly gender identity or characteristics), it also has a limited scope despite its seemingly open-ended wording, applying solely to the actions of EU institutions and those of the Member States when they are implementing EU law, by virtue of Article 51(1) of the Charter. In fact, the only time Article 21(1) has been mentioned to date in litigation involving discrimination against LGBTIQ minorities was in Léger concerning the implementation of Directive 2004/33/EC. In this case, the CJEU concluded that a French law which entailed a permanent contraindication to blood donation for homosexual men discriminated against them on the grounds of their sexual orientation, subject to justification under Article 52(1) of the Charter.

The threefold guise of non-discrimination considerations

These limits of EU non-discrimination and equality law may explain why the far-reaching discriminatory effects of Hungarian legislation for the LGBTIQ community could not have been fully captured on that legal basis, thereby “forcing” the Commission to opt for a different path. Be that as it may, non-discrimination considerations are abundantly present in Commission v. Hungary, albeit under a threefold guise that corresponds to the three-level structure of the Commission’s argumentation, namely the breach of (1) internal market legislation, (2) Charter-based rights, and (3) the values of Article 2 TEU.

Internal market legislation

Pursuant to the so-called “horizontal equality clause” of Article 10 TFEU, combatting discrimination based, among others, on sex or sexual orientation is relevant to all policy areas of EU law, even in those not necessarily associated with equality and even where no specific equal treatment provisions exist, thereby diversifying the forms of equality promotion within the EU (see Timmer and Muir, Davio and van der Meulen). Against this background, it is unsurprising that the CJEU increasingly relies on economic instruments to achieve equality objectives in favour of LGBTIQ individuals, as observed by Baillet. This trend is particularly evident in the field of data protection and free movement law, where persons belonging to sexual or gender minorities were granted protection by reference to the GDPR (see Mousse and Deldits), or by relying on Articles 20 and 21 TFEU and the Citizenship Directive (see Coman, Pancharevo and Mirin), respectively.

In the case of Commission v. Hungary, among the various internal market provisions relied on by the Commission, the only one expressly granting protection to LGBTIQ persons against discrimination is Article 9(1)(c)(ii) of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (see Baillet). Nevertheless, all the rules of primary and secondary law relating to free movement of services (i.e. those contained in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the e-Commerce Directive, the Services Directive and Article 56 TFEU) that Hungary violated according to the Commission sufficed to bring the case within the ambit of EU law, thus triggering the applicability of the Charter as per its Article 51(1). In this regard, AG Ćapeta recalled that any derogations from the freedom to provide services must respect fundamental rights (para. 284 with reference to the line of case law following ERT) and concluded that the Hungarian legislation contravenes multiple EU law provisions on free movement of services in an unjustified manner (paras. 277-340).

Charter-based rights

Apart from the above internal market instruments, the Commission claimed that the Hungarian rules violate the fundamental rights to human dignity (Article 1), private life (Article 7), freedom of expression (Article 11) and non-discrimination (Article 21) of the Charter. Whereas the invocation of the latter right is unsurprising, being the only one explicitly related to equality considerations, the reference to the other rights is perhaps striking. Yet, these rights have been also deployed by the CJEU in the past to grant protection to LGBTIQ persons: for instance, the Court linked the recognition of sex discrimination on the basis of transgender identity to the respect of dignity in P v. S even before the adoption of the Charter; it further recognised free movement rights of rainbow-families on the basis of Article 7 Charter in Coman and Pancharevo. Similarly, the Court ruled in NH that discriminatory statements about homosexuals in matters of employment are not covered by the employer’s freedom of expression under Article 11. The CJEU’s approach in these cases explicitly draws on the rich case law of the ECtHR which has predominantly relied on the rights to private life and freedom of expression under Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, respectively, taken separately or in combination with Article 14 ECHR on non-discrimination to ensure effective protection of LGBTIQ individuals.

In her Opinion in Commission v. Hungary, AG Ćapeta fully sided with the Commission’s position about all the alleged fundamental rights infringements. Starting with Article 21 of the Charter as the guiding provision of her argumentation, she observed that, by creating a difference in treatment between heterosexual and cisgender persons in comparison to LGBTIQ persons, the Hungarian provisions are clearly based on the prohibited criteria of sex and sexual orientation and, as such, are directly discriminatory (paras. 67-69).

Most importantly, the AG emphasised the stigmatising effects for the members of LGBTIQ minorities that result from Hungary’s legislation, undermining the very nature of the principle of equality. She noted that these effects are further aggravated due to the merging of the rules in question with those concerning the protection of children from paedophilia (paras. 73-81).

In a similar vein, by interpreting Articles 7 and 11 of the Charter in light of their ECHR counterparts, AG Ćapeta found that the contested rules interfere with the freedom of expression and information (paras. 84-93), while also severely affecting the private lives of LGBTIQ individuals through the creation of a hostile climate towards them in Hungary (paras. 94-102). Accordingly, the AG concluded that the fundamental rights restrictions in question cannot be justified pursuant to Article 52(1) of the Charter (paras. 103-133), thus giving rise to a violation of human dignity under Article 1 thereof (paras. 134-141).

Interestingly, AG Ćapeta’s analysis expressly underlines the harmful effects of the Hungarian provisions not only for the LGBTIQ community itself but also for the general public. In line with the doctrine of discrimination by association (see e.g. CHEZ), she argued that the prohibition on the provision of or access to LGBTIQ content affects natural and legal persons in general (e.g. any service provider or service recipient), regardless of the victims’ belonging to sexual or gender minorities (paras. 66 and 72). This confirms that, contrary to the ECtHR’s findings on Article 14 ECHR in the similar case of Macatė v. Lithuania (see para. 221 and dissenting opinion), Article 21(1) of the Charter captures discriminatory restrictions on pro-LGBTIQ content as such.

Similarly, in the AG’s view, the interference of the contested rules with the freedom of expression concerns anyone wishing to impart or receive pro-LGBTIQ information (paras. 88-89) and results in breaching the dignity of anyone who is prevented from treating LGBTIQ persons equally with the rest of society due to the prohibition at issue (para. 138). By highlighting these broader societal implications of the Hungarian legislation, AG Ćapeta clarified that such serious and systemic discrimination against certain minority groups in a given Member State amounts to an overall deviation from the EU’s constitutional model of society as expressed in Article 2 TEU (paras. 155-157 and 265), thus linking the fundamental rights infringements at issue with the breach of EU values discussed subsequently in her Opinion.

Article 2 TEU values

Turning to Article 2 TEU, the question whether it can be used as a self-standing ground of infringement of EU law goes beyond the scope of my present analysis. What is worth noting, though, is that Commission v. Hungary constitutes the very first discrimination dispute relying on the Treaty provision on EU values. This is all the more remarkable given that the level of protection granted to LGBTIQ rights largely differs among Member States, thus raising the question whether the prohibition of discrimination against sexual and gender minorities can be plausibly considered a “common” EU value at all (see Bonelli and Claes).

Although AG Ćapeta acknowledged the sensitive and contested nature of LGBTIQ equality for some European societies (paras. 83, 259, 263-264), she emphatically argued that disrespect and marginalisation of an entire societal group are “the ‘red lines’ imposed by the values of equality, human dignity and respect for human rights” (para. 262). In her view, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex or sexual orientation constitutes a choice that is “firmly rooted in the EU constitutional framework”, as expressed in Articles 21 of the Charter and 19 TFEU. Thus, the question is not “if” equality on those grounds should be guaranteed, but rather “how” – with its implementation potentially varying among different Member States (paras. 82 and 263). Consequently, by reflecting the idea that members of the LGBTI community are “an unwanted part of society”, the Hungarian legislation at issue results in “negating” the values of Articles 2 TEU, as specified by the fundamental rights of Articles 1, 7, 11 and 21 of the Charter which she deemed violated (paras. 265-271).

Never before had a violation of the Charter’s right to non-discrimination been found to contravene the values of equality, tolerance and human dignity set out in Article 2 TEU (para. 268). This development seems to build upon the CJEU’s obiter dictum in Hungary v. Parliament and Council (paras. 157-158) stating that the scope of the values of equality and non-discrimination is defined by Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter as well as by Articles 10 and 19(1) TFEU. Moreover, it is well-established case law that the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter constitutes a general principle, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression (see e.g. Glatzel, para. 43). Taken together, one may conclude that the AG’s findings in Commission v. Hungary mark the apex of the constitutionalisation of equality and non-discrimination within the EU legal order – they are now clearly utilised not only as general principles, but also as judicially enforceable values.

Conclusion

As now fully endorsed by AG Ćapeta, the “disguised” discrimination case against Hungary seeks to protect LGBTIQ people through the back door, bypassing ingeniously the restrictive scope of the EU Equality Directives. Should the CJEU uphold this approach, the same tools could be also deployed to tackle other forms of blatant and generalised State actions against the LGBTIQ community, such as Hungary’s recent legislative ban on Pride parades. As such, Commission v. Hungary constitutes yet another notable example of the recent judicial trend observed above: EU non-discrimination and equality law appears to progressively concede its role in upholding LGBTIQ rights to alternative legal instruments. This confirms that the currently existing EU rules against discrimination have reached their limit, failing to provide sufficient protection to sexual and gender minorities. Thankfully, though, different tools available under EU law prove to be an effective substitute to achieve the envisaged level of LGBTIQ equality. Under these circumstances, absent a comprehensive equality framework at EU level, the “rainbow-coloured” utopia promised by the Commission is to be inevitably sought somewhere else… over non-discrimination law.

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Tunisia intensifies crackdown on LGBTI individuals: Amnesty International

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Tunisia intensifies crackdown on LGBTI individuals: Amnesty International

Amnesty International denounced Tunisian authorities’ increased arrests of LGBTI individuals on Thursday. The organization reported that at least 84 individuals, mostly gay men and transgender women, have been arrested since September 2024.

The wave of arrests began after a homophobic and transphobic online campaign gained traction. Many individuals involved in the campaign were supporters of Tunisian President Kais Said. President Said has historically supported the criminalization of homosexuality.

The majority of arrests were based on Article 230 of Tunisia’s Penal Code, which criminalizes “sodomy and lesbianism.” Additionally, Article 226 of the Penal Code prohibits acts that are “against good morals or public morality.” Tunisian authorities have deemed displays of non-conforming gender identity to fall under these provisions.

Arrestees have been subjected to mistreatment while in custody. Men accused of participating in same-sex relations must undergo anal examinations to test for evidence of penetration. Amnesty International considers these forced examinations to be a form of torture. According to the UN Convention Against Torture, “torture” means any official act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information from him or for a reason based on discrimination.

Amnesty International reported that LGBTI activists have also been subject to arrest in Tunisia. Mira Ben Salah, who is a part of the LGBTI activist group Damj Association for Justice and Equality, stated that she has been repeatedly harassed by authorities due to her work. Ben Salah has filed complaints with the Public Prosecutor at the country’s Court of First Instance but told Amnesty International that the investigation has not progressed.

Amnesty International has consistently monitored the human rights situation in Tunisia. The organization’s Secretary General reported an alarming rollback of human rights protections after a visit to Tunisia in July 2024. Amnesty International now calls for Tunisian authorities to immediately release arrested LGBTI individuals.

Even though there are no international conventions with a view to eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, the UN considers Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the source of state obligations to respect the human rights of LGBTI persons.

Relatedly in January 2024, Human Rights Watch called on Meta to protect LGBTQ+ people by preventing Middle Eastern countries’ security forces, including Tunisia, from using their data to prosecute sexual minorities.

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UN rights office denounces ‘horrendous’ attack on Tanzania transgender activist

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UN rights office denounces ‘horrendous’ attack on Tanzania transgender activist

The United Nations Human Rights Office condemned an attack against transgender woman and activist Mauzinde in Tanzania on Friday, calling it “horrendous.”

Mauzinde, a resident of Rahaleo, was found abandoned in the forest, beaten and with her ears cut. The UN Human Rights office said that she had been “tortured & sexually assaulted by 12 men” and called for “bold action to combat discrimination against #LGBTIQ+ people and other minorities.”

The attack could be a violation of Mauzinde’s rights under international and Tanzanian law. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,” such as sex or other status. Furthermore, Principle 2 of the Yogyakarta Principles stipulates that everyone is entitled to enjoy all human rights without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Principle 5 also emphasizes that everyone “has the right to security of the person and to protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual or group.”

Additionally, according to Article 13 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to protection and equality before the law.”

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